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ABSTRACT 
A key trend in laws and policies aimed at combatting terrorism is the increasing use 
of policing strategies that allow law enforcement officers anticipate risk so that they 
can engage in preventing, interrupting and prosecuting those suspected of terrorism 
offences before their commission. One such pre-emptive policing strategy is the use 
of terrorist profiling. The rationale underpinning terrorist profiling is to allow law 
enforcement officers identify those likely to involved in terrorism or its associated 
activities so that law enforcement officers can prevent, interrupt and prosecute 
suspects before an act of terrorism. The use of terrorist profiling is highly 
controversial given that its use has been perceived as being unlawful. Previous 
attempts to analyse terrorist profiling has tended to rely solely on human rights law as 
the analytical lens to evaluate the usefulness and lawfulness of terrorist profiling. 
The discussion in this thesis argues that the effectiveness and usefulness of terrorist 
profiling should only be undertaken by deconstructing the profiling process so as to 
allow a thorough examination of the phenomenon of terrorist profiling. As a result, 
the discussion in this thesis establishes two analytical lenses as the basis to 
systematically examine terrorist profiling. Firstly, the discussion develops an 
effectiveness framework that examines the construction of terrorist profiles separately 
from the application of terrorist profiles. Secondly, the discussion also draws upon 
criminal profiling methodologies and approaches as the basis to evaluate different 
manifestations of terrorist profiling. These analytical lenses are used to conduct a 
taxonomy on different manifestations of terrorist profiling so as to systematically 
evaluate their usefulness as a law enforcement tool to predict likely terrorist 
characteristics. 
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 1 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research Background and Context 
This thesis examines whether law enforcement officers are able to rely on profiling methods or 
approaches as a pre-emptive means to assist them in the detection, prevention and deterrence of 
terrorism and/or its preparatory activities by assisting them to identify those engaged or likely 
to be involved in acts of terrorism.  Although the phenomenon of terrorist profiling has been 
examined previously, this thesis poses a number of new questions about terrorist profiling 
(outlined later in the chapter) in order to analyse its usefulness as a law enforcement tool to 
assist in managing the risks arising from the enduring war on terror. 
The politics at the international level over the past decade and beyond has been primarily 
focused on creating laws and policies to ensure the protection of citizens and institutions of 
democracies against those countries, groups and individuals wishing to use violence as a means 
to demonstrate their objection and hostility towards the norms of democracy, liberty and 
freedom.1   
Enders and Sandler identify “that states have a positive duty towards ensuring the safety of its 
national culture, identity and democracy from the arbitrary interference of terrorism.”2   This 
duty can be identified as being composed of at least two strands.  Firstly, the duty to protect 
against threats of terrorism and secondly the duty to uphold fundamental human rights and 
freedoms.   In isolation, these state duties are not contentious, but the means adopted by 
                                                             
1 M. Eilliott, ‘The “war on terror”, UK Style: the detention and deportation of suspected terrorists’ (2010) 8(1) 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 131, 131. 
2 W. Enders and T. Sandler, ‘The Effectiveness of Anti-Terrorism Policies: A Vector-Autoregression-Intervention 
Analysis’ (1993) 87(4) American Political Science Review 829, 830. 
 2 
governments to discharge these duties often create controversy.  Specifically, law and policies 
aimed at managing the threat of terrorism regularly come into direct conflict with the duty to 
protect and uphold fundamental human rights and freedoms.   
The issues raised here generally involve focussing on the question to what extent it can be 
considered legitimate for a state to interfere with fundamental rights and freedoms so as to 
protect against the threat of terrorism?  This often creates a conundrum for governments as to 
how to balance their duty to protect against the threat of terrorism versus their duty to uphold 
fundament rights and freedoms. 
Over the course of the past few decades, various governments have sought to conduct this 
balancing exercise by relying on risk management strategies through the creation of 
counterterrorism frameworks.  A recurrent theme in counterterrorism frameworks is that they 
provide law enforcement officers with an array of special police powers aimed at assisting in 
the prevention, detection and prosecution of those engaged in terrorism and/or terrorism 
preparatory activities.   
The justification in favour of the creation of special police powers is due to the serious nature 
of the threat posed by terrorism to human life and the difficulty for law enforcement officers 
using more traditional police powers to detect, deter and prosecute terrorism suspects.  
Counterterrorism frameworks frequently represent “a fusion of national security and criminal 
justice policies in an attempt to move towards pre-emptive strategies of ‘prevention and control’ 
of terrorism threats.”3    
                                                             
3 J. McCulloch and S. Pickering, ‘Pre-crime and counter-terrorism: impacting future crime in the “war on terror”’ 
(2009) 49(5) British Journal of Criminology 628, 629. 
 3 
The counterterrorism “strategies of prevention and control have resulted in a shift towards” a 
reliance on “anticipatory risk” practices in policing policy “which aims to allow law 
enforcement officers to identify, interrupt and prosecute those suspected of terrorism offences 
before their commission.”4  One such policing policy is the use of a profiling method or 
approach that is aimed at assisting law enforcement officers identify those likely to be engaged 
in terrorism or its preparatory activities.  
1.2 Terrorism and Profiling – a definitional problem 
At this stage in the thesis, it is necessary to define profiling in a general sense and further to 
consider the definition of terrorism for the purposes of this thesis. 
Profiling may be considered as being a process that allows the profiler to identify a sequence of 
commonalities from different sets of data so as to predict likely offender characteristics.5 There 
is a lack of consensus in the literature as to the precise definition of profiling which sways 
between a narrow and a broad definitional approach.  For the purposes of this thesis, a broad 
definition of profiling is adopted so as to ensure that a significant array of profiling methods 
and approaches can be included for analysis.  As a result, profiling is defined as being any 
technique or process that that seeks to allow law enforcement officers to identify probable 
offender characteristics.6   
The term profiling has become interchangeable with the terms “offender profiling, criminal 
profiling, criminal personality profiling and psychological profiling” as a label for profiling 
                                                             
4 ibid. 
5 B. Snook, J. Eastwood, P. Gendreau, C. Goggin and R. Cullen, ‘Taking Stock of Criminal Profiling: A Narrative 
Review and Meta-Analysis’ (2007) 34(4) Criminal Science and Behaviour 437, 437-438. 
6 M. Horvath, ‘Offender Profiling’ in S. Tong, R. Bryant and M. Horvath, Understanding Criminal Investigation 
(John Wiley & Sons Publishing, 2009), 69. 
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techniques.7 Many methods use the same structure such as the analysis of crime scene evidence, 
victim reports and/or previous criminal records to identify common offender characteristics.  
The core differences lie in the abilities and the characteristics of the profiler and the use of the 
information by profilers to make predictions on likely offender characteristics.8  For example, 
some profiling methods may rely on forensic evidence to make predictions of likely 
characteristics, whilst other methods may use previous offending records to engage in statistical 
reasoning to identify commonalities to make predictions as to likely offender characteristics. 
Doughlas et al identify that there are commonly three phases of profiling in criminal justice 
including: “firstly, criminal investigation, secondly apprehension and thirdly prosecution”.9   
Consequently, the use of any data by a profiler so as to make predictions about “likely offender 
characteristics can be considered some form of profiling” that may occur during criminal 
investigation, apprehension or prosecution of offenders.10 
The definition of terrorism is similarly problematic as there is no consensus in law or academia 
about its scope.11   The absence of consensus may be attributable to the broad range of views 
and differences of opinion about the use of violence to further objectives.12  Despite this lack of 
an agreed consensus, it is possible to develop a definition of terrorism in two ways.  Firstly, 
there have been various attempts at the international and domestic levels to criminalise acts of 
                                                             
7 J. Douglas, R Ressler, A. Burgess and C. Hartman, ‘Criminal profiling from crime scene analysis’ (1986) 4 
Behavioural Science and Law 401, 405. 
8 P. Gendreau, C. Goggin, E. Cullen and M. Paparozzi, ‘The common sense revolution and correctional policy’ in 
J. Maguire, (ed) Offender rehabilitation and treatment: Effective programmes and policies to reduce reoffending 
(John Wiley & Sons Publishing, 2002), 359-365. 
9 Doughlas et al (n7) 401-405.  See also:  B. Turvey, Criminal Profiling: An introduction to behavioural evidence 
analysis (Academic Press 1999), chp 1. 
10 Doughlas et al (n7) 404.   
11 A. Robertson, Global Issues: Terrorism and Global Security (Infobase Publishing, 2007), 3-4. 
12 A. Schmid, ‘The Definition of Terrorism’ in A. Schmid (ed) The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research  
(Routledge, 2011), 40. 
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violence.  Secondly, it is also possible to draw upon academic literature to support a definition 
of terrorism for the purposes of this thesis. 
Internationally, the United Nations General Assembly has condemned various uses of violence 
as acts of terrorism in the following terms:  
“criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in a general 
public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in 
any circumstances unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, 
philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that 
may be invoked to justify them.”13 
Additionally, terrorism is described in the “International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism” as being  
“[a]ny other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, 
or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation 
of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to 
intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international 
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.”14 
At the domestic level in countries, such as the United Kingdom (UK), there is a statutory 
definition of terrorism that allows us to capture a formal definition of terrorism.  Section 1 of 
Terrorism Act 2000 (TA) provides a broad definition of terrorism as being: 
“(1)In this Act “terrorism” means the use or threat of action where— 
(a)the action falls within subsection (2), 
(b)the use or threat is designed to influence the government [or an 
international governmental organisation] or to intimidate the public or 
a section of the public, and 
                                                             
13 UN General Assembly, Measures to eliminate international terrorism : resolution / adopted by the General 
Assembly, 17 February 1995, A/RES/49/60, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f3171c.html 
[accessed 30 July 2018], para 3. 
14 UN General Assembly, International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 9 
December 1999, No. 38349, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3dda0b867.html [accessed 30 July 
2018], Article 2(b). 
 6 
(c)the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, 
religious [racial] or ideological cause. 
(2) Action falls within this subsection if it— 
(a)involves serious violence against a person, 
(b)involves serious damage to property, 
(c)endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person committing 
the action, 
(d)creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section 
of the public, or 
(e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an 
electronic system. 
(3) The use or threat of action falling within subsection (2) which involves the  
use of firearms or explosives is terrorism whether or not subsection (1)(b) is 
satisfied.”15 
The definition of terrorism has also provoked considerable debate in the literature where a 
survey by Schmid and Jongman across over 100 definitions of terrorism led them to conclude 
that terrorism should be defined as being:   
“…an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by a 
(semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, 
criminal or political reasons, whereby – in contrast to assassination – the 
direct targets of violence are not the main targets.”16  
 
Although the international, domestic and academic discussion of the definition of terrorism 
shows considerable variation in approaches, for the purposes of this thesis it is necessary to 
identify a working definition of the term. It is arguable that two aspects of the definition most 
common across the differing definitions in use can be identified for these purposes.  Firstly, the 
“use of violence or threat of violence” and secondly the motives and objectives of the 
                                                             
15 Terrorism Act 2000, section 1(1) and (2). 
16 A. Schmid and A. Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, 
Theories, and Literatures (Transaction Publishers, 1988), 6. 
 7 
organisers/perpetrators of terrorism.  Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis, terrorism shall 
be defined as being any “use or threat of violence with the purpose of advancing a political, 
religious, racial or [any] cause.”17  It is contended that this definition reflects most of the legal 
and academic definitions that law enforcement officers will employ when performing their 
duties. 
1.3 Thesis Aim 
The primary aim of this thesis is to assess the usefulness of terrorist profiling as a 
counterterrorism tool utilised by law enforcement officers. The primary research question asked 
in this thesis is: to what extent (if at all), and in what ways (if any) terrorist profiling may be 
useful as part of the law enforcement process of identifying individuals engaged in acts of 
terrorism and associated preparatory activities?   
This question is broken down into at least three separate questions.   
§ What is terrorist profiling? 
§ How should the usefulness of terrorist profiling be examined? 
§ Can terrorist profiling ever be considered a useful counterterrorism tool? 
The approach adopted in this thesis to assess the usefulness of terrorist profiling is directed at 
law enforcement officers and is orientated at determining the utility of various manifestations 
of terrorist profiling for law enforcement officers. The assessment of the usefulness of any 
counterterrorism tool can be conducted in a variety of different ways depending on the context 
                                                             
17 Crown Prosecution Service, Guidance in relation to the prosecution of offences relating to Daesh and the 
conflict in Syria, Iraq and Libya (revised December 2016) (Crown Prosecution Service, 2016), para 6. 
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of the analysis being pursued.  For example, the discussion later in the thesis will highlight that 
past approaches examining terrorist profiling tend to navigate between a human rights 
assessment and a utilitarian assessment.  A human rights assessment tends to focus on the 
compatibility of terrorist profiling with fundamental human rights standards.  Alternatively, a 
utilitarian assessment tends to focus on the assistive value of terrorist profiling regardless of the 
compatibility of human rights standards.  This thesis argues that viewing both of these 
assessments as being mutually exclusive fails to conduct a systematic assessment of the theory 
and the practice of terrorist profiling.   
The discussion in this thesis argues that profiling by its very nature exists in a variety of forms 
which means that there is no one model that can be drawn upon to examine the usefulness of 
terrorist profiling.  It is a flexible concept that can apply to almost any method or approach 
aimed at discerning likely offender characteristics.  This means that the usefulness of terrorist 
profiling is best examined by undertaking an examination of its core processes by separating 
the analysis of the “construction” of profiles on the one hand, from their "application", on the 
other, so as to be able to identify and examine profiling’s usefulness as a technique to assist law 
enforcement officers make predictions about likely offender characteristics. This separation of 
the profiling process allows a systematic assessment of the phenomenon of terrorist profiling 
by breaking it down into its constituent parts.   
The examination of the usefulness of terrorist profiling is conducted by examining the likely 
‘effectiveness’ of different manifestations of terrorist profiling.  The framework for analysing 
effectiveness is set out later in this chapter at 1.8.  This effectiveness framework is developed 
to engage in analysing whether terrorist profiling can be considered capable of achieving its aim 
of assisting law enforcement officers identify those likely to be involved in terrorist activities 
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or its preparatory activities.  The argument advanced in this thesis is that if a manifestation of 
terrorist profiling can satisfy the effectiveness framework, then it may be possible to draw a 
conclusion that specific manifestations of terrorist profiling could be considered useful as it is 
likely to deliver on its aim of assisting law enforcement officers identify those engaged in 
terrorism or its preparatory activities. 
However, this measure of usefulness fails to appreciate the human rights concerns that might 
arise from the reliance on terrorist profiling by law enforcement officers.  It is argued in this 
thesis that any assessment of the usefulness of terrorist profiling must engage with a complex 
array of human rights issues that may impact any conclusion drawn on the usefulness of terrorist 
profiling. This thesis does not seek to position the usefulness of terrorist profiling above human 
rights norms.  As a result, the discussion in this thesis proceeds on the basis of firstly engaging 
with the utilitarian assessment of usefulness in chapters three to five as a basis to analyse 
whether terrorist profiling may be capable of delivering the aim of assisting law enforcement 
officers identify those likely to be engaged in terrorism or its preparatory activities.   
After this utilitarian assessment, the discussion then secondly proceeds to consider the complex 
array of human rights issues related to assessing the conclusion drawn on the usefulness of 
terrorist profiling in chapter six.  This assessment is primarily undertaken by considering the 
human rights norms and standards that are most relevant from a law enforcement officer’s 
perspective operating in the field and those affecting the assessment of the utility of the 
manifestations of terrorist profiling examined in chapters three to five. The aim of this human 
rights assessment is to determine whether the conclusions drawn on the usefulness of terrorist 
profiling in chapters three to five are outweighed by the human rights concerns which arise in 
relation to terrorist profiling. 
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The thesis develops a taxonomy of terrorist profiling by examining available evidence on 
different manifestations of terrorist profiling.  In developing this taxonomy, the thesis argues 
that an analysis of terrorist profiling is best conducted where profiling is examined as occurring 
along a spectrum.  At one end of this spectrum a form of profiling exists that is best classified 
as being “formal terrorist” profiling.  Formal terrorist profiling can be defined as the systematic 
and official use of any profiling method or approach by law enforcement officers that is aimed 
at identifying likely terrorist characteristics. There are at least three defining features of formal 
terrorist profiling, firstly an official and systematic process to construct a profile, secondly the 
application of a profile by law enforcement officers and finally the ability to review the 
operation and practice of formal terrorist profiling.  Formal manifestations of profiling may in 
some instances be characterised as being an assistive tool to help law enforcement officers 
identify individuals that are engaged in acts of terrorism or preparatory activities.   
At the opposite end of the spectrum there are other manifestations of terrorist profiling that are 
best classifiable as being “informal” terrorist profiling.  Informal terrorist profiling exhibits at 
least two common characteristics. Firstly, it is common for states to refuse to acknowledge the 
existence of manifestations of informal terrorist profiling as being a form of profiling.  
Secondly, manifestations of informal terrorist profiling do not exhibit the same level of a 
systematic process, approach or structure in direct contrast to those manifestations of formal 
terrorist profiling.  The thesis argues that informal terrorist profiling is unlikely to be a tool 
capable of assisting law enforcement officers to identify suspects likely to be engaged in 
terrorism and/or preparatory activities. 
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1.4 Thesis Outline 
Following this introductory chapter, the discussion begins in chapter two by conducting an 
examination of different profiling methods and approaches that can be adopted in criminal 
profiling.  The objective of this discussion is to establish an analytical lens that draws upon 
general profiling methods and approaches as the basis to critique the likely usefulness of 
manifestations of terrorist profiling examined in subsequent chapters.  This discussion identifies 
that there are two types of profiling, deductive and inductive profiling.  
Deductive profiling is where law enforcement officers use profiling methods to react to crimes 
already committed and deduce offender characteristics by using forensic crime evidence and 
victim reports.  The use of deductive profiling to identify likely offender characteristics is 
supported by offenders exhibiting particular pathologies in their commission of crime. For 
example, pathological crimes such as murder, rape and arson tend to be committed in a 
particular way where the defendant may leave clues about their likely characteristics that may 
assist the profiler to construct an accurate profile. The discussion in chapter two suggests that 
this type of profiling is not suitable in the context terrorism given that terrorist are unlikely to 
exhibit the pathologies necessary to allow the profiler to accurately predict likely offender 
characteristics.  Further, this type of profiling is about trying to apprehend an offender still at 
large but in some instances of contemporary terrorism, the use of suicide bombers means the 
death of the actual bomber.  As a result, a deductive profiling method or approach may not be 
considered capable of assisting law enforcement officer predict likely terrorist characteristics. 
Alternatively inductive profiling is where the law enforcement officer relies on proactive 
profiling methods as a tool to predict likely offender characteristics to prevent future criminality.  
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The discussion in chapter two argues that this type of profiling may be considered as being more 
suitable in the context of terrorism so long as the profiler takes into account at least four issues.  
This includes the changing nature of information on terrorists, the availability of terrorism 
information/data, the accuracy of available data and not all suspects exhibiting the 
characteristics will necessarily be terrorists. 
In light of the deductive/inductive analytical lens, the discussion in chapters three to five 
examine various manifestations of terrorist profiling so as to consider their potential usefulness 
to assist law enforcement officers detect, deter and prosecute those likely to be engaged in 
terrorism and/or preparatory activities. Each of these different manifestations of profiling is 
assessed in terms of its "effectiveness". The approach adopted to measure and evaluate 
"effectiveness" is explained in section 1.8 of this chapter below. 
Chapter three examines manifestations of formal terrorist profiling by focusing on various 
approaches adopted in Germany and the United States (US).  This chapter separately examines 
the construction and application of profiles that draw upon knowledge discovery processes and 
data mining approaches.  Knowledge discovery processes is where a profiler engages in a 
systematic extraction of information from various data sources so as to construct a profile of 
likely offender characteristics.  Data mining is one step within a knowledge discovery process 
that assists the profiler make sense of the data that they have extracted.   
A key theme evident in the discussion in chapter three is that manifestations of formal terrorist 
profiling considered in this chapter tend to adopt a highly systematic and formalised process to 
construct and apply profiles that follows an inductive profiling method/approach.  Specifically, 
the construction of profiles is premised upon a broad range of data and their application in the 
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field is subject to continuous testing so that the accuracy of these profiles can be reviewed and 
as a result they may have the potential to improve through iterative development.   
It is acknowledged that the discussion cannot prove in absolute terms that the examined 
manifestations of formal terrorist profiling may capable of assisting law enforcement officers 
identify those likely to be engaged in acts of terrorism in practice.  Nevertheless, from a 
theoretical perspective the approaches adopted in these manifestations of terrorist profiling 
provide a basis to control the data used in the construction of profiles and to further monitor the 
use of profiles in the field.  As a result, it may be argued that there is a reasonable degree of 
probability that these manifestations of formal terrorist profiling may have the potential to assist 
law enforcement officers in preventing, detecting and deterring acts of terrorism over time.  
However, the discussion in this chapter questions whether the usefulness of this type of terrorist 
profiling is overshadowed by its impact on society as a whole.  Nevertheless, it is argued that 
although manifestations of formal terrorist profiling are problematic, they are more capable of 
being controlled given their open and transparent nature. 
Chapter four examines behavioural terrorist profiling as a further manifestation of terrorist 
profiling.  This chapter argues that behavioural terrorist profiling cannot accurately be classified 
as being an example of formal terrorist profiling in comparable terms with those manifestations 
of formal terrorist profiling examined in chapter three.  This is due to the fact that the 
manifestation of behavioural terrorist profiling examined in this chapter did not appear to 
exhibit the same level of a systematic process in the construction/application of profiles.  
However, the manifestation of behavioural terrorist profiling considered in this chapter tends to 
exhibit more of a formalised process that partially relied on inductive profiling 
methods/approaches in contrast to manifestations of informal terrorist profiling examined in 
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chapter five.  Consequently, the discussion in chapter four argues that the manifestation of 
behavioural terrorist profiling examined is on the profiling spectrum between formal and 
informal terrorist profiling. 
Chapter five examines manifestations of profiling which may be classifiable as being closer 
towards manifestations of informal terrorist profiling on the profiling spectrum.  In order to 
examine manifestations of informal terrorist profiling, the discussion in this chapter assesses 
the exercise of police powers so as to demonstrate to quite a high degree of probability that 
some uses of police powers may be classifiable as an example of informal terrorist profiling.  
These police powers include police initiated stop and searches, the use of powers of arrest and 
the power to engage in identity checking and the raiding of premises.  This classification rests 
on two core arguments.  Firstly, the exercise of these powers are not officially recognised as 
being a form of profiling.  Secondly, they do not appear to exhibit a comparable systematic 
process, approach or structure in the construction and application of profiles as those 
manifestations of formal terrorist profiling examined in chapter three.  The selection of countries 
in this chapter may appear unusual from a methodological perspective but the evidence 
presented in this chapter is entirely based on available evidence. 
The assessment of stop and search powers begins by examining the structure of this power 
established in various statutes so as to discern the types of data and the treatment of this data 
that can be drawn upon in the construction of profiles.  The discussion of the application of the 
various stop and search powers in practice argues that there is a strong likelihood that these 
powers may be considered as showing the hallmarks of a profiling process that is far short of 
the processes evidence in manifestations of formal profiling examined in chapter three.   
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The discussion also considers qualitative studies on people’s experiences of other uses of police 
powers including the use of targeted identity checking, the use of arrest powers and the targeted 
raiding of premises in France and Germany.  This discussion argues that these studies further 
support the contention that some uses police powers may be considered as resembling a 
hallmark of informal profiling.  Although, these qualitative studies may expose potential abuses 
of police powers, they combine to show a strong possibility that law enforcement officers in 
some instances may be using these powers in an almost crude way to profile those suspected of 
being involved in terrorism. 
The discussion in chapter five ultimately concludes that the use of these manifestations of 
informal terrorist profiling poses three grave concerns that questions the usefulness of this form 
of profiling.  This includes the lack of an acknowledgment that these powers may in some 
instances be considered as being a form of profiling, which seriously impacts the reviewability 
of profiling   Additionally, the apparent absence of a process to construct profiles possess 
significant risks to the accuracy of the profile by being able to minimise the limitations of 
deductive and inductive profiling methods that is discussed in chapter two.  Finally, the apparent 
application of these police powers on specific ethnicities raises serious concerns related to the 
lawfulness of each application of these powers.  As a result, the discussion in this chapter 
concludes these manifestations of informal terrorist profiling are unlikely to assist any law 
enforcement officer prevent, detect or deter acts of terrorism by assisting in the identification of 
likely terrorist characteristics. 
Chapter six examines the human rights concerns arising from the discussion on the usefulness 
of terrorist profiling in chapters three to five.  In this chapter, it is argued that there are two 
unresolved issues arising from the assessment of the usefulness of terrorist profiling that may 
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have an impact on the conclusions drawn on usefulness. Firstly, whether it can ever be justified 
to include such sensitive characteristics in terrorist profiling and secondly, if so, in what 
circumstances can sensitive characteristics be justified in the construction and application of 
terrorist profiles.  The argument advanced in this chapter is that there is no singular answer to 
either of these questions from the perspective of law enforcement officers but rather there are 
at least two sets of arguments that need to be taken into account in assessing the justification of 
including sensitive characteristics in the profiling process.  It is contended that an examination 
of human rights norms is necessary at this juncture in the thesis so as to question whether any 
of the conclusions drawn on the usefulness of terrorist profiling in chapters three to five are 
outweighed by the human rights concerns.  
There are positive arguments which involve focusing on the lawfulness of including sensitive 
characteristics in the terrorist profiling process. Alternatively, there are normative arguments 
which involve assessing the justification question by assessing whether the inclusion of 
sensitive characteristics is something that the state ought to be avoided in light of danger that 
particular individuals or groups of individuals may become the target of law enforcement 
scrutiny.  The discussion in this chapter concentrates on identifying, explaining and evaluating 
the positive arguments concerning the justification question. The normative arguments are 
considered individually in chapters three to five when the discussion turns to assessing the 
impact of terrorist profiling which is explained further below. 
In addressing the first question, the discussion in chapter six argues that there appears to be a 
basis to argue that formal manifestations of terrorist profiling can be considered justified for 
two reasons.  Firstly, the systematic nature of manifestations of formal terrorist profiling means 
that it is possible to review, alter and adapt profiling so that the risk is of relying solely on 
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sensitive characteristics is minimised. Secondly, the sensitive characteristics are included with 
non-sensitive characteristics to reduce the risk of sensitive characteristics becoming the main or 
sole criteria to identify individuals for enhanced levels of review by law enforcement officers. 
The discussion in chapter six also argues that those manifestations of informal terrorist profiling 
can never be justified on the grounds that these profiling processes are not subject to review and 
lack transparency in assessing their usefulness. Additionally, manifestations of informal 
terrorist profiling carry a risk that particular individuals exhibiting the sensitive characteristics 
become the concentration for law enforcement officers in the detection, prevention and 
prosecution of acts of terrorism and preparatory activities. 
1.5 Contribution of Knowledge 
The discussion in this thesis makes at least three core claims of originality. 
Firstly, one of the core themes that the discussion in this thesis explores is whether law 
enforcement officers can use profiling methodologies to assist with preventing, detecting and 
deterring terrorism by affording law enforcement officers the ability to identify likely terrorist 
characteristics.  The discussion in this thesis draws upon established criminal profiling 
methodologies as the basis to engage in an analytical assessment of terrorist profiling. As a 
result, the discussion in this thesis makes the claim that it is one of the first attempts to engage 
in identifying, explaining and evaluating manifestations of terrorist profiling by reference to 
core established profiling methodologies.  This adds to the previous knowledge by extending 
the reach of criminal profiling methodologies as one basis to evaluate manifestations of terrorist 
profiling.  
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Secondly, the discussion in the thesis also argues that the usefulness of terrorist profiling is best 
examined by adopting a three-tiered evaluative approach so as to ensure that each constitute 
part of terrorist profiling is thoroughly examined.  This means that any examination of profiling 
should be analysed by reference to the input assessment, output assessment and the impact 
assessment.  The input assessment provides the basis to analyse the types of data that can be 
used to construct profiles while the output assessment focuses on the application of that profile 
in practice.  However, a further layer of assessment involves considering the broader impact of 
the use of profiling in practice so as question its usefulness to identify those likely to be involved 
in terrorism and/or preparatory activities. 
Thirdly, in light of the identification and explanation of criminal profiling methodologies and 
the effectiveness framework, the discussion in the thesis is able to make classifications on 
different manifestations of profiling by creating a profiling spectrum.  The profiling spectrum 
ranges from formal terrorist profiling to informal terrorist profiling.  This spectrum provides a 
systematic basis to examine the usefulness of terrorist profiling as an assistive tool for law 
enforcement officers by separating the process to construct and apply profiles. 
This approach is not undertaken in existing research.  The assessment of the usefulness of 
terrorist profiling in the literature raises a dichotomy between portraying profiling as an 
essential tool to assist law enforcement officers detect and prevent acts of terrorism and an 
unnecessary and unlawful practice capable of creating and perpetuating stereotypes which 
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disproportionately affect ethnic and racial minorities in addition to stigmatising individuals who 
may have been previously involved in criminality.18  
For example, De Schutter and Ringleheim,19 Moeckli,20 Goldson,21 Parmar,22 Ojanen23 and 
Edley24 all consider the use of terrorist profiling by law enforcement officers by conducting a 
legal assessment of the compatibility of terrorist profiling in light of human rights standards and 
norms.  Although human rights standards and fundamental norms may provide a basis to 
assess/measure the effectiveness of terrorist profiling, an inherent limitation of this approach is 
that it frequently characterises terrorist profiling as being ineffective primarily on the basis of 
human rights norms and standards without undertaking a systematic identification, explanation 
or evaluation of the different profiling methods used to construct profiles.  Further this literature 
does not specifically focus on the effectiveness of these methodologies as a tool to assist law 
enforcement officers in identifying individuals engaged in terrorism or preparatory activities. 
                                                             
18 J. Rosen, The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming security and freedom in an anxious age (Random House, 2004), 24-
29. 
19 O. De Schutter and J. Ringelheim, ‘Ethnic profiling: a rising challenge for European human rights law’ (2008) 
71(3) Modern Law Review 358. 
20 D. Moeckli, ‘Discriminatory profiles: law enforcement after 9/11’ (2005) 5 European Human Rights Law 
Review 517.  See also: D. Moeckli, ‘Anti-Terrorism Laws, Terrorist Profiling and the Right to Non-
Discrimination’ in A. Salinas De Frias, K. Samuel and N. White (eds), Counter-Terrorism: International Law 
and Practice (Oxford University Press, 2012). 
21 J. Goldson, Ethnic Profiling and Counter-Terrorism: Trends, dangers and alternatives, 6th June 2006, 
available from: 
<<http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/articles_publications/articles/counterterrorism_20060606/goldston_20
060606.pdf>> (accessed 03rd January 2018). 
22 A. Parmar, ‘Policing and Ethnic Profiling’ in K. Pall Sveinsson Ethnic Profiling: The Use of Race in UK Law 
Enforcement (Runnymede, 2010). 
23 T. Ojanen, ‘Terrorist Profiling and Human Rights Concerns’ (2010) 3(2) Critical Studies in Terrorism 295.  
See also: T. Ojanen, ‘Human Rights Dilemmas in Terrorist Profiling’ in M. Scheinin (ed), Law and Security – 
Facing the Dilemmas (EUI Law, 2009). Available from: 
<<http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/12233/LAW_2009_11.pdf?sequence=3>> (accessed 03rd January 
2018). 
24 C. Edley, ‘The New American Dilemma: Racial Profiling Post 9/11’ in R. Leone and G. Anrig (eds), The War 
on Our Freedoms (Public Affairs Publishing, 2003). 
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Alternatively, terrorist profiling has also been evaluated by conducting a utilitarian assessment 
of its capacity to assist law enforcement officers in detecting and preventing acts of terrorism.25  
This approach commonly characterises terrorist profiling as being effective on the basis of its 
necessity as part of counter-terrorism policy necessary to assist law enforcement officers to foil 
and intercept serious terrorist attacks prior to their commission.26  For example, a terrorist attack 
intercepted by law enforcement officers includes the attempted truck bombings in Singapore 
thought to have been targeting Singapore’s airport, financial and embassy districts.27   
However, this approach fails to identify the specific role fulfilled by terrorist profiling in 
comparison to other counter-terrorist measures in assisting law enforcement officers preventing 
and detecting terrorism.  Any assessment of terrorist profiling which fails to identify the role 
played by terrorist profiling within counter-terrorism may be subject to the criticism that the 
assistive value of terrorist profiling may be over or under inflated in the prevention and detection 
of terrorism and as a result is unable to determine a realistic assessment/measurement of 
effectiveness. 
The effectiveness of terrorist profiling has also been assessed/measured on the strength of moral 
arguments.  This approach commonly characterises terrorist profiling as being ineffective on 
basis of empirical evidence, which demonstrates a negative impact of terrorist profiling on 
ethnic minority communities.  For example, Swiney demonstrates the negative impact of 
terrorist profiling on Arab and Muslim communities by drawing on empirical research 
conducted on a selection of Arab and Muslim communities across the US since the September 
                                                             
25 T. Coke, ‘Racial profiling post 9/11: Old story, new debate’ in C. Brown (ed) Lost Liberties: Ashcroft and the 
Assault on Personal Freedoms (New York Press, 2003), 13-32. 
26 R. Reddick, ‘Point: The case for profiling’ (2004) 79 International Social Science Review  154, 154-157. 
27 P. Rogers, ‘The War on Terrorism: Winning or Losing’ [2003] ORG Briefing Paper, available at: 
<<http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/briefings/winningorlosing.htm>>  
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11th attacks.28  This involved analysing empirical data collected from a range of Arab and 
Muslim community support centres across the US to identify common concerns in Arab and 
Muslim communities stemming from the use of terrorist profiling by law enforcement officers.  
This approach can also be considered limited as the assessment of effectiveness is largely 
conducted on the basis of opinion canvassed from various communities as opposed to an 
enhanced investigation of the processes involved in constructing and applying terrorist profiles. 
The problem with these previous assessments of terrorist profiling is that they tend to either 
support or reject terrorist profiling without undertaking a systematic assessment of the profiling 
methodologies that distinguishes between the construction and application of profiles.  This 
approach may be considered problematic, as it tends to concentrate on manifestations of 
profiling that are not accurately classifiable as being examples of profiling.  Specifically, the 
discussion throughout this thesis will show that most previous examinations on profiling tend 
to concentrate on manifestations of profiling that are classifiable as being manifestations of 
informal terrorist profiling which are examined in chapter five.  The discussion in chapter five 
argues that manifestations of informal terrorist profiling are off the profiling spectrum given 
that they exhibit an apparent absence of a systematic process to construct and/or apply terrorist 
profiles in contrast to manifestations of formal terrorist profiling. 
There is a distinct lack of debate, discussion and analysis in the literature that provides an 
analytical framework to assess/measure the effectiveness of terrorist profiling which is capable 
of characterising terrorist profiling as being effective, ineffective or harmful on the basis of 
analysing the process of constructing terrorist profiles separate from the application of terrorist 
                                                             
28 C. Swiney, ‘Racial Profiling of Arabs and Muslims in the US: Historical, Empirical and Legal Analysis 
Applied to the War on Terrorism’ (2006) 3(1) Muslim World Journal of Human Rights 1. 
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profiles.  It is contended that the characterisation of terrorist profiling as being effective, 
ineffective or harmful can only be done by developing an analytical framework that is capable 
of assessing/measuring the effectiveness of the profiling methods used in the construction of 
terrorist profiles separately from the application of terrorist profiles by law enforcement 
officers, as this provides a basis for a methodical and systematic investigation of the 
effectiveness of terrorist profiling. 
Therefore, the examination of profiling in this thesis extends beyond previous attempts by 
examining the construction and application of profiles separately within a systematic framework 
capable of drawing conclusions on the usefulness of terrorist profiling to identify likely terrorist 
characteristics.  It should be noted here that the purpose of this approach is not to advance or 
support the use of terrorist profiling but rather to deconstruct the profiling process from 
construction to application of profiles so that any evaluation of profiling is more advanced than 
previous efforts by conducting a more in-depth assessment of terrorist profiling.  
1.6 Research Limitations 
It is acknowledged that there are methodological challenges in the study of terrorist profiling 
that are common in any research.  Specifically in this thesis, there are challenges that relate to 
the limited availability of evidence to allow an affirmative conclusion to be drawn on the 
classification of profiling and the assessment of the usefulness of the different manifestations 
of terrorist profiling examined.  However, the discussion throughout this thesis argues that there 
is sufficient evidence presented to support the various evaluations made on the different 
manifestations of terrorist profiling on the basis of a high degree of probability.   
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It is argued that the use of established criminal profiling methods as an analytical lens to 
evaluate the evidence on terrorist profiling and further the classification of terrorist profiling 
along a spectrum as being manifestations of formal and informal terrorist profiling begin to 
address the methodological challenges.  It should be noted here that at various points throughout 
the thesis, the selection of countries examined may appear somewhat random or ad hoc but the 
selection is primarily based on available evidence to support the thesis aim.  The very nature of 
the examination of terrorist profiling in this thesis is about deconstructing the profiling process 
so as to create an analytical lens that is capable of examining the usefulness of different 
manifestations of profiling.  As a result, it will be necessary to examine different countries and 
manifestations of profiling based on available evidence so as to develop the profiling spectrum 
and to some degree test the framework established in the next section to assess the effectiveness 
of terrorist profiling. 
1.7 Assessing/Measuring the Effectiveness of Terrorist Profiling 
As identified and explained above an overarching concern of the thesis involves assessing the 
usefulness of terrorist profiling.  The assessment of usefulness in this thesis is conducted by 
undertaking an assessment of the effectiveness of profiling methods as a means to assist law 
enforcement officers to identify likely terrorist characteristics so as to determine whether 
terrorist profiling may be classified as being useful in assisting law enforcement officers to 
identify those likely to be engaged in terrorism or its preparatory activities.  The central aim of 
this section is to identify an analytical framework capable of assessing/measuring the 
effectiveness of terrorist profiling which can be drawn upon in subsequent chapters when 
examining different manifestations of terrorist profiling. 
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As a starting point, it is useful to examine some of the limitations of previous attempts at 
assessing/measuring the effectiveness of counter-terrorism policies before presenting an 
analytical framework to measure the usefulness of terrorist profiling.   
1.7.1 Research Approaches in Examining the Effectiveness of Counter-Terrorism Policies 
It is significant to note that the literature on counter-terrorism does not present a universally 
accepted framework or approach to assess/measure the effectiveness of counter-terrorism 
policies.29  Consequently, the development of an analytical framework capable of 
assessing/measuring the effectiveness of terrorist profiling can be considered challenging.  Lum 
et al argue that  
“there has been a proliferation of anti-terrorism programs and policies as well 
as massive increases in expenditures towards combating terrorism.  Yet we 
currently know almost nothing about the effectiveness of any of these 
programmes”.30   
Other academic commentators have also identified a significant gap in literature dealing with 
the issue of assessing/measuring the effectiveness of counter-terrorism policies.31  
Despite the inherent difficulty in assessing/measuring the effectiveness of counter-terrorism, 
the literature presents two alternative approaches to assess/measure the effectiveness of counter-
terrorism policies.   
                                                             
29 T. Van Dongen, ‘Break it Down: An Alternative Approach to Measuring Effectiveness in Counter-Terrorism’/ 
(2011) 6 Journal of Applied Security Research 357, 357-358. 
30 C. Lum, L. Kennedy and A. Sherley, ‘Are counter-terrorist strategies effective? The results of the Campbell 
systematic review on counter-terrorism evaluation research’ (2006) 2 Journal of Experimental Criminology 489, 
510. 
31 For example: D. Gold, “The Cost of Terrorism and the Costs of Countering Terrorism” (2005) International 
Working Affairs Papers, available at: << http://www.gpia.info/files/u1/wp/2005-03.pdf>> (accessed 03rd January 
2018), 7.  van Dongen,(n27), 1.  E. Benmelech, C. Berrebi and E. Klor, “Counter-Suicide-Terrorism: Evidence 
from House Demolitions. (2010) NBER Working Paper No 16493. 
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Firstly, a number of studies adopt quantitative approaches that concentrate on assessing the 
effectiveness of counter-terrorism policies by employing statistical and mathematical 
techniques to demonstrate the impact of counter-terrorism policies.  The quantitative approaches 
tend to assess/measure the effectiveness of counter-terrorism policies by undertaking a 
utilitarian assessment of the results of specific counter-terrorism policies by analysing evidence 
of their capacity to curtail, disrupt or contain terrorism. 
Secondly, a number of studies alternatively adopt qualitative approaches which assess the 
effectiveness of counter-terrorism policies both by undertaking a utilitarian assessment of 
counter-terrorism policies but also present a number of arguments as to the reasons why 
particular counter-terrorism policies can be considered more effective in comparison to other 
counter-terrorism policies. 
This section will now proceed to examine these two alternative approaches used to 
assess/measure the effectiveness of counter-terrorism as it is necessary to identify and 
acknowledge some of the limitations inherent in any analytical framework developed to 
assess/measure the effectiveness of terrorist profiling. 
1.7.2 The use of quantitative approaches in assessing effectiveness 
A number of studies have undertaken an assessment of the effectiveness of individual counter-
terrorist policies by adopting quantitative approaches.  The assessment/measurement of 
effectiveness in quantitative approaches commonly demonstrates effectiveness by 
concentrating on identifying the end result of the use of counter-terrorism policies.  This means 
that quantitative approaches commonly characterise counter-terrorism policies as being 
effective if the study can demonstrate some evidence of success of the counter-terrorism 
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policy’s capacity to interfere, deter or prevent acts of terrorism.  In essence, the quantitative 
approaches of assessment/measurement of effectiveness can be considered similar to a 
utilitarian assessment of effectiveness.  For example: Cauley and Im32 and Landes33 examined 
the effectiveness of metal detectors and intervention policies used at airport and embassies to 
enhance security screening; Makovsky34 examined the effectiveness of protecting terrorism 
sensitive buildings and installations through increased defence fortification measures; Enders 
and Sandler35 examined the effectiveness of criminalising terrorism activities through anti-
terrorism laws; Zussmann and Zussmann36 and Plaw37 examined the effectiveness of ‘targeted 
assassination’ of ‘known’ terrorists; Dugan, La Free and Korte38 examined the effectiveness of 
containment and curfew policies; and Testas39 examined the effectiveness of the use of 
aggressive military retaliation policies as part of counter-terrorism policies.  
An identifiable theme in these studies is that they engage in an assessment of the effectiveness 
of individual counter-terrorism policies by adopting a time series analysis of the individual 
counter-terrorism policy under investigation against the occurrence of terrorism so as to 
measure the impact of the individual counter-terrorism policy.  In essence, they define the 
                                                             
32 J. Cauley and E. Im, ‘Intervention policy analysis of skyjackings and other terrorist incidents’ (1988) 78(2) 
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39 A. Testas, ‘Determinants of Terrorism in the Middle East’ (2004) 16(2) Terrorism and Political Violence 253. 
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effectiveness of individual counter-terrorism policies by identifying indicators of success by 
reference to the stated aim of a particular counter-terrorism policy.  This typically involves 
examining the impact of a policy in counteracting or minimising the risk of a known terrorism 
threat in isolation from other threats and other counter-terrorist policies over a period of time.  
Therefore, this approach is a results driven assessment/measurement of effectiveness. 
The classic example can be considered Cauley and Im40 who examined the effectiveness of 
metal detectors and other intervention counter-terrorism policies including enhanced security 
measures at embassies in counteracting the threat terrorism at airports and embassies from the 
1950s to the 1970s. This involved adopting a time series analysis so as to plot the number of 
terrorist incidents at airports in the US and at embassies so as to demonstrate the impact of these 
intervention counter-terrorist policies in being able to manage the threat of terrorism.  By 
mapping out the frequency and the occurrence of terrorism incidences and the introduction of 
intervention counter-terrorism policies the study was able to identify statistics which illustrated 
a fall in the occurrence of terrorism as a consequence of the intervention counter-terrorism 
policies. 
Although these attempts at assessing/measuring the effectiveness of terrorist profiling may be 
considered a useful basis to characterise the effectiveness of counter-terrorism policies, they 
ultimately fail to identify the value of any particular policy in assisting law enforcement officers 
in managing the threat of terrorism.  It is significant to note that the use of quantitative 
approaches to assess the effectiveness of counter-terrorism raises at least three core weaknesses. 
                                                             
40 Supra (n32). 
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Quantitative research approaches tend to evaluate the effectiveness of individual terrorist 
policies in isolation which fails to appreciate that law enforcement officers rarely employ 
counter-terrorism policies in isolation or singly.  Therefore, caution must be exercised in relying 
exclusively on quantitative research approaches to assess the effectiveness of counter-terrorism 
policies as this approach could over or under inflate the role of the policy under investigation in 
the prevention and detection of terrorism. 
Additionally, quantitative approaches carry the innate potential to assume that the capabilities 
of terrorist groups remain static over time.  It is submitted that relying exclusively on 
quantitative research approaches requires caution not to over or under estimate the changing 
capabilities of terrorist groups and terrorist individuals. 
Finally, any approach used to assess/measure effectiveness which concentrates almost entirely 
upon the results of a counter-terrorism policy can be considered as being a very narrow 
assessment/measurement of effectiveness as it fails entirely to consider the broader implications 
and consequences of using that policy to manage the threat of terrorism.   
1.7.3 The use of qualitative approaches in assessing effectiveness 
Other studies evaluating counter-terrorism regimes, such as those carried out by Charter,41 
Schmid and Crelinsten,42 Art and Richardson43 and Cronin44 have attempted to adopt qualitative 
approaches as a basis to identify the effectiveness of individual policies within counter-terrorism 
                                                             
41 D. Charter, The Deadly Sin of Terrorism: Its Effect on Democracy and Civil Liberty in Six Countries 
(Greenwood Press, 1994). 
42 A. Schmid and R. Crelinsten, Western Responses to Terrorism (Frank Cass Publishers, 1993). 
43 R. Art and L. Richardson, Democracy and Counter-Terrorism: Lessons from the Past (United States Institute 
of Peace Press, 2007). 
44 A. Cronin, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns (Princeton 
University Press, 2009).  
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regimes.  The qualitative approach commonly seeks to evaluate the effectiveness of counter-
terrorism policies by adopting a two-stage analysis of counter-terrorism policies.  Firstly, a 
broad investigation is commonly conducted of the counter-terrorism policy under investigation, 
and secondly a further study is conducted to hypothesise the factors governing the effectiveness 
of that counter-terrorism policy.  
For example, Schmid and Crelinsten45 conduct an investigation into a broad range of counter-
terrorism responses where they characterise counter-terrorism responses as either being “soft” 
or “hard” depending on the nature of the counter-terrorism response.  After Schmid and 
Crelinsten develop their characterisation theory on counter-terrorism responses they further 
investigate whether their theory can be demonstrated by analysing the operation of different 
counter-terrorism responses in practice.  In essence, Schmid and Crelinsten’s investigation 
assesses the effectiveness of counter-terrorism responses by firstly developing a theory on 
counter-terrorism policies and secondly progresses to examine the frequency of the occurrence 
of their theory in practice so that they are able to draw conclusions as to the factors that influence 
the effectiveness of different counter-terrorism responses. 
Therefore, qualitative approaches used to assess/measure the effectiveness of counter-terrorism 
seeks to evaluate effectiveness by not only concentrating on the results and capacity of counter-
terrorism to manage the threat of terrorism but also seek to analyse the broader implications of 
using particular counter-terrorism policies.  However, all of the qualitative studies, similar to 
the quantitative studies, can be subject to criticism for failing to identify explicitly the role of 
individual counter-terrorism policies as being effective in assisting in managing the threat of 
                                                             
45 Supra (n42). 
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terrorism. For example, Schmid and Crelinsten’s study on the effectiveness of counter-terrorism 
responses was ultimately incapable of characterising individual counter-terrorist responses as 
being effective, but rather was only capable of examining counter-terrorism responses as a 
whole.  Despite this limitation, it is contended that qualitative approaches used to 
assess/measure effectiveness demonstrates a stronger basis to characterise any counter-
terrorism policy as being effective, ineffective or harmful as it undertakes a broader assessment 
of not only the results of counter-terrorism policies but also assists in interpreting the results of 
counter-terrorism policies. 
1.7.4 Summary 
The limitations of quantitative and qualitative approaches demonstrate that assessing/measuring 
the effectiveness of counter-terrorism policies may be open to criticism on the basis that it can 
be considered challenging to examine single counter-terrorist policies in isolation.  The 
challenge is due to the specific nature of counter-terrorism generally operating as a concert of 
policies in harmony to ‘manage’ the threat of terrorism.  However, the mere fact that it can be 
considered challenging or limited does not invalidate the conclusions drawn in either the 
quantitative or qualitative studies, but rather this is a weakness that is attributable to the nature 
of counter-terrorism as opposed to the individual approaches.  In particular, it is contended that 
these studies demonstrate that in developing an analytical framework to assess/measure the 
effectiveness of terrorist profiling it is necessary to not only evaluate effectiveness by the results 
of terrorist profiling but also part of the assessment/measurement of effectiveness must include 
the broader impact and consequences of using terrorist profiling to assist in managing the threat 
of terrorism. 
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Although all of the studies investigating the effectiveness of counter-terrorism policies may be 
subjected to criticism, the basis upon which the studies were conducted can be considered 
relevant in assisting with the creation of an analytical framework capable of 
assessing/measuring the effectiveness of terrorist profiling.   
In particular, it is significant to note that adopting purely quantitative approaches to assess the 
effectiveness of terrorist profiling can be considered as being limited as it would fail to 
appreciate the broader implications of other counter-terrorism policies which are interdependent 
on the effectiveness of terrorist profiling as a counter-terrorist policy.  Therefore, any 
assessment of the effectiveness of terrorist profiling must be conducted by using qualitative 
approaches in addition to quantitative approaches as a basis to evaluate effectiveness as it 
provides a broader basis to assess/measure the effectiveness of the construction and application 
of terrorist profiles by law enforcement officers.  It is contended that by using quantitative and 
qualitative approaches at different stages in the assessment/measurement of effectiveness, it 
creates a strong basis to characterise terrorist profiling as being effective, ineffective or harmful. 
1.8 An Analytical Framework to Assess/Measure the Effectiveness of Terrorist Profiling 
The lack of coherence and consensus in the literature on the measurement/assessment of the 
effectiveness of counter-terrorism policies demonstrates that it may be considered difficult to 
develop an analytical framework agreeable by many to examine the thorny issue as to how to 
measure/assess effectiveness.  Despite this difficulty, Van Um and Pisoiu present a useful 
framework capable of assessing/measuring the effectiveness of counter-terrorism policies by 
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assessing the “output, outcome and impact effectiveness” of the counter-terrorism policies 
through a combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches.46   
The ‘output’ can be defined as an assessment of the counter-terrorism measure; the ‘outcome’ 
can be defined as an assessment of the use of the counter-terrorism measure in managing the 
threat of terrorism, whereas the ‘impact’ can be defined as an assessment of the long-term 
consequences of the counter-terrorism measure.   In the context of terrorist profiling the 
assessment of the ‘output’ involves analysing the construction of terrorist profiles, the 
assessment of the ‘outcome’ involving analysing the application of terrorist profiles and the 
assessment of the ‘impact’ involves examining the evidence of the long term impact on society 
of use of terrorist profiling in assisting in preventing and detecting terrorism.  
Although the terminology used by Van Um and Pisoiu may be considered somewhat confusing 
and unnecessary complex, the important point demonstrated from their framework is that in 
order to assess/measure the effectiveness of a counter-terrorism measure it is necessary to 
undertake an examination of more than simply a utilitarian assessment of a counter-terrorism 
measure.   
Consequently, the analytical framework below involves the assessment of terrorist profiling by 
concentrating on assessing/measuring effectiveness in three stages, which begins to address 
some of the inherent weaknesses of the previous attempts at evaluating the effectiveness of 
terrorist profiling (discussed above). 
                                                             
46 E. Van Um and D. Pisoiu, ‘Effective Counterterrorism: What have we learned so far?’ [2011] Economics of 
Security Working Paper 55, available at: 
<<http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.386651.de/diw_econsec0055.pdf>> (accessed 03rd 
January 2018), 3. 
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1.8.1 Output Effectiveness – Construction of Terrorist Profiles 
The first stage, the “output effectiveness” assessment, involves concentrating on assessing the 
counter-terrorism measure.  In order to be use a label that more accurately reflects the nature of 
the assessment of profiling at the first stage, the discussion throughout this thesis refers to this 
stage as being the “input effectiveness”.  This is due to the fact that at this first stage the entire 
approach is based on the inputting of data so as to construct profiles.   In the context of terrorist 
profiling, it is contended that the assessment of the measure must begin by analysing the 
construction of a terrorist profile by focusing on analysing the profiling methods.  This first 
stage in assessing/measuring effectiveness can be largely considered a utilitarian assessment of 
terrorist profiling as it seeks to establish whether the profiling methods are capable of 
identifying likely terrorist characteristics.    
A methodological assessment of the terrorist profiling can only be conducted in light of other 
more established criminal profiling methods.  Consequently, chapter two below commences 
with a thorough investigation by identifying and explaining the established criminal profiling 
methods.  The assessment of the established criminal profiling methods provides the first means 
of assessing/measuring the effectiveness of terrorist profiling methodologies.  The terrorist 
profiling methods are subsequently considered in the first part of chapters three by examining 
the profiling methods used in formal terrorist profiling including knowledge discovery 
processes and behavioural profiling in light of the analysis from the study of the established 
criminal profiling methods. 
The examination of the profiling methods used in the construction of terrorist profiles only 
provides the first basis in assessing/measuring the effectiveness of terrorist profiling.  It is 
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contended that this first stage in assessing/measuring the effectiveness of terrorist profiling will 
allow for conclusions to be drawn as to whether terrorist profiling is at minimum capable of 
identifying individuals likely to be engaged in terrorism or preparatory activities.   
1.8.2 Outcome Effectiveness – Application of Terrorist Profiles 
The second stage, the “outcome effectiveness” assessment, involves assessing the use of the 
counter-terrorism measure in managing the threat of terrorism.  Similar to the previous section, 
in order to be use a label that more accurately reflects the nature of the assessment of profiling 
at this second stage, the discussion throughout this thesis refers to this stage as being the “output 
effectiveness”.   This is due to the fact that at this second stage the entire approach is focused 
on applying the constructed profiles, therefore this involves assessing the output.  In the context 
of terrorist profiling this involves concentrating on assessing the application of terrorist profiles 
by law enforcement officers.  
This will involve considering factors such as arrests, prosecutions and investigations conducted 
as a result of the individuals identified by the application of terrorist profiles.  The assessment 
of the application of terrorist profiles will primarily involve an empirical assessment of the 
application of terrorist profiles.  This assessment will use quantitative research approaches to 
identify patterns and trends in the information whereas qualitative research approaches will be 
used to analyse any patterns or trends identified.   
In the second part of chapters three and four the application of formal terrorist profiling and the 
application of behavioural profiling techniques are considered by reference to the specific 
country examples.  The discussion of the application of formal terrorist profiling and 
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behavioural profiling by law enforcement officers will allow conclusions to be drawn about the 
value and the effectiveness of terrorist profiling from a purely utilitarian perspective. 
The assessment of terrorist profiling by examining the construction of terrorist profiles 
separately from the application of terrorist profiles by law enforcement officers can be 
considered a useful basis to characterise the terrorist profiling as being effective or ineffective 
as it seeks to assess/measure effectiveness by focusing on the capability of terrorist profiling to 
produce results.   
Undoubtedly, part of the assessment/measurement of the effectiveness of terrorist profiling 
should involve an assessment as to whether terrorist profiling can actually work through an 
analysis of the construction and application of terrorist profiles.  However, any analytical 
framework which purely assesses/measures effectiveness by concentrating on its results can be 
considered as undertaking a narrow measurement/assessment of effectiveness.  A parallel may 
be drawn here to the discussion above on quantitative approaches, which criticised any 
assessment/measurement of effectiveness purely on results as it denied a broader 
assessment/measurement of effectiveness. 
Therefore, any assessment/measurement of the effectiveness of terrorist profiling through an 
examination of the profiling methods used in the construction of profiles and the application of 
profiles by law enforcement officers may be subject to the criticism that this approach fails to 
appreciate the broader consequences of terrorist profiling stemming from the use of terrorist 
profiling in the prevention and detection of terrorism.  It is contended it is necessary to evaluate 
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the effectiveness of terrorist profiling by progressing to the third stage in order to characterise 
terrorist profiling as being “effective, ineffective or harmful”.47   
1.8.3 Impact Effectiveness – The Consequences of Terrorist Profiling 
The final stage, “the impact effectiveness” assessment involves examining the long-term impact 
by identifying the consequences of terrorist profiling as a counterterrorism tool.  The previous 
two stages will be able to show, within a reasonable degree of probability, whether the various 
manifestations of terrorist profiling may be likely to work in theory and practice.  However, in 
light of the very serious nature of terrorist profiling, it is argued that a narrow assessment of 
terrorist profiling by simply asking whether it works would fail to appreciate the broader 
consequences of using terrorist profiling which may be considered as eroding its usefulness as 
a counterterrorism policing tool.  
Therefore, in each of the examinations of terrorist profiling in chapters three to five, the 
discussion will consider evidence of a discernable impact of terrorist profiling by questioning 
whether its long term consequences can be considered as being harmful and perhaps 
counterproductive to deterring, detecting and prosecuting those engaged in terrorism acts or its 
preparatory activities.   
The purpose of this discussion on impact is to question whether the cost and/or associated cost 
of terrorist profiling is likely to be considered as outweighing its perceived usefulness.  It is 
important to acknowledge that in some cases, the assessment of the impact of terrorist profiling 
may appear tentative which is due to inconclusive available evidence in the public domain.  
                                                             
47 C. Lum and L. Kenedy, ‘Evidence-Based Counter-Terrorism Policy’ in C. Lum and L. Kennedy, Evidence-
Based Counterterrorism Policy (Springer Publications, 2012), 3-4. 
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However, the discussion on impact will generally be able to discern whether the cost of terrorist 
profiling can be considered as eroding the state’s moral authority to govern to the point that the 
cost of profiling is too much to pay in light of the danger it poses to fundamental human rights 
and democratic values in society.  This will involve drawing upon qualitative studies that 
demonstrate the general dissatisfaction and resentment held by some in society about the use of 
terrorist profiling.  However, the state’s resolve to continue to rely on terrorist profiling as a 
counterterrorism tool represents an obsession on achieving security at all costs. 
Although the discussion throughout this thesis accepts that the state has a right to adopt laws 
and policies to achieve its ‘security’, the discussion also accepts Teson’s argument that security 
in of itself cannot be viewed as being the end at the cost of fundamental human rights.48  Further, 
if security becomes/remains the state’s end focus then the continual denial of human rights will 
mean that the state begins to operate in the same field as the terrorists. This will create injustice 
and perceived injustice that questions the overall usefulness of terrorist profiling as a 
counterterrorism tool, which may be considered as denying the state its legitimacy to govern. 
A further issue on assessing impact involves examining the lawfulness of including sensitive 
characteristics such as race, ethnicity, gender, religion etc in any form of profiling, which is 
examined in chapter six below.  This examination in chapter six on the tensions between 
fundamental human rights and terrorist profiling allows an analysis of the impact of terrorist 
profiling from a legal perspective in light of discussion on the effectiveness of the profiling 
methodologies as being an assistive tool for law enforcement officers.   This discussion on the 
lawfulness of including sensitive characteristics is not included in each of the chapters three to 
                                                             
48 F. Teson, ‘Liberty Security’ in R. Wilson (ed) Human Rights in the ‘War on Terror’ (Cambridge University 
Press, 2005). 
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five.  The reason for this is that this issue of including sensitive characteristics is such a 
significant issue; it merits a whole chapter to examine, unpack and debate the issue of including 
sensitive characteristics in terrorist profiling. 
1.8.4 Measuring Effectiveness 
It is contended that the strongest approach to measure the effectiveness of terrorist profiling that 
provides a basis to deconstruct the profiling process for analytical purposes is to conduct an 
input, output and broader impact assessments. 
In light of the thesis aim and the effectiveness framework established in this chapter, the 





CHAPTER 2: CRIMINAL PROFILING AND ITS APPLICABILITY TO 
TERRORIST PROFILING 
2.1 Introduction 
Criminal profiling can be described as being an investigative process that has been subjected 
to an increasing degree of interest over the past four decades from both academics and 
mainstream popular media.1  This interest in criminal profiling can be classified as being 
conflicting in nature.  For instance, it has been praised as a key investigative tool2 and also 
criticised for being tedious and of little investigative value.3  
 
Criminal profiling at its most basic is a method/approach that may assist law enforcement 
officers identify likely offender characteristics and traits of unknown offenders from 
information gleaned from the crime scene and/or previous criminal records.4   
 
As noted in the introductory chapter above, criminal profiling is a process allowing the 
profiler to identify a sequence of commonalities from the crime scene and/or previous 
criminal records to predict likely offender characteristics.5   For the purposes of the 
discussion in this thesis, profiling is defined broadly as being any technique or process which 
                                                             
1 W. Petherwick, ‘What’s in a name? Comparing Applied Profiling Methodologies’ (2003) 5 Journal of Law 
and Social Challenges 173, 173.  See also: G. Copson, Coals to Newcastle? Part 1: A study of offender profiling 
(Home Office Policy Research Group 1995).   S. Egger, ‘Psychological profiling: Past present and future’ 
(1999) 15 Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 242.  P. Wilson, R. Lincoln and R. Kocsis ‘Validity, 
utility and ethics of profiling for serial violent and sexual offenders’ (1997) 4 Psychiatry, Psychology and the 
Law 1. 
2 J. Doughlas and A. Burgess, ‘Criminal Profiling: A Viable Investigative Tool Against Crime’ (1986) 55 FBI 
Law Enforcement Bulletin 9, 9-13. 
3 J. Goodwin, Murder USA: The Ways We Kill Each Other (Ballantine Publishing, 1978), 274-279. 
4 A. Pinizotto, ‘Forensic Psychology: Criminal Personality Profiling’ (1984) 12 Journal of Police Science and 
Administration Section 1, 32-40. 
5 B. Snook, J. Eastwood, P. Gendreau, C. Goggin and R. Cullen, ‘Taking Stock of Criminal Profiling: A 
Narrative Review and Meta-Analysis’ (2007) 34(4) Criminal Science and Behaviour 437, 437-438. 
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is likely to allow law enforcement officers to identify likely “offender characteristics can 
be considered some form of profiling”.6   
 
The primary aim of the discussion in this chapter is to identify, explain and evaluate the 
various different methodologies that can be adopted within criminal profiling.  The objective 
of this discussion is to use this analysis later in the thesis as an analytical tool to evaluate 
whether counter-terrorism strategies can use profiling methods and processes to identify 
likely terrorist characteristics. 
 
It is evident from the literature that law enforcement officers can use criminal profiling in 
two ways: firstly, deductively and secondly inductively.7   
 
Deductive profiling is where law enforcement officers use profiling methods to react to 
crimes already committed and deduce offender characteristics by using forensic crime 
evidence and victim reports.   The methods used within deductive profiling follow a reactive 
methodology where the profile purports to be rationally or logically deduced following a 
thorough analysis of the crime scene and the victim. 
 
In contrast to deductive profiling, inductive profiling occurs when law enforcement officers 
use proactive profiling methods as a tool to detect and prevent crime. This is a profiling 
method where police officers use analytical methods to predict likely offender characters so 
as to prevent future criminality.  The distinguishing feature of inductive profiling methods 
is its dependence upon a statistical analysis of previous offending records to identify the 
                                                             
6 M. Horvath, ‘Offender Profiling’ in S. Tong, R. Bryant and M. Horvath, Understanding Criminal 
Investigation (John Wiley & Sons Publishing, 2009), 69. 
7 J. Bumgarner, Profiling and Criminal Justice in America (ABC-Clio Publications, 2004), 28-29. 
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common characteristics of known offenders so as to allow the profiler to make predictions 
about likely offender characteristics.8   
 
The distinction between deductive and inductive profiling will become important in 
subsequent chapters when the discussion turns to concentrate on analysing different 
manifestations of terrorist profiling.  Specifically, this distinction will assist in analysing 
whether law enforcement officers can rely on criminal profiling methodologies in a 
reactionary way to assist in the identification of terrorist characteristics and/or in a 
preventative way to predict likely terrorist characteristics. 
 
There are three main parts to this chapter.  In the first part of this chapter, the discussion 
concentrates on evaluating deductive profiling methods in order to determine whether there 
are any methods within deductive profiling that can be used within counter-terrorism in 
assisting with the identification of likely terrorist characteristics.  In the second part of the 
chapter, the discussion progresses by examining inductive profiling so as to identify and 
evaluate whether these profiling methods/approaches can be used within the counter-
terrorism context. The discussion in the final part of the paper ultimately concludes that only 
inductive profiling methods/approach may be of some use in assisting law enforcement 
officers identify likely terrorist characteristics if the profiling process takes into account at 




                                                             
8 W. Neuman and B. Wiegand, Criminal Justice Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches 
(Allyn and Bacon Publishing, 2000), 45.  
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2.2 Deductive Profiling 
As noted above, deductive profiling is the practice where law enforcement officers use crime 
scene evidence to deduce likely offender characteristics.  It involves a profiler using 
deductive profiling methods to extract key information from the crime scene to establish 
likely offender characteristics.  Essentially it is the behavioural analysis of specific crimes 
scenes, crimes and victims which is drawn from the forensic evidence relating to a specific 
offender.9  Deductive profiling concentrates primarily on using forensic evidence to 
rationally and logically deduce likely offender characteristics.   
 
On the basis of the literature, it can be argued that deductive profiling reflects two 
approaches: non-scientific approaches and scientific approaches.  Both of these approaches 
draw upon various methodologies including “behavioural analysis, [psychological] 
analysis, crime scene analysis, police officer investigative experience and empirical studies 
conducted with [known] offenders”.10   
 
The “scientific” profiling approaches in this chapter are considered scientific because they 
tend to take a more scientific based approach in constructing the profile.  For example, 
scientific profiling approaches primarily use investigative psychology to test, validate and 
replicate the accuracy of the profiles.  Additionally, scientific approaches generally aim to 
develop a wide range of literature, knowledge and practice so as to allow an entire profiling 
process to be enhanced and developed with each case profiled. 
 
                                                             
9 Horvath (n6), 73. 
10 ibid. 
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The “non-scientific” profiling approaches are considered non-scientific because they do not 
attempt to test, validate or replicate any of the profiles constructed.  Additionally, non-
scientific profiling approaches do not use any scientific discipline to enhance the reliability 
of the profiles constructed.  In essence each profile constructed using a non-scientific 
approach is only a standalone example or manifestation of profiling.  It does not seek to 
build a growing body of literature, knowledge or practice.   
 
For the purposes of analysis in this thesis, an approach or method will be considered 
scientific if it exhibits certain features including; the ability to test its application by 
replication, the publication and validation of its results and its ability to draw upon one or 
more scientific disciplines.   
 
2.2.1 The Origins of Profiling 
The “origins of profiling can be traced to fictional literature of the nineteenth century when 
various characters were given specific roles of catching” serial murderers and rapists.11   
“Modern profiling can be attributed to the works of psychiatrist James Brussel who 
successfully profiled a bomber in New York City in the late 1960s”.12  The methods 
employed by Brussel involved a two-step process: firstly he studied all known information 
about the bomber which included an analysis of the letters and demands made to the police 
by the bomber.13  Secondly, he also examined the methods used by the bomber to carry out 
his attacks on New York City.14   
 
                                                             
11 S. Hicks and B. Sales, Criminal Profiling (American Psychological Association, 2006), 4 – 5. 




Brussel was assisted in constructing the profile by using “previous personality traits 
constructed by Ernst Kretchmer which allowed Brussel to compartmentalise the likely 
offender characteristics of the bomber.”15  The profile produced by Brussel “allowed the 
police to focus [and target] their investigation” on the likely characteristics and personality 
traits of the unknown offender.16   It was the success of Brussel’s work which elevated the 
use of profiling into the media spotlight as his profile resembled almost the identical 
characteristics of the actual bomber.   
 
The effect of Brussel’s work was to spotlight the potential of using profiling to identify 
unknown offenders when traditional investigative techniques failed. Although, it should 
be acknowledged that police investigate work has long involved elements of profiling even 
prior to Brussel where law enforcement officers have used crimes schemes to assist them 
identify likely offenders. 
 
The specific focus of this thesis now turns to investigate the non-scientific and scientific 
profiling approaches so as to examine whether any deductive profiling methods can be 
used in the context of terrorism. 
 
2.2.2 Non-Scientific Deductive Profiling Approaches 
Whilst there is much academic literature on criminal profiling it can be argued that there are 
five non-scientific profiling approaches capable of being classified as examples of deductive 
profiling: 
(1) ‘Douglas, Ressler, Burgess and Hartman’ Approach. 
(2) ‘Holmes and Holmes’ Approach. 
                                                             
15 J. Brussel, Casebook of a crime psychiatrist (Bernard Geis Associates, 1968), 17-22.  
16 ibid, 32-33. 
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(3) ‘Keppel and Walter’ Approach. 
(4) ‘Turco ‘Approach. 
(5) ‘Turvey’ Approach.17 
 
The ‘Douglas, Resseler, Burgess and Hartman’ approach “was primarily used for the 
identification of unknown offenders which employed a categorisation process to assimilate 
information from the crime scene”.18  In essence, Douglas et al’s approach is the closest 
approach to a law enforcement officer using their own investigative experience and intuition 
so as to identify potential offender characteristics by using evidence from the crime scene 
which may exhibit personality and behavioural traits of an unknown offender.19   
 
Typically, this approach would involve six stages.  Firstly, a field officer would gather vital 
information including: crime scene evidence, a victimology report, any available “forensic 
information, the preliminary police reports and any photographs of the [crime] scene.”20  
The profiling officer would use this information to make certain decisions to predict the 
likely characteristics of the offender which is known as the secondary decision process stage.  
The third stage is where the field officer would make a crime assessment.  This involves a 
reconstruction of the crime scene to focus attention on how the offender committed the 
crime.  The fourth stage involves the construction of the offender profile by using all the 
information the officer has collected and analysed.  The fifth stage is where the actual 
                                                             
17 For example: R. Holmes and J. DeBurger, ‘Profiles in terror: The serial murderer’ (1985) 49(3) Federal 
Probation 29.  R. Holmes and S. Holmes, ‘Understanding mass murder: A starting point’ (1992) 56(1) Federal 
Probation 53.  R. Homant and D. Kennedy, ‘Psychological aspects of crime scene profiling: Validity research’ 
(1998) 25 Criminal Justice and Behaviour 319. 
18 J. Douglas, A. Burgess and R. Ressler, Crime classification manual (Lexington Publishing, 1992).  See also: 
J. Douglas, R. Ressler, A. Burgess and C. Hartman, ‘Criminal profiling from crime scene analysis’ (1986) 4 
Behavioural Sciences and the Law 401, 401-405.    
19 P. Cook and D. Hinman, ‘Criminal Profiling: Science and Art’ (1999) 15(3) Journal of Contemporary 
Criminal Justice 230, 231. 
20 ibid. 
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investigation of crime takes place with the help of the profile constructed from the fourth 
stage.  The final stage involves the successful apprehension of the offender based upon all 
the evidence gathered and the constructed profile.   
 
The typical example of the use of the Douglas et al approach is where the police officer goes 
out to a crime scene and firstly collects all available evidence, secondly analyses the 
evidence with a view to identifying likely characteristics of the offender and thirdly uses all 
information collected to create a profile of the offender.  It may be characterised as being 
‘unscientific’ as it does not use any process which is capable of being tested, replicated 
or validated for the accuracy of profiling predictions. As a result, it would seem that this 
profiling approach is focused on drawing upon a law enforcement officer’s intuition 
so as to interpret specific crime scene information. 
 
The ‘Holmes and Holmes’ develops the Douglas et al’s approach.  It not only uses all the 
stages of collecting, analysing and constructing the profile but goes further by being more 
selective in the information it uses to construct the profile.21  Whilst the Holmes and Holmes 
approach uses the Douglas et al six step approach, it differs somewhat “by matching 
evidence and information from the crime scene to various criminal typologies with an 
additional focus on the geography of the area in which the crime occurs”.22   
 
                                                             
21 R. Holmes and S. Homes, Profiling violent crimes: An investigative tool (Thousand Oaks 1996). 
22 ibid, 49. 
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The ‘Holmes and Holmes’ approach significantly draws upon behavioural analysis 
professionals:  Kolko and Kazdin23, Sakheim et al24, Rider25, Groth et al26, Knight and 
Prently27 and Burgess et al.28 The practical difference between the Holmes and Holmes 
approach and the Douglas et al approach is that under the Holmes and Holmes approach, 
the field officer still goes out to the crime scene to collect all available evidence but the key 
distinction is how that information and evidence is used to construct the profile.  Unlike the 
Douglas et al method it does not solely allow the police officer to construct the profile upon 
their own intuition and experience, but rather it uses typologies to aid the linkage between 
the crime scene evidence and the profile.  For example, the typologies advanced within the 
Holmes and Holmes approach focuses on the crime scene evidence which would indicate 
whether the offender was organised or disorganised.29  This typology would allow certain 
probabilities to be included in the profile, for instance, if the crime scene evidence suggested 
a disorganised offender then it could be true that they are disorganised in “appearance, 
psychological state, domestic situation and criminal activity”.30  Essentially, this would 
allow more characteristics to be predicted which could lead to a closer identification of the 
offender.  Additionally, it may be considered a more intelligent use of available information 
to identify more defined characteristics of the offender. 
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The third approach, advocated by ‘Keppel and Walter’,31 further develops the profiling 
approaches in Holmes and Holmes and Douglas et al.  In particular, the authors critique the 
Holmes and Holmes approach “as being too wide ranging and being of little investigative 
value as it is largely unsupported by empirical data”.32  Keppel and Walter’s approach is 
similar in many respects to the Holmes and Holmes approach in that they draw heavily upon 
academic literature to support their profiling approach.   
 
Similar to Holmes and Holmes they use the Douglas et al approach as the template for the 
collection of evidence from the crime scene.33  The key difference between Holmes and 
Holmes and Keppel and Walter is that the latter uses academic literature which has an 
empirical basis to validate some of the typologies used.  In particular Keppel and Walter 
focus exclusively on the crimes of murder and rape, and use academic literature which 
present empirical studies to validate the typologies used.  The empirical literature used by 
Keppel and Walter is produced by Hazelwood and Burgess34 who interviewed thirty-three 
suspects in the Michigan State Penitentiary who were prosecuted for crimes of rape and 
murder.   
 
The fourth method, advocated by ‘Turco’,35 “focuses on developing a psychological theory” 
as a profiling hypothesis “which draws heavily upon the work of Liebert” who was a 
specialist psychiatrist in the context of identifying common traits found in convicted serial 
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murders.36   Turco’s approach is somewhat different to the previous three approaches as it 
is the first real attempt at bringing some scientific elements within the non-scientific 
profiling approaches.  The primary focus of Turco’s approach is to identify the psychological 
problems the offender exhibited at the crime scene and to discern the likely characteristics 
by using psychological theories to explain why an offender committed the violent crime.37   
 
The particular approach adopted by Turco develops profiles along three dimensions: firstly 
the profiler considers all crime scene evidence.  Secondly, the profiler engages in an 
assessment of this evidence in the context of neurological behavioural disorders in order to 
develop the profile.  Turco’s approach integrates the crime scene evidence with 
contemporary medical science on neurological disorders, as he argued “that between 20% 
and 90% of violent offenders suffered from brain impairment or structural abnormalities” 
which were relevant to understanding the destructive behaviour of killers in violent crimes.38  
The third stage in Turco’s approach creates the profile of the offender with an understanding 
of the impact of neurological disorders upon the likely characteristics of the offender.  
Turco’s approach employs a differential method to the previous three approaches because it 
only focuses on violent crimes by using an understanding of neurological disorders to distil 
likely offender characteristics. 
 
The fifth and most recently developed approach is that developed by ‘Turvey’ which 
primarily uses behavioural analysis as a basis to predict potential characteristics of an 
unknown offender.39  Turvey’s approach relies exclusively upon physical and behavioural 
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evidence from the crime scene.  It typically involves two stages, firstly actually gathering 
evidence from the crime scene and then secondly using this evidence to deduct a profile of 
likely characteristics.40  In practice Turvey’s methodology seeks to marry together much of 
the previous work on gathering information from the crime scene with already known 
information from previous crimes focusing exclusively on utilising behavioural science to 
distil the likely characteristics of the offender. 41  Turvey distinguishes his approach by 
referring to inductive profiling as “a process reliant upon subjective expertise involving 
broad generalisations or statistical reasoning”.42  Turvey places his method of profiling 
within deductive profiling referring to it as “a forensic-evidence based process-orientated, 
method of investigative reasoning about the behavioural patterns of a particular offender”.43   
 
In essence the Turvey approach brings together a range of physical and behavioural evidence 
to draw a specific conclusion.  In particular, Turvey draws upon Groth et al’s44 behaviour-
motivational typologies for rape offenders which are common to some of the other non-
scientific approaches including Douglas et al, Holmes and Holmes and Turco.   
 
Although Groth et al’s typologies only relate to rapists, Turvey’s approach uses the rapist 
typologies for a broader range of criminal behaviour including “kidnapping, child 
molestation, terrorism, sexual assault homicide and arson”.45  Turvey argues that the 
typologies developed by Groth et al remained constant across a range of offences and 
focused only on classifying behaviours as opposed to offenders.46  The key distinction 
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between Turvey and the other methods of profiling is that, this method focuses exclusively 
on classifying behavioural traits and characteristics as opposed to offenders. 
 
2.2.3 Non-Scientific Deductive Profiling Approaches – A Critique 
There are six principal criticisms that can be made of the non-scientific profiling 
methods/approaches, including the absence of standardised methods and approaches, the 
poor consistency in the use of language, the misapplication of typologies, the high 
dependence on law enforcement instinct and prior investigative experience, the absence of 
clear procedures and for being of little investigative value. 
 
(a) An Absence of Standardised Methods and Approaches 
Across each of the approaches there is no well-defined method or “standard for profiling 
but rather each departs upon different routes to construct a profile of offender 
characteristics”.47   It can be argued that having standardised methods and approaches within 
profiling is vital to the success of developing a coherent method in the construction of a 
profile.48  Additionally, the setting of “goals should form a core aspect” in the construction 
“of a profile because they represent the guidance necessary to standardise the development 
of profiles across a range of offences”.49   
 
Across the non-scientific methods/approaches, it is possible to identify that there are at least 
ten different common goals for profiling.50  For example Douglas et al’s approach places 
primary importance upon analysing the crime scene, providing offender characteristics, 
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providing police leads and evaluating suspect belongings left at the crime scene.  Whereas 
Holmes and Holmes’s approach primarily focuses on providing offender characteristics and 
evaluating suspect belongings left at the crime scene.   
 
Therefore, it can be argued that each of the profiling approaches use the crime scene 
evidence in different ways to achieve different goals but ultimately are aimed at providing 
unknown offender characteristics.  The central problem is that none of the methods 
sufficiently address the question of consistency of methodology and they do not offer any 
consensus on the issue.51   
 
It can be argued that those crimes which allow the profiler to garner particular information 
from the crime scene allow the profiler identify commonalities between crimes so as to 
enable the construction of a profile.52  This may suggest that crimes, such as murder or rape, 
have identifiably similar patterns including- “where they were committed, how they are 
committed and who they are committed against”.53  For example, the Doughlas et al’s 
approach deals with rape, murder, arson and threats to life. Whereas Holmes and Holmes 
approach only deals with rape, paedophilia, murder and arson. There is no available evidence 
capable of demonstrating any of the approaches actually work outside of these offences. It 
is clear that the offences profiled using the non-scientific methods are pathological in nature 
which allows the profiler to identify possible patterns and trends not only from the crime 
scene but also from previous offences. 
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(b) Poor Consistency in the use of Language 
The use of vocabulary throughout each of the approaches varies author by author “which 
contributes to a problematic [coherent] application of the principles” in the construction of 
a profile.54  The primary problem with using different vocabulary throughout each approach 
is that at each vital stage in the construction of a profile, from collecting to analysing crime 
scene evidence, each author describes the process differently despite essential 
commonalities existing.  For example, all of the non-scientific approaches rely, to varying 
degrees, upon physical evidence from the crime scene although each of the methods describe 
the process of collecting evidence by using different vocabulary.  There are two main 
criticisms that can be made of the language used by the authors: 
 
(i) There is a lack of consistency in many of the profiling approaches in the language 
used to explain the profiling techniques and processes.55  For example, serial 
killers are described as being those individuals with a minimum of three victims 
with a cooling off period between killings in the Douglas et al approach.56  
Whereas, in the Holmes and Holmes approach serial killers do not have a cooling 
off period between killings.57  Additionally, Douglas et al’s approach argues that 
an offender’s behaviour is likely to change and adjust over a number of offences 
whereas in the Holmes and Holmes approach they argue that offending behaviour 
across an offence will remain constant throughout. 
 
(ii) There is a lack of evolution towards a standardised vocabulary within the non-
scientific methods.  Whilst it can be argued that each method is entitled to use its 
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own terminology as long as the methods are moving towards a consolidation of 
vocabulary.  Unfortunately, each of the approaches are deficient in developing a 
core vocabulary for profiling.  For example, some of the methods use 
terminology without actually explaining its context or its definition.  Turco uses 
terms such as ‘dyscontrol syndrome’ and ‘pre-Odeipal matrix’ without dealing 
with what the terms mean or how they connect to profiling.   
 
(c) Misapplication of Typologies 
The main “focus of the non-scientific [methods] (except for Turco) is geared principally 
towards the use of typologies where the authors try [to] match the offender to particular 
typologies largely developed by the academic literature”.58  The use of typologies 
throughout the non-scientific approaches creates at least two specific issues: 
 
(i) The non-scientific approaches attempt to cluster offences according to general 
similarities identifiable from a crime scene analysis so as to create a general 
overview and picture of an unknown offender.  This approach produces a belief, 
albeit a conceptual belief, that the constructed profiles are accurate given the 
support from academic study.59  However, it can be argued that it would seem 
unlikely that suspects can be matched to a profile constructed from general 
similarities as not every offender will be the same.  The non-scientific methods 
do not make clear what a profiler should do when an offender does not match all 
or any of the criterions from the general similarities of other crimes.  This creates 
“a conceptual weakness” within the non-scientific methods as “they do not 
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appear to factor in changes within each crime under investigation and the impact 
this may have on the identification of offenders”.60   
 
(ii) There are significant discrepancies within the typologies utilised in the non-
scientific approaches.  For example, some approaches such as ‘Holmes and 
Holmes’ begin with the geographical importance of the offence’s location and 
progress to deal with offender motives without making the linkages between 
motives and the geographical significance of the criminal act.  Additionally, in 
Holmes and Holmes when linking the geographical significance to motives the 
authors use typologies which are based upon a study of 100 inmates in one 
penitentiary in America.   Although the study of 100 inmates does provide an 
empirical insight into the offences committed and does attempt to offer 
explanation as to why those convicted offenders committed their offences, it fails 
methodologically when the authors seek to use one study to form a representation 
of those offences nationally or globally.61  It cannot be legitimate to use one study 
as the basis of predicting crimes nationally as it fails to reflect different cultures, 
attitudes to crime and propensity to commit crime. 
 
 (d) The High Dependence on Law Enforcement Instinct and Prior Investigative Experience 
It is evident from all of the non-scientific methods that they are heavily influenced by the 
intuition of the profiler.  The intuition of a profiler can be considered the investigative 
experience of that profiler in investigating or profiling the offence under investigation.  
There may be a particular danger that the experience of profilers could taint their future 
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construction of profiles.62  The risk of a profiler being tainted by a previous profiling 
experience may be particularly high in non-scientific profiling given that the excessive 
apparent influence of intuition. This may cause at least two issues of note: firstly, the greater 
the role-played by intuition, the greater the likelihood that the reliability of the process is 
compromised.  Secondly, it is apparent from the discussion above that the non-scientific 
approaches validate their profiles so as to measure their ability to identify offenders or likely 
offenders. 63  As a result, these two challenges combine to reveal a real risk that profiles 
could be constructed inaccurately. 
 
(e) An Absence of Clear Procedures 
An overarching problem with non-scientific approaches is that they lack open processes and 
procedures used to construct profiles.64  If the goal of this profiling process is meant to be 
about identifying the offender, then it may be argued that a profiling approach should inform 
the profiler about correlations between crime scene evidence and offender characteristics.65  
Therefore, it may be argued that a primary weakness of the non-scientific approach is the 
lack of an open process so as to understand how likely offender characteristics may be 
gleaned from crime scene evidence. 
 
A secondary weakness is that the non-scientific approaches do not adequately explain how 
to use typologies in the construction of profiles.  
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A final weakness is the silence in each of the non-scientific approaches on how best to deal 
with an overlap between different categories of profiles. Specifically, there is no best 
practice on how to deal with the circumstance where offenders that fit more than one 
profiling approach. This means that the profiler has to pick which profiling approach may 
be best suited with little or no guidance to support their decision-making process.  
 
(f) Little Investigative Value? 
There is little (if any) evidence to demonstrate that the non-scientific approaches work in 
practice by being able to assist law enforcement officers identify offenders or likely 
offenders. Each of the non-scientific approaches work on the basis of a hypothesis which is 
never quite tested and retested to ensure/improve its accuracy. 
 
2.2.4 Scientific Deductive Profiling Approaches 
A common theme evident across many authors of the non-scientific profiling methods and 
approaches is their usage of scientific terminology when making the linkages between crime 
scene evidence and the various typologies used in the construction of potential offender 
characteristic profiles.  However, none of these methods and approaches claim to represent 
a completely scientific approach to deduct potential offender characteristics.66   
 
A scientific method for the purposes of this thesis will be considered ‘scientific’ when that 
method or approach exhibits certain features including the ability to replicate the results, test 
the results and validate the results of the profiles constructed.  Additionally, it must be 
possible to assess the process used to construct the profile in order to ascertain whether it 
remains constant across a range of profiles.  Further, it should also be possible to identify 
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the areas where the profile fails and the areas where the profile succeeds in identifying 
offender characteristics.  Each of the authors in the non-scientific approaches directly or 
indirectly accentuates the importance of investigative experience and professional 
judgement as a key component in the process of profile construction.   
 
The first attempt to inject elements of scientific methodologies into profiling was undertaken 
in the work of David Canter.67  Much of Canter’s work grew out of an impetus to criticise 
the non-scientific methods of profiling.  Canter’s principal criticisms of the non-scientific 
methods revolve around the lack of research conducted by the proponents of the non-
scientific methods.68   
 
From a scientific perspective there are two key differences between Canter’s work and the 
previous non-scientific profiling approaches.  Firstly, Canter places profiling within 
investigative psychology in an attempt to validate his profiles.  Secondly he publishes all of 
his results, both successes and failures in an attempt to identify a process that works.  In 
essence the Canter profiling process becomes more scientific than the other non-scientific 
approaches, as it uses investigative psychology to develop processes to test, replicate and 
validate the profiles constructed. 
 
“Investigative psychology” (IP) uses a collection of psychological techniques developed 
principally by Canter which are a mix of inductive and deductive techniques which is subject 
to the quality and the amount of data accumulated and available.69  The deductive elements 
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use current crime scene evidence whilst the inductive elements seek to use previous criminal 
records to draw comparisons to the current offence under investigation and past criminality. 
 
IP adopts a five step approach to offender profiling which includes an analysis of “an 
offender’s interpersonal coherence” at the crime scene, the significance of time and place of 
the criminal act, any criminal characteristics exhibited by the offender, the potential of the 
offender having “a criminal career” and a “forensic awareness” of all the crime scene 
evidence.70   
 
It is explained by Canter that interpersonal coherence involves examining the behaviour of 
individuals when they interact with other people.71  It refers to examining the consistency 
between offending and non-offending behaviour.  Canter argues that the same characteristics 
exhibited during a criminal offence are exhibited during the offender’s everyday life.72    
The significance of the time and place of a criminal act draws on typological models 
employed in environmental criminology.73  The offence may occur at a time and/or a place 
that holds some personal significance that may indicate to the profiler something about the 
offender’s likely characteristics.  The example that Canter uses here is where a criminal act 
occurs along a major road route, which he suggests that this may demonstrate that the 
offender is a courier or truck driver because the criminal act took place close to a major road 
route.74  The underlying significance of considering the time and place of a criminal act is 
the suggestion that offenders will most likely commit serious crime in an area they are 
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familiar with.75  This area will more commonly be close to the offender’s personal life, or at 
minimum may have significance to the offender.76 
 
The consideration of the likely criminal characteristics of other convicted offenders who 
engage in similar crimes can assist investigators in establishing typical and common 
characteristics of that offence.77  Canter identifies that the aim here is to see “whether the 
nature of the crime and the way it is committed can lead to some” classification which can 
assist the profiler in leading to likely offender characteristics.78  This involves drawing 
parallels between past criminality and current criminality. 
 
It is also argued by Canter that the consideration of whether the unknown offender may have 
a criminal career may assist the profiler in establishing the potential offender 
characteristics.79  An example provided by Canter is the offender who is a rapist and is able 
to enter a premises undetected may indicate that they have committed prior offences in 
burglary where they utilised those skills of entering a premises.   
 
The final facet of Canter’s profiling approach is being forensically aware of all available 
evidence which is closely related to the previous criminal career dynamic.  This is where the 
offender has an awareness of the evidence likely to be used by the police to assist in their 
detection.  For example, a rapist who uses a condom and takes the condom with them after 
a crime may have an arrest history in rape.  Additionally, a murderer who takes the spent 
                                                             
75 Ainsworth (n72), 199. 
76 J. Boon, ‘The contribution of personality theories to psychological profiling’ in J. Jackson and D. Bekarian 
(eds), Offender Profiling: Theory, Research and Practice (John Wiley & Sons Publishing, 1997), 43-49. 
77 Canter (n68), 91-92. 
78 D. Canter, ‘Offender Profiles’ (1989) 2(1) The Psychologist 14, 15-16. 
79 Canter (n68), 91-92. 
 61 
gun cartridges with them is likely to be aware that they could be used by the police to link 
offences. 
 
From compiling this information, there are five characteristics or clusters of information that 
are important within Canter’s approach of profiling in assisting the profiler to construct the 
likely offender characteristics.80  These include (1) the location of the criminal act, (2) the 
criminal bibliography of the likely offender, (3) the domestic/social characteristics of the 
crime, (4) the likely personal characteristics of the offender and (5) the occupational and 
educational history of the offender.    
 
In essence, Canter’s profiling approach draws upon both deductive and inductive elements 
of profiling.  The inductive element of Canter’s approach uses previous criminal information 
to identify commonalities between convicted offender characteristics and particular 
offences.  For example, Canter’s approach makes linkages between those convicted of 
murder and those crimes of murder being investigated in an attempt to correlate some of the 
particular similarities between crimes so as to distil likely offender characteristics.  The 
process used by Canter to draw out these similarities and commonalities is primarily through 
using investigative psychology techniques to distil likely offender characteristics.  The 
deductive element of Canter’s profiling approach lies in the fact that this approach is 
primarily used to investigate crimes that have already been committed. 
 
2.2.5 Scientific Deductive Profiling Approaches – A Critique 
There are two key criticisms that can be made of Canter’s IP approach in constructing 
profiles.  




Firstly, the inductive element of Canter’s approach relies heavily upon linking a sample of 
past criminal records to a current crime under investigation so as to predict the likely 
offender characteristics.81 For example, one of the core components of Canter’s work is the 
ability to use past criminal records and information as a basis to predict likely offender 
characteristics for a particular crime being investigated.  The main criticism of this practice 
is the fact that the size of the sample criminal records to predict commonalties between the 
crime being investigated and the previous occurrence of that crime may simply be too small 
to allow accurate and creditable predictions of the likely offender characteristics.82  In 
essence, Canter’s work is subjected to a relatively small sample of past criminal records 
which questions the legitimacy of making connections between past criminality and current 
criminality.83  However, as time passes and the more Canter conducts his profiling 
techniques this flaw may be corrected, as with the more crimes profiled by Canter the greater 
the body of literature will become. 
 
Secondly, many of the statistical procedures used in making linkages between past 
criminality and the current criminality will take a single behaviour and interpret it outside 
of its context in which it occurs.84  For example if “a rapist bites the breast of a victim” 
during an assault, this behaviour may have for all intents and purposes the same meaning 
regardless of its motivation.85  It may be the case that an offender is trying to correct 
resistance presented by the victim in reaction to the assault or alternatively it may be an 
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offender who is biting out of sadistic impulses.  The two motivations here and subsequent 
meaning of the behaviour are different but may be treated as being the same by applying the 
IP analysis. 
 
In conclusion on scientific approaches of profiling, it can be identified that at minimum there 
are clearer processes to use in constructing profiles.86  These processes may be considered 
more ‘scientific’ than the non-scientific approaches as they at least allow the possibility of 
replication, testing and validation in future profiling. 
This discussion will now turn to examine the deductive profiling approaches in the context 
of terrorism in order to identify if there are any processes that can be used in the 
identification of likely terrorist characteristics. 
 
2.2.6 The Applicability of Deductive Profiling Approaches to Terrorism 
In dealing with the non-scientific profiling approaches first, it is evident that many of the 
non-scientific methods and approaches discussed above primarily draw upon a profiler’s 
experience, their intuition and the use of typologies to compare and contrast offences under 
investigation.87  The lack of standardised methods and approaches, the poor consistency in 
the use of language, the misapplication of typologies coupled with the heavy reliance upon 
‘intuition’ all form together to question the legitimacy and accuracy of predicting offender 
characteristics.  There is a severe lack of evidence to assess whether “this design of profiling 
actually works at either assisting or helping the investigation and the detection of criminal 
offenders.”88   The principal problem with the non-scientific methods is that they fail to 
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incorporate principles, approaches and methods that can be validated by replication which 
would increase the likelihood of accuracy in processes and methodologies in the 
construction of profiles.  
 
In light of this discussion, it is now pertinent to consider whether the non-scientific 
approaches might be useful to identify unknown terrorist characteristics. In following the 
critique above, there are two significant weaknesses with using non-scientific 
methods/approaches to identify terrorists:  
(1) Non-scientific profiling methods all deal with crimes that may be considered 
pathological in nature where offenders exhibit core traits across a range of 
offences.89 For example, murder, rape, arson etc, all these offences carry specific 
characteristics and tendencies which other offenders are likely to exhibit in the 
commission of that offence.90  It is possible to map out these characteristics and 
tendencies of convicted offenders.  However, it may be considered that terrorism 
offences do not necessarily exhibit the same or similar pathology.91   
 
(2) The use of typologies forms a central function in the development of profiles within 
non-scientific profiling approaches.92  For example, the typologies used in the 
Holmes and Holmes approach demonstrates that profiling in general may only be 
suitable for particular crimes which are serial in nature.  The four crimes that 
Holmes and Holmes provide typologies for are murder, rape, arson and paedophilia 
– all of these crimes are serial in nature which allow for the identification of patterns 
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and trends to detect the behavioural and personality characteristics from the crime 
scene analysis.   It is questionable whether terrorism offences can use typologies for 
constructing profiles as terrorism represents a very dynamic threat changeable 
country by country which varies considerably over time. 
 
In conclusion it may be argued that non-scientific profiling approaches do not exhibit any 
practical or logical processes which can be used in the context of identifying likely terrorist 
characteristics. 
 
In dealing with scientific profiling approaches it can be argued that there are two core 
weaknesses which question the viability of using scientific approaches in the context of 
terrorism. 
 
Firstly, the scientific approach is highly contingent upon making linkages between the crime 
scene evidence and past criminality.  The problem presented by this dynamic is that it may 
be considered difficult to link each terrorism crime scene when in fact it has been essentially 
destroyed.  Additionally, this issue can become further complicated as information on 
terrorist offences and convictions may differ greatly from country to country.   
 
Secondly, the core aim and focus of the scientific profiling approach is to identify 
characteristics of an offender who is at large and so far undetected.  In contemporary 
terrorism the use of suicide bombers has formed a central strategy in successfully executing 
acts of terrorism.  Therefore, using scientific profiling approaches would be contrary to its 
overall objective as the offender being profiled will already be dead with the act of terrorism.     
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For these reasons it may be argued that the deductive profiling methods and approaches are 
not generally suited to form a basis for identifying likely offender characteristics in the 
context of contemporary terrorism. 
   
The discussion will now turn to analyse whether there are any methods within inductive 
profiling which can be used within the context of terrorism to identify likely offender 
characteristics. 
 
2.3 Inductive Profiling 
2.3.1 Introduction 
As noted above, inductive profiling is the practice where law enforcement officers use past 
criminal records to predict future crimes and likely offender characteristics to detect future 
trends in criminal activity.  It involves a profiler extracting key information from previous 
criminal records and establishing commonalities between that information.  Essentially, the 
inductive profiling process becomes an inferential process whereby the profiler makes a 
sequence of rational judgments about the information gleaned from previous criminal 
records which leads to an overall conclusion of likely offender characteristics.   
 
The statistical information used for predicting probability is drawn from at least two sources: 
firstly, previous criminality and/or secondly police officer investigative experience.93  If the 
profiler can identify patterns in the characteristics of offenders from previous criminal 
records or previous officer investigative experience, then correlations of future criminal 
behaviour may become possible.  Inductive profiling can be used for specific crimes such 
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as drug trafficking or in specific geographical areas which are known for high crime rates 
as a basis for identifying potential offenders.  It holds the potential for being an important 
tool in allowing police officers to target their policing policies in practice. 
A core foundation in inductive profiling is the assumption that the higher the probability of 
matching an individual to a profile constructed from past criminality, the greater the 
likelihood that person will be engaged in crime.94 
 
Therefore, the distinction between deductive and inductive profiling is that deductive 
profiling is reactive to a particular crime and seeks to assist police officers to solve crimes 
that are already committed.  In contrast, inductive profiling is intended to interfere with or 
foil crimes which have not yet been committed.  The core basis of inductive profiling is the 
ability to predict likely crime with the likely offender characteristics.  It is aimed at assisting 
police officers in predicting criminality based upon previous occurrences and patterns of 
crime. 
 
There is a substantial imbalance in the coverage in the literature between inductive and 
deductive profiling.  There is substantial coverage of deductive profiling whilst inductive 
profiling is covered somewhat less.  It may be argued that there is a substantial coverage of 
deductive profiling as it has evolved essentially from police officer investigative experience, 
whereas inductive profiling has tended to evolve as an attempt to correct methodological 
weaknesses within deductive profiling and as a way to predict patterns of future criminality.   
 
The discussion of inductive profiling is divided into five parts.  The discussion in the first 
part provides a general background to inductive profiling so as to examine the wider issue 
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of the increasing use of probability and prediction within criminal justice more generally.  It 
is important to consider this aspect because it highlights the fact that inductive profiling 
forms part of a much wider general theme which demonstrates a trend towards actuarial 
science and methods of prediction within criminal justice.  The discussion in the second part 
concentrates on analysing the actual methods used within inductive profiling so as to 
consider how profiles are actually constructed using inductive methods.  The discussion in 
the third part provides a critique and an evaluation of the inductive profiling methods.  The 
discussion in the fourth section concentrates on the relevance and applicability of using 
inductive profiling methods to identify likely terrorist characteristics.    
 
2.3.2 Actuarial Prediction and Criminal Justice 
Kaufmann argues that during the 1980s and 1990s there has been an increasing trend in the 
criminal justice system towards using risk-assessment instruments, algorithms and 
profiling.95  Harcourt explains that selective incapacitation policies, parole prediction, 
predictions of future dangerousness and ‘three strike’ laws are examples of these increasing 
actuarial procedures.96   
 
The use of prediction and probability for crime can be traced to the first half of the 1920s 
when parole boards made predictions about offender recidivism rates.  This early approach 
involving the prediction of offending modelled its approach on the same scientific approach 
used by insurance companies to estimate the probable cost of insuring new applicants.97  
Over time the acknowledgement of correlations between criminality and an offender’s 
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personal circumstances, physical traits, genetic makeup and the environment of the offender 
changed the decisive elements of predictability. Parole boards used group traits, individual 
traits and their record in prison to predict the likelihood of an individual reoffending if 
released early on parole.98 
 
With an increasing emphasis over the past century towards the individualisation of 
punishment of offenders, this has fuelled an actuarial rise in law enforcement policy with a 
desire to identify correlations between crime patterns and offender characteristics.99  This 
method of crime prediction involves the mechanical combination of information so as to 
classify crime with the ultimate objective of discerning the probability or a likelihood of a 
criminal act.100  In the context of decision-making in law enforcement, the core aspect of 
prediction involves probabilistic reasoning by analysing any identified correlations between 
crime, criminal patterns and offenders.101   
 
The general goal of actuarial methods in criminal justice, and more specifically policing, are 
deterrence and efficiency.  Both of these goals combine to form a utilitarian model for police 
action – the deterrent effect on the offender increases proportionally with the ‘cost factor’ 
of catching offenders.  Therefore, if actuarial policing methods can increase the likelihood 
of identifying and catching offenders there is a correlation between deterring future offences 
and identifying potential offenders which may result in a general cost reduction for policing.  
The inductive profiling approach rests on a simple premise; if different people with similar 
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characteristics commit similar crimes, other unknown offenders will share these common 
personality and general traits.102   
 
Furthermore, if actuarial methods of policing can be used within the context of terrorism 
then this may have significant advantages in managing the threat of terrorism and its 
preparatory activities.  As terrorists have used everyday objects, such as planes and trains, 
to successfully execute mass terrorism killings, it has become increasingly difficult for 
police officers to identify potential terrorists.  The ability of current terrorists to operate 
under the guise of normality and turn everyday items into weapons capable of mass 
destruction requires a unique counter-terrorism strategy to manage the risk and threat of 
terrorism as it evolves over time.  The advantage of using actuarial methods and approaches 
to predict the likely characteristics of terrorists so as to allow police pre-emption would not 
only bring financial benefits but also, and more importantly, it would prevent the needless 
loss of life caused by acts of terrorism by allowing the police to pre-empt planned attacks. 
 
This section will now turn to investigate the inductive profiling methods to identify how 
inductive profiling actually works in practice. 
 
2.3.3 Inductive Profiling Methods – The Computation of an Inductive Argument 
Inductive arguments and profiles involve the development of a hypothesis which can draw 
upon a variety of methodologies and processes.103  As Burch explains: 
“[t]here are several common types of inductive arguments, including 
predictions about the future, arguments from analogy, inductive 
generalisations, (many) arguments from authority, arguments based on signs 
and causal inference.”104 
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On the basis of the literature it is possible to identify two common and prevalent types of 
inductive profiling methods.  The first is inductive generalisation which creates inductive 
profiles that argue from a specific point to a grand generalised theme.105  For example, this 
would involve drawing conclusions formed about offender “characteristics from 
observations of a single [criminal] event or [convicted offender] or a small number of 
criminal events” or convicted offenders.106  After these observations, the profiler would draw 
generalisations to suggest or predict similar criminal events or potential offender 
characteristics which are likely to be encountered by the police in future crime.   
 
The second method for inductive argument is statistical argument.107  This is where a 
collection of previous conviction records is used to identify a statistical correlation and 
pattern between previous convictions and offender characteristics.  For example, it would 
typically involve a police officer sifting through a sample of previous conviction records to 
draw out and match offending characteristics with particular types of crimes.  The accuracy 
of the statistical argument is a matter of probability and ultimately can only be considered a 
matter of ‘likelihood’.108   
 
Most inductive profiles will combine inductive generalisations from the profiler’s 
experience and secondly statistical argument from previous criminal records. 
The actual inductive profiling process relies solely on statistical and/or correlational 
reasoning to identify likely offender characteristics – it essentially revolves around the 
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construction of a sequence of probabilities.109  For example, inductive profiling involves a 
profiler making a sequence of inferences from criminal records which allows them to make 
generalisations, known as a premise which becomes the working assumption for the police 
officer in the field.110  The specific observations made from previous cases and instances of 
offending allow differences and similarities to emerge within particular categories of crime.  
For example, this may involve a police officer sifting through previous crime records to 
identify patterns and commonalities.  In order for commonalities to be identified it would 
involve the profiler researching through past witness statements, criminal records and any 
information on past crimes to identify similarities within particular crimes such as murder, 
rape, drug related crimes, etc.   It is argued by Kocsis that the core skill required by the 
profiler is the ability to calculate statistics from previous criminal records and pre-existing 
crime information.111   
 
2.3.4 Inductive Profiling – A Critique 
Inductive profiling is arguably a much simpler method than deductive profiling because it 
solely uses past offending records and/or police officer investigative experience for the 
prediction of future crime and likely offender characteristics.   
 
Aside from the main critique that inductive profiling is only a prediction of ‘likelihoods’ and 
as such can never be considered as definitively accurate, there are four key criticisms of the 
legitimacy and the creditability of using inductive methods for identifying likely offender 
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characteristics: firstly, the size of the criminal record sample, secondly the accuracy of 
criminal records, thirdly the variance in practice and finally the profiler training. 
 
(A) The Size of the Criminal Record Samples 
Popper argues that samples of past cases will not always allow for the drawing of accurate 
conclusions and generalisations about criminality and offender characteristics.112  The key 
task for any profiler using inductive methods is to decide which records to use and how 
many samples of records to include as the raw source of information.   The accuracy of any 
prediction will be contingent upon the ability of the profiler to select not only relevant 
records but also an appropriate number of records to build a statistical base of common 
information.  For example, as we saw in the discussion of deductive profiling, Holmes and 
Holmes failed to demonstrate that the inclusion of interviews with 100 convicted offenders 
in a US penitentiary added any accuracy to their profiling methodology.  Rather the 
interviews only served to identify commonalities between the 100 interviewees which could 
not be taken as representative of the crimes profiled by Holmes and Holmes. 
 
The particular issue with the selection of records concerns the ability to identify which 
records are most representative of crime and how many records to include.  For example, is 
it better for the profiler to select records on a chronological basis or on a random basis?  How 
many records make a good statistical basis to extract the key information?  The particular 
danger with having no set procedures for selecting records and for setting a minimum 
number of samples is that it may lead to the profiler towards selecting particular types of 
criminal records. 
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It can be argued that the random selection of previous crime records for the purposes of 
predicting future crimes is problematic in ensuring accuracy in the prediction.  Ultimately 
the reliability of using past criminal records as a core source of statistical data to predict 
future criminal trends, patterns and offending characteristics will depend heavily upon the 
volume of the sample and the accuracy of the information contained within those records. 
 
(B) The Accuracy of Criminal Records 
There are two critical issues in using previous criminal records as the key source for the 
future predictability of crime and likely offender characteristics.  
  
Firstly, a study conducted by Farrington and Lambert into the prediction of likely burglar 
offender characteristics from past criminal records of violent crimes demonstrates serious 
accuracy issues within the recording of criminal information.113  The research presented by 
Farrington et al sets out to test whether inductive profiling can actually assist field officers 
in the prediction of offender’s characteristics likely to be involved in burglary or violent 
crime.  They used existing police records and compared a vast array of criminal offences to 
form predictions; in total they used 665 criminal records.  They found that there were 
common correlations between height, weight, build, gender, ethnicity, facial hair, tattoos 
and hair colour towards the types of crimes committed.114  Their research demonstrated that 
there were a number of commonalities which could allow a process to identify potential 
offender characteristics.  In particular, they found that “offender’s features, offence features, 
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victim features, victim reports of the offender and witness reports of the offender” should 
always be included in an inductive profile to attempt to provide a full profile of prediction.115   
 
However, the research found that the accuracy of police records was deficient and in 
particular the methods used by the police to record data varied leading to inaccuracies in the 
actual recording of key information.  The lack of systematic and consistent inclusion of all 
important information within criminal records lead to many predictions being subjected to 
substantial assumptions to compensate for any missing information.116  Although 
commonalities were identifiable from the records the authors found that many 
generalisations were required to compensate for the lack of consistent information in order 
to build predictive offender characteristics.117  Ultimately in this particular example, it can 
be argued that due to the poor recording of criminal information and the assumptive nature 
of inductive profiling, many profiles only serve as a useful tool amongst many other policing 
practices to assist field officers in the detection of crime. 
 
Secondly, there are further issues with using particular types and categories of crime for the 
prediction of future crime and offender characteristics.118  Turvey argues that there are at 
least four central issues which may affect the creditability and the reliability of certain 
recorded crimes for use as a statistical output.119   
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In Turvey’s first argument, he identifies that an anger retaliatory offender who commits a 
crime in response to an angered situation who does not possess any psychological illnesses 
does not represent a good statistical source for predicting future offending probability.  As 
a result, those offenders who commit crimes as a ‘one off’ criminal act who were angered 
by a situation are not likely to be a good source for probability of future crime.   
 
In Turvey’s second argument, he identifies that domestic violence-related offences cannot 
be predictive of other similar crimes.  He argues that domestic violence crimes are a 
particular type of crime that exhibit specific characteristics and traits which are often unique 
to their individual circumstances.  In Turvey’s third argument, he identifies that those 
convictions that are a direct result of police intelligence are also not likely to be a good 
statistical source.  In cases where crimes are detected by police intelligence, it is unclear as 
to whether the police would have been able to detect that crime without the aid of specific 
intelligence.  The inclusion of these types of criminal records may interfere with the 
accuracy of a profile when using records that have not resulted from police intelligence.   
 
In Turvey’s final, he argues that offences involving controlled substances such as drugs and 
narcotics are too varied and too unpredictable to allow future crimes to be predicted on their 
basis.  For example, Turvey suggests that when offenders have consumed controlled 
substances their rationality and ability to commit crime is highly subjective to the individual 
offender.   
 
On the basis of Turvey’s arguments, it can be contended that the ability to predict offending 
on past occurrences of crime becomes entangled with issues of credibility and reliability 
surrounding the source information used as the basis for predicting offender characteristics.   
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If police officers use past offending records to build the likely identity of future offender 
characteristics and patterns, it is likely the whole basis of prediction is at best only probable.  
 
(C) The Variance in Practice 
There are two central issues involving the variance in practice within inductive profiling.  
Firstly, there is a variance in practice in constructing the profile and secondly, there is a 
variance in practice in the application of the profile in practice. 
 
In dealing with the first issue, there is no national co-ordinated procedure for ensuring 
consistency in the construction of profiles.120  This means that profiling officers construct 
profiles without any specific guidelines.  The particular danger with profilers operating 
without specific guidelines is that profilers can decide which factors they should include in 
constructing the profile.121  The profiler can use factors such “as age, gender, race and 
ethnicity of the offender” from the criminal records to identify commonalities between 
particular crimes and particular genres of offenders.122  For example, a profiler may find that 
a particular age range, gender and race are common amongst criminal records which are 
associated with particular categories of crimes.123  This can become problematic if any one 
of the factors takes precedence in the construction of the profile.   
 
In dealing with the second issue, when a profile is used in practice a police officer can use 
the race, gender, age and ethnicity factors amongst other factors to apply the profile to 
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identify potential offenders and criminality.124  Over time the police officer can become 
tainted by a repetitious use of profiles constructed from experience and/or past criminal 
records using the same factors to extract offender characteristics.125  If the same or similar 
factors continually re-emerge, law enforcement officers can become targeted at specific 
individuals or groups of individuals who fit this profile.126 
 
The practice of police officers using inductive profiling may be justifiable in so far as it 
allows policing resources to be concentrated on identifying and locating unknown offenders 
on the basis of an identified likelihood of offending characteristics from a profile.127 The 
practice of profiling becomes similar in nature to sampling:128 when police officers use 
profiled characteristics derived from inductive processes, they are essentially attempting to 
sample more members of the predicted higher offending groups.129  Instead of the alternative 
random sampling, which would be the only way to achieve a proportional cross-section of 
the population, the police are in principle sampling greater numbers from within the 
predictive higher-offending groups which attempts to skew the sampling results in favour of 
frequent offender types. 130   
 
However, the problem becomes apparent if particular groups of individuals become the 
focus as a result of inductive profiling methods.131  For example if particular races or age 
groups become the subject content of profiles then these groups of individuals will become 
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more likely to be disproportionately subjected to law enforcement policies and police checks 
in comparison to other members of society.132  The basis of the identification of these groups 
of people may be solely based on an imperfect collection of historical criminal records.133  
In essence inductive profiling methodologies allow profiles to be repeatedly used which may 
or may not be fully accurate.134 
 
There are two critical questions which arise out of a method and process which allow the 
identification of a group of individuals to become subject to greater police scrutiny without 
any actual evidence of criminality.  Firstly, does the concentrated sampling by the police 
actually result in crime detection?  Secondly, how does the law become concentrated on 
particular types of characteristics?   
 
In considering the first question, it is not evident that inductive profiling methods can 
actually result in crime detection as the methods do not facilitate profilers to validate the 
accuracy of their profiles.  There is no mechanism to identify the success in detecting 
criminality using inductive profiling.   
 
Additionally, in considering the second question, the real danger of inductive profiling 
methods is that it may facilitates the potential that numerous individuals may become subject 
to continual suspicion by police officers simply because they fit a particular characteristic 
or trait.135  Whilst “Code A of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984”136 specifies the 
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factors a police officer may take into account in forming reasonable suspicion of criminality, 
it only specifies the range of factors and arguably does not ensure that particular 
marginalised communities are not demonised because they exhibit particular characteristics 
within an inductive profile.  
 
(D) Profiler Training 
The standards applied for training of profilers differ greatly not only from country to country 
but from police force to police force.137  There is no consistency in profiler training, with 
sometimes profiles being constructed by police officers with investigative experience and 
sometimes profiles being constructed by personnel trained in investigative psychology.138  
The net effect of using different personnel for creating profiles is that there can be a 
mismatch between the skills of the profiler and the skills required to build an accurate 
profile.139   
Traditionally, inductive profiles were qualified with phrases such as “normally, likely, often, 
many, rarely, most, some, probably, usually, always, never,” etc to indicate to the profile 
user that the information contained within the profile is only at best probable and its accuracy 
is contingent upon certain factors relevant to the crime and the offender.140  In more recent 
times, research conducted by Turvey indicates that profilers are no longer using these 
qualifiers in inductive profiles which may have a consequential effect on the accuracy of 
profiling in practice creating the distinct potential to sway police attention in a particular 
direction which may or may not be accurate.141    
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The training of the profiler presents a critical issue for ensuring consistency and accuracy in 
the development of inductive profiles.  Ultimately without effective training, guidelines and 
frameworks for profilers, the inductive profiling process becomes subject to criticism for 
being ineffective. 
 
(E) Summary Conclusions 
Before moving on to examining inductive profiling methods within the context of terrorism 
it is important to point out that within criminal law there are a number of imperfections 
within inductive profiling methods.  Firstly, there are a number of problems surrounding the 
size of the sample used by the profiler and how best to select these records.  Secondly there 
are difficulties surrounding the accuracy of the criminal records as a raw source of 
information for the statistical calculation of future criminality and offender characteristics.  
Thirdly, there are significant issues with the variance in practice of profiling which affect 
not only the construction of the profile but also its application in practice.  Finally, there are 
further issues surrounding the training of profilers and the skills training required to ensure 
consistency in profiling methods and techniques. 
 
The critique of inductive profiling methods demonstrates that inductive profiling at best only 
provides the field officer with an indication of characteristics which may or may not be 
accurate in detecting and identifying potential offenders. 
 
This section will now turn to evaluate whether the inductive methods of profiling can be 
used within the terrorism context to identify potential unknown terrorists. 
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2.3.5 Inductive Profiling and its applicability to Terrorism 
As noted above, the starting point for inductive profiling methods within criminal law is the 
identification of criminal records and then to draw out from these records commonalities 
using probabilistic reasoning to identify likely offender characteristics.  Therefore, in 
applying these profiling methods within the counter-terrorism context to assist law 
enforcement officers with the identification of likely terrorist characteristics, the starting 
point must be focused on considering what information is available on convicted terrorist.   
 
Early behavioural research conceptualised terrorism as “psychological and behavioural 
deviance”.142  The early behavioural studies conducted on known terrorists sought to place 
the origin of the deviance within disturbances from the terrorist’s childhood.143  However, 
with greater advances in science in the understanding of psychology, the general consensus 
amongst modern experts is that terrorists are not psychologically abnormal nor do they 
exhibit any characteristics which could be considered abnormal – in fact they are more than 
often ‘normal’ everyday citizens.144   
 
As a result of their normality, it is challenging to construct a precise general profile which 
will reflect current terrorist types or at least the identity of those individuals likely to be 
associated with contemporary terrorism.145  For example, it might be considered that in the 
aftermath of September 11th and the London Bombings on 7/7 that the current ‘face’ of 
terrorism originates from individuals with an appearance from Asia/South-East Asia.  
Although numerous terrorist organisations exist globally, one of the current biggest threats 
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faced by the UK, Europe and the USA is found within the al Qaeda terrorist organisation.  
A survey documented by Gunarantna highlights that al Qaeda recruits from more than 74 
countries worldwide with more than 40 different nationalities.146  This evidence suggests 
that it is particularly difficult to locate physical traits, ethnicity, gender, common 
characteristics etc as uniquely or commonly associated with the current ‘face’ of 
terrorism.147   
 
Therefore, using inductive profiling methods to identify potential terrorist characteristics 
requires an examination of past convicted terrorists or known terrorists to distil the 
commonalities to use as a statistical basis for the prediction of likely future terrorist 
characteristics.  As terrorism and the threat of terrorism remains a global phenomenon, it 
can be argued that the best inductive profile would be constructed from an array of terrorism 
offences and terrorism records across a number of countries so as to allow a full statistical 
basis to construct inductive profiles.  Before considering the actual methods used within 
inductive profiling, it is possible to identify four fundamental challenges within counter-
terrorism laws and terrorism records which combine to present some difficulties and 
challenges in ensuring the reliability of using inductive profiles within a counter-terrorism 
context. 
 
Firstly, there are issues surrounding the classification of terrorist offences arising out of the 
changing nature of terrorism laws and frameworks which criminalise terrorism that affect 
the identification and selection of terrorism records for inductive purposes.  Secondly, there 
are issues with the overlapping nature of the prosecution of terrorism crimes under ordinary 
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criminal law in addition to specific terrorism laws.  Thirdly, in comparison to ordinary 
criminal law, there are significantly lower successful prosecutions under terrorism laws 
which mean that there are very few individuals actually convicted of terrorism offences.  
Finally, there are likely to be issues of accuracy in the actual content of the terrorism records 
which may affect the validity of using these records as a basis to distil likely terrorist 
characteristics.  This chapter will now turn to examine each of these issues in turn below 
before considering the general challenges of using inductive profiling methods within a 
counter-terrorism context. 
 
2.3.5.1 Inductive Profiling and Terrorism Records  
It is not evident that all the information available on convicted terrorists will be relevant for 
predicting current contemporary terrorist characteristics.  Terrorism has changed radically 
over the past century and in particular in the last two decades which continues to evolve on 
a global scale.  It is argued by Rapoport that terrorism has occurred in a sequence of four 
waves each lasting approximately forty years each starting from the 1870s.148  He argues 
that the first wave began in Russia in 1870 and was a direct result of a slow democratisation 
process. He further argues that the second wave of terrorism began with the dissident’s 
efforts in colonised countries to secure European withdrawal from overseas territories.  
Rapoport identifies the third wave of terrorism as the principal terrorist threats throughout 
the twentieth century.  Examples provided by Rapoport are tactical assassinations with the 
hi-jacking of airplanes and public office buildings in addition to lucrative kidnappings.149  
The final wave of terrorism, is the current manifestation of terrorism, and is a religious 
orientated form of terrorism which originally centred upon Islam.150  
                                                             
148 D. Rapoport, ‘Modern terror: the Four Waves’ in A. Cronin and J. Ludes (eds) Attacking Terrorism: 
Elements of a Grand Strategy.  (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 46-59. 
149 ibid, 55-60. 
150 ibid, 61. 
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If Rapoport’s arguments can be accepted as factually accurate then the individual 
convictions of terrorist offenders within each of these waves are likely to be radically 
different.  Additionally, the laws criminalising terrorism will differ greatly in each period of 
history to match the threat of terrorism faced by particular countries.  The difference will 
not necessarily be within the laws prohibiting terrorism acts but rather in their application in 
practice in targeting the prevalent contemporary threat.  As a result, terrorism records are 
likely to be reflective the laws in operation and their application to individual instances of 
terrorism. 
 
The laws criminalising terrorism have evolved from at least two things: firstly the threat 
faced by a particular country and secondly, the ability of legal frameworks to facilitate 
prosecutions.151  For example in the UK the changing nature of the terrorism threat over the 
past seven decades has seen a continuous development of specific terrorism laws which have 
resulted in a differential array of terrorism convictions.152  In the UK’s more recent history, 
an attempt to criminalise terrorism was taken in response to the Northern Ireland troubles in 
the 1970s with the enactment of the “Prevention of Terrorism Act 1974”.  The Northern 
Ireland troubles presented a unique threat which saw the introduction of a number of 
Prevention of Terrorism Acts (PTA) from 1974 until 1989 which were initially designed to 
deal with specific threats within Northern Ireland but subsequently were widened out to 
cover the UK wide terrorism threats not only emanating from Northern Ireland but also 
international terrorism.153   
 
                                                             
151 C. Walker, Terrorism and the Law (Oxford University Press, 2011), 3-4 
152 C. Walker, The Anti-Terrorism Legislation (Oxford University Press, 2009), 34-36. 
153 Walker (n 152), chp 11. 
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These laws facilitated the prosecution of those individuals or groups of individuals suspected 
of terrorism.  As the threat of terrorism faced by the UK changed direction at the end of 
twentieth century the criminalisation of terrorism became more permanent with the 
introduction of the “Terrorism Act 2000” (TA).    Other Acts of Parliament such as the 
“Crime and Security Act 2001”, “Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005”, “Terrorism Act 2006”, 
“Terrorism (Northern Ireland) Act 2006” and the “Justice and Security (Northern Ireland) 
Act 2007” and the “Counter Terrorism Act 2008” have attempted to fine tune the counter-
terrorism framework in step with the gravity and changing nature of the threat faced by the 
UK from contemporary terrorism. 
Therefore, from the UK in the 1970s it is possible to identify the laws designed to criminalise 
terrorism changing from a narrow Northern Ireland specific focus to wider international 
terrorist focus to the current focus of radical, fundamental and international terrorism threats 
coupled with some outstanding threats from Northern Ireland ‘republicans’.  The issue that 
stems from this is the fact that the successful prosecutions taken on foot of these laws will 
result in a specific terrorism record corresponding to the specific instance of terrorism.  For 
example, the early PTA criminalisation of terrorism will be dominated with the Northern 
Ireland troubles whilst the more recent successful prosecutions will be dominated by the 
contemporary terrorism threat.  It is inevitable that due to the nature of terrorism evolving 
and shifting in focus, there will be categorises of terrorism records which will be similar, 
less similar and those that will be completely different. 
 
In order to manage the issue of how best to categorise terrorism records, there must be a 
process within the identification, selection and collation of terrorism records which allows 
a profiler to separate and streamline those terrorism records which belong to each category 
of terrorism.  For example, if the police are profiling current threats, each individual threat 
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will require a separate statistical base of terrorism records to make those predictions more 
accurate and tailored to meet the specific threat under investigation. 
 
In summary, if inductive profiling methods are to be used in the context of terrorism the 
question now becomes whether it is possible to identify conviction records within each type 
or category of terrorism?  And whether there are any commonalities or similarities between 
each of these convictions that will allow a profiler to employ statistical and probabilistic 
reasoning to identify likely terrorist characteristics?  The next section will examine the issues 
and challenges even when terrorism records can be identified. 
 
2.3.5.2 Inductive Profiling and the Overlapping Nature of Terrorist Crimes 
It is important to consider that not all convictions of terrorism are prosecuted on the basis of 
terrorism specific offences but rather some are convicted on ordinary criminal law.  For 
example, some terrorists are convicted of ordinary criminal offences whilst others are 
convicted of specialist counter-terrorism offences depending upon the available evidence.  
In 2017 there were 319 individuals charged with ordinary criminal offences which were 
connected to terrorism activities.154   
 
2.3.5.3 Inductive Profiling and the Size of Terrorism Record Samples 
It can be argued that the best collection of terrorism records for inclusion in the inductive 
profiling of likely terrorist characteristics for the contemporary terrorism threats will be from 
a range of countries which have been the subject of contemporary terrorism.  For example, 
the USA, countries within Europe and beyond would provide a wider perspective for a 
                                                             
154 Home Office, Operation of Police Powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and Subsequent Legislation: 
Arrests, Outcomes and Stops & Searches, (Home Office, 2018), 25. 
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profiler to build a statistical basis for predicting likely terrorist characteristics of those 
individuals likely to be engaged in contemporary terrorism.  The sharing of this type of 
information between different countries may be considered sensitive to national security.  
However, if countries do share information on terrorism prosecutions, the criminalisation of 
terrorism tends to be very specific to individual legal systems and the gravity of the threat 
faced.  If it were possible to identify a suitable number of terrorism records, there would be 
substantial practical challenges arising out of how best to classify a terrorist conviction for 
the purposes of future probability and prediction.    
 
Additionally, there is the further problem of very few individuals actually being convicted 
of terrorism offences which creates the specific problem of having a poor array of raw source 
information to base the future prediction of terrorist characteristics.   
 
For example if the UK is taken as example again, the Home Office national statistics on 
terrorism offences illustrate that there were 441 terrorism arrests in the year ended March 
2018 which subsequently resulted in 114 of these individuals (comprising 32% of those 
arrested) being charged with terrorism offences with only 39 of these individuals resulting 
in an actual conviction, although there were 67 individuals awaiting prosecution.155  
Therefore in the year ended March 2018 only 39 conviction records would be considered 
useful in the computation of an inductive profile.  In considering the year ended March 2017 
there were 400 arrests, which subsequently resulted in 115 or 29% being charged that 
ultimately resulted in only 30 being prosecuted and convicted.156   
 
                                                             
155 ibid, 4. 
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The 2018 statistics also reveal that since the 11 September 2001 there have been 458 
terrorism convictions out of 488 individuals charged which resulted from 4182 arrests.157  In 
considering terrorism offences specifically, there would only be 458 terrorism records 
suitable for inclusion in inductive profiling up to the end of March 2018. 
The consideration of the Home Office national statistics demonstrates the key difficulties 
faced when using terrorism records which may arguably be less useful than what is currently 
available for criminal profiling.   
 
2.3.5.4 Terrorism Records and the Accurate Recording of Information 
There are likely to be significant accuracy issues in the recording of important information 
within terrorist offences.  As within criminal inductive profiling there are a number of 
significant difficulties in ensuring that law enforcement officers record relevant information 
consistently within each criminal record.  It can be argued that terrorism records are likely 
to encounter the same or similar difficulties in ensuring consistently and accuracy in the 
recording of key information between the terrorist records.  This difficulty is further 
complicated by the fact that terrorism is international in scale and using records from 
different legal systems will have completely different sets of information.  The central 
concern for a profiler would be to determine how best to use the terrorist record to extract 
data which will allow a statistical reasoning of the likely offender characteristics.  With so 
many different legal systems and so many different laws for terrorism this task becomes 
extremely difficult and complex. 
 
In considering the points discussed above, the use of terrorism records as a raw source of 
information for probabilistic reasoning of likely future terrorist characteristics becomes 
                                                             
157 ibid. 
 90 
entangled in specific difficulties of actual terrorism offences, counter-terrorism regimes and 
terrorism records.  The root of the difficulties is twofold: firstly the actual accuracy of the 
recording of information within the terrorism record and secondly the vast array of offences 
an individual could be convicted of within counter-terrorism. 
 
2.3.5.5 Conclusion: Inductive Terrorist Profiling and Other Issues 
Aside from the critical issues of the raw source data in inductive profiling of terrorists there 
are also some additional potential flaws in adopting this approach to identify likely terrorist 
characteristics.  As we have seen above the first common type of method in inductive 
profiling is inductive generalisation which involves developing a hypothesis that argues 
from a specific point to a general theme.  Applying this methodology to terrorism is highly 
questionable from a creditability point of view.  In particular, each occurrence of 
contemporary terrorism tends to be very sporadic and does not occur often or at least in a 
pattern.  It may be considered difficult to create an inductive profile which can take specific 
terrorist characteristics from individual occurrences of terrorism to create a generalised 
theme applicable on a global scale.  Any generalisations made are likely to be very broad 
with little relevance to establishing accurate likely terrorist characteristics. 
 
In conclusion, inductive profiling presents a number of core issues, including the raw source 
information for probabilistic prediction, the selection of information for use in prediction 
and the profiler training which create specific challenges for the use of inductive profiling 
methods to identify likely terrorist characteristics.   In particular, the accuracy of probability 
from scant and deficient information leads directly to question the legitimacy of using 
inductive profiling methods for identifying likely terrorist characteristics.  The central 
problem is whether inductive profiling methods can actually lead to the identity of terrorist 
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characteristics?   Many countries, including the UK, will face difficulties in ensuring the 
information is consistent and constant across a common range of cases.  There are significant 
credibility issues surrounding the use of inductive profiling methods to arrive at the identity 
of terrorist characteristics, but ultimately countries use inductive profiling as an inexpensive 
and quick method to assist in managing terrorism threats.  However, its use can come at the 
expense of wasted resources, misguided investigations and unnecessary harassment to 
particular groups of society under suspicion. 
 
3.0 Conclusion 
The primary aim of this chapter was to evaluate whether criminal profiling methods and 
approaches can be used in the context of counter-terrorism in assisting law enforcement 
officers to identify likely terrorist characteristics. There are a number of advantages and 
disadvantages in using the various profiling methods discussed above to distil the likely 
terrorist characteristics.   
 
The profiling approaches identified in deductive profiling do not appear to present a basis to 
allow law enforcement officers to predict likely terrorist characteristics.  In particular, there 
are two core issues within deductive profiling approaches which support the argument that 
these approaches are generally not appropriate to profile the likely terrorist characteristics 
of individuals likely to be engaged in the current threat of terrorism. 
 
Firstly, deductive profiling approaches have been primarily used for crimes that can be 
considered pathological in nature, such as murder, rape, arson etc.  The offenders who 
commit these types of crimes tend to exhibit behaviours that are considered serial in nature, 
which allow direct comparisons to be made between particular crime scenes and past 
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offenders. However, in the context of terrorism it was noted that terrorism offences do not 
tend to exhibit the same or similar pathology.  Therefore, this creates the specific difficultly 
with using methods and processes which are contingent upon identifying the sequential 
pathology between offenders and crime scenes. 
 
Secondly, it was also noted above that the whole purpose and aim of deductive profiling was 
to identify an unknown offender still undetected by the police.   Some instances of 
contemporary terrorism have tended to use suicide bombers which have resulted in the death 
of the actual bomber.  Therefore, using deductive methods and approaches to identify these 
types of terrorists who are already dead as a result of the terrorist act is going to be 
completely contrary to the aims and purpose of deductive profiling. 
 
In the final conclusion on using deductive profiling methods and approaches in the context 
of terrorism, it can be argued that they do not form the basis to identify likely terrorist 
characteristics as the methods do not appear to apply within the sphere of contemporary 
terrorism. 
 
In considering inductive profiling methods, it can be argued that these profiling methods 
may be of some use in assisting law enforcement officers to identify likely terrorist 
characteristics if it is performed in a way that takes into account a number of issues.  In 
particular, it was identified above that there are four critical issues which challenge the use 
of inductive profiling in the context of terrorism.   
 
Firstly, it is not evident that all terrorism information will be relevant for predicting current 
contemporary terrorist characteristics.  It is argued by the thesis that as terrorism has changed 
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radically over the past century there are likely to be significant issues with changes in 
counter-terrorism laws criminalising terrorism and the terrorism records which flow from 
the counter-terrorism laws.  As the laws which criminalise terrorism will differ not only 
country by country but also individually year on year within each country, inductive 
profiling methods will require a categorisation of criminal records so as to allow a reliable 
and accurate raw data set to emerge for constructing inductive profiles.   
 
Secondly, there are issues relating to the actual terrorism record.  It can be argued that as the 
current threat of terrorism is global in nature, the best collection of terrorism records to use 
as a statistical basis to predict likely terrorist characteristics will be those terrorism records 
from across the globe.  It is not evident whether countries will actually share information 
freely amongst the international community as the information may be considered sensitive 
to national security.  Even where countries do share information and terrorism records, there 
will be issues around how best to categorise terrorism records.  For instance, some terrorists 
will be prosecuted under ordinary criminal offences whilst others will be prosecuted under 
terrorism specific offences.   
 
Thirdly, as noted within criminal inductive profiling there sometimes can be difficulties in 
ensuring that all relevant information is actually recorded correctly and accurately within 
each criminal record.  It is highly likely that similar problems will be present within terrorist 
records.  As there is no nationally, or internationally, co-ordinated approach to the collection 
of information within criminal records, it is likely that when key information is missing from 
terrorism records, its absence may become subject to compensation by weighty assumptions 
on the part of the profiler. 
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Finally, it is important to consider that not all terrorism arrests actually become subject to 
prosecution through the courts.  Current terrorism frameworks provide for direct deportation 
of individuals.  Therefore, not all of the information on terrorism will be found within 
terrorism records.  
 
In order to manage the issues raised by these weaknesses, inductive profiling methods 
require that there must be a way to filter the terrorism records so as to allow: 
 
(a) A categorisation of the record so that it can be identified that terrorism specific offences 
and ordinary criminal law can be identified.  This will allow that a full statistical database 
where the profiler can attain the correct information when profiling particular terrorism 
threats. 
 
(b) A further categorisation and filtering of terrorism records beyond the terrorism law and 
ordinary law distinction discussed above, which will allow the profiler to identify the types 
of terrorism records.  For example, in the UK a profiler would need to access a database that 
allows  them to distinguish between Northern Ireland related terrorism records and those 
relating to radical and fundamental terrorism.  Therefore, it must be possible for the profiler 
to distinguish between the types of terrorism faced by the country profiling for likely terrorist 
characteristics. 
 
Additionally, there are four other issues which need to be addressed to further manage the 
challenges presented by inductive profiling in the context of terrorism: 
(i) The size of the terrorism record samples is likely to create difficulties in 
producing a statistical prediction on likely terrorist characteristics.  As the current 
 95 
threat of radical terrorism is in essence only ten years old since the September 
11th 2001 attacks, it was noted above that only 418 individuals have been 
successfully prosecuted in the UK relating to terrorism specific offences.158  
Although this is likely to improve with time as more and more individuals are 
prosecuted.  However, it is something that any profiler would need to take into 
account when profiling by using inductive methods.  A profiler could take this 
into account by alerting the user of the profile that only a limited number of 
terrorism records were used in the calculation of the profile.  This would allow 
the law enforcement officer in the field to use the profile with caution. 
 
(ii) The accuracy of the information recorded in the terrorism record samples is likely 
to create some difficulties in ensuring the predictability of likely terrorist 
characteristics.  Inductive profiling methods would become significantly more 
coherent if a consistent approach was developed for the recording of key 
information.  This weakness could be corrected by drawing up standard codes of 
practice for the collection of terrorism data which individual countries could 
implement. 
 
(iii) The variance in practice, firstly in constructing the profile and secondly the 
variance in practice in the application of the profile by the law enforcement 
officer can combine to create a significant issue in using inductive profiles in the 
context of terrorism.  In dealing with the first issue, inductive profiling would 
benefit from the development of specific national and international guidelines to 
assist profilers identify which factors they should take into account in 
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constructing profiles.  In dealing with the second issue law enforcement officers 
require further training in the application of profiles in practice.  Additionally, a 
policy should be developed which only allows inductive profiles to be used 
within a range of other counter-terrorism strategies. 
 
(iv) The final issue of using inductive profiling methods in the context of terrorism 
is interlinked to the previous point.  In order to increase the accuracy of the 
profiles, there must be consistent training for all profilers.  The practice of 
profiling varies not only from country to country but also from police force to 
police force.  Therefore, a national training qualification should be developed to 
allow all profilers gain and develop the skills set necessary for consistent 
profiling. 
 
In consideration of the above, it is arguable that inductive profiling as part of a broader 
counter-terrorism strategy may assist law enforcement officers in the identification of likely 
terrorist characteristics. 
 
Therefore, on the basis of the discussion in this chapter it is possible to argue a working 
hypothesis for the use of criminal profiling methods and approaches in the context of 
terrorism.  Firstly, deductive profiling is almost devoid of all value for the profiling of likely 
terrorist characteristics.  Secondly, inductive profiling, provided it is conducted within 
defined and controlled circumstances, is likely to assist law enforcement officers in the 
identification of potential terrorist characteristics. 
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CHAPTER 3: FORMAL TERRORIST PROFILING: THE CONSTRUCTION AND 
APPLICATION OF TERRORIST PROFILES 
3.1 Introduction 
The primary aim of this chapter is to begin analysing the usefulness of different 
manifestations of terrorist profiling.   This aim is pursued by relying on the effectiveness 
framework established in chapter one and the deductive/inductive analytical lens established 
in chapter two.   
The discussion throughout this chapter argues that by relying on the effectiveness framework 
it is possible to deconstruct the profiling process so as to analyse the construction and 
application of terrorist profiling separately. This deconstruction allows the 
deductive/inductive analytical lens established in chapter two to evaluate the potential 
usefulness of terrorist profiling.  However, a core argument advanced in this chapter is that 
it is short sighted to simply view the effectiveness of terrorist profiling by focusing on 
whether terrorist profiling works or is likely to work, as a result the discussion towards the 
end of this chapter will question the usefulness of manifestations of formal terrorist profiling 
by considering its impact on society.  This involves considering whether there is any 
evidence to question whether the cost associated with using terrorist profiling outweighs its 
potential usefulness as a counterterrorism tool assisting in the prevention, detection and 
prosecution of those likely to be involved in terrorism and/or its preparatory activities. 
At its most elementary level, the use of profiling methods/approaches in countering 
terrorism with the aim of discerning likely terrorist characteristics can be described as being 
a form of terrorist profiling.  In a similar way to criminal profiling, terrorist profiling may 
exist deductively where law enforcement officers deduce likely terrorist characteristics 
based on available crime scene evidence in response to a particular attack, a foiled attack or 
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a preparatory attack.  Or alternatively, terrorist profiling may exist inductively where law 
enforcement officers draw upon an array of data aimed at predicting likely terrorist 
characteristics.  
Terrorist profiling exists in a variety of different manifestations.  As a result, it is argued that 
there is no one type of profiling synonymous with the label ‘terrorist profiling’.   It is 
contended that in order to analyse terrorist profiling an analytical distinction needs to be 
made between different manifestations of terrorist profiling.  It is acknowledged that this 
approach may be considered a departure from previous evaluations conducted on the uses 
of profiling methods/approaches in the context of terrorism.  Nevertheless, it is maintained 
that this distinction forms an important and necessary part of analysing profiling 
methods/approaches in the context of terrorism so as to evaluate whether these 
methods/approaches may be considered useful to law enforcement officers in discerning 
likely terrorist characteristics. 
This chapter begins by drawing upon the profiling spectrum established in chapter one.  It 
will be recalled form chapter one, at one end of the profiling spectrum a form of profiling 
exists that is best described as being formal terrorist profiling. Formal terrorist profiling can 
be defined as the systematic and official use of any profiling method or approach by law 
enforcement officers which is aimed at identifying likely terrorist characteristics. The 
discussion in this chapter argues that there are at least three defining features of formal 
terrorist profiling, firstly an official and systematic process to construct a profile, secondly 
the application of a profile by law enforcement officers and finally the ability to review the 
operation and practice of formal terrorist profiling.  The discussion will show that the 
systematic construct and application of the manifestations of terrorist profiling considered 
in this chapter draws significantly upon the inductive profiling methods/approaches 
analysed in chapter two.  
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The aim is pursued in four sections below.   
Firstly, the discussion focuses on examining the use of knowledge discovery processes and 
data mining as the first formal terrorist profiling method.  This approach allows for an 
identification, explanation and evaluation of “knowledge discovery processes” and “data 
mining” approaches used in the construction of formal terrorist profiles. 
Secondly, the discussion progresses by examining different manifestations of formal 
terrorist profiling in Germany and the US.  This discussion provides a useful basis to 
evaluate the way law enforcement officers have applied formal terrorist profiling methods 
in identifying individuals engaged in terrorism or preparatory activities.  This discussion 
draws upon the inductive profiling methods/approaches set out in chapter two as the basis 
to classified the systematic nature of the manifestations of profiling examined in this chapter. 
Thirdly, the discussion progresses further by assessing/measuring the effectiveness of 
formal terrorist profiling in light of the discussion of the methods used in the construction 
of terrorist profiles and the application of terrorist profiles by law enforcement officers and 
the effectiveness framework established in chapter one.  
Finally, the conclusion considers to what extent (if at all), and in what ways (if any) terrorist 
profiling may be useful as part of the law enforcement process of identifying individuals 
engaged in acts of terrorism and associated preparatory activities. It is argued that by 
examining the construction and application of terrorist profiling separately, it is arguable 





3.2 Knowledge Discovery Processes and Data Mining 
3.2.1 Introduction 
Over the course of the last half century there has been an explosive growth in the capabilities 
of not only creating data but also, and more importantly, collecting, storing, transmitting and 
searching data including highly sensitive personal information.1  In an era of digitalisation 
previously inaccessible personal information involving the ‘individual’ is now commonly 
created, collected, stored and transmitted in personal, public, private and governmental 
databases which is capable of exhibiting trends and patterns that may be a significant 
indicator of future behaviour.   
In a law enforcement context, the access to different datasets containing personal and public 
information which can be connected together into a ‘meaningful’ form holds an innate 
potential to allow law enforcement officers predict future trends and patterns in behaviour.  
This prediction in human behaviour may assist law enforcement officers to identify likely 
offending trends and patterns including likely offender characteristics.  Similarly, in the 
context of terrorism, access to vast arrays of information contained in a variety of databases 
holds an innate potential to identify significant knowledge which can be used as a basis to 
identify trends and patterns which may be considered significant.2  
 
The discovery of “knowledge” from data can be considered a knowledge discovery process 
which either involves the extraction of explicit information from single databases, or 
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alternatively it can involve “the non-trivial extraction of implicit, previously unknown and 
potentially useful information from more than one database”.3  The discovery of explicit 
knowledge from data usually involves traditional information retrieval searches that rely 
upon linking explicit data within the same database.4  For example, a driving licensing 
database will typically contain information such as driver’s name, address, data of birth, 
licence type, etc and any search of a driver licensing database will reveal the explicit 
knowledge in the database.  This type of knowledge discovery is akin to information 
retrieval in response to a specific query or ‘search’.   
Alternatively, the discovery of implicit knowledge from data will usually involve more 
complex knowledge discovery processes involving the use of “data mining techniques” and 
methods to reveal relationships and repetitions in data from different databases.  Data 
mining, therefore, can be considered one step in the broader “process of knowledge 
discovery” which assists in revealing patterns and trends from different databases.5     
3.2.2 The Construction of Profiles using Knowledge Discovery Processes and Data Mining 
There are typically five phases in the use of knowledge discovery processes and data mining 
in the construction of profiles.6  The first phase is called “selection” which involves the 
identification of the different sources of databases.  Roiger explains that this involves 
identifying different databases which contain information that merit further analysis.7  The 
second phase is called “pre-processing” which involves eliminating information that can be 
considered irrelevant or is considered what is common termed ‘noise’.  ‘Noise’ refers to 
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6 P. Adriaans and D. Zanintge, Data Mining (Addison-Wesley, 1996), 25-29. 
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information that is likely to either mislead the knowledge discovery process or obscure the 
value in the identified patterns.8   
The third phase is “transformation” which involves converting the pre-processed 
information into ‘searchable’ datasets.  In essence, transformation creates a ‘master 
database’ which is commonly referred to as the “data warehouse or data mart”.9  Typically 
data warehouses will contain four types of data which can “be used in the knowledge 
discovery process.”10  Firstly, ‘integrated data’ can be considered data which has been pre-
examined so as to identify common patterns and trends.  Secondly, ‘detailed and summarised 
data’ can be considered data that is ‘raw’ or granular’ data which is the most elementary and 
basic form of data available.  Thirdly, ‘historical data’ is the inclusion of any data that has 
been previously used in a knowledge discovery process.  Fourthly, ‘metadata’ which is data 
that provides the contextual background to particular types of data.  The inclusion of 
metadata in data warehouses can be considered important to understanding the significance 
of patterns and trends associated with particular types of data.  In particular, it is only through 
the careful pre-processing of detailed and summarised data with historical data and metadata 
that a workable and effective dataset emerge which may be capable of identifying trends and 
patterns of significance. This form of pre-processing allows the profiler to appreciate the 
significance of the reoccurrence of particular patterns and trends in the data. 
The fourth phase is “the data mining” phase where various methods and “techniques are 
applied [to all] the data in the data” warehouse in an attempt to identify common trends and 
patterns of significance in the data.11 The definition to be attributed to data mining is 
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discussed and debated in a vast array of different academic literature; however, there is a 
lack of consensus on a specific and unified definition.12  For example, Taipale broadly 
defines data mining “as the non-trivial process of identifying valid, novel, potentially useful 
and ultimately understandable patters in data”.13  Whilst Thursaingham argues that “at the 
core of the data mining process is the application of data analysis and discovery algorithms” 
to identify patterns and trends in vast quantities of information.14  In essence, data mining 
refers to the process that allows “the analysis of data by automatic means in order to 
discover previously unknown knowledge in data”.15  More generally, data mining is the 
ability to apply algorithms to different categories of data so that it can be organised to reveal 
previously unknown relationships between the data which signifies some value to the pattern 
identified.16  It is the discovery of previously unknown patterns, trends and connections 
between different categories of data that is significant which allows the prediction of other 
similar patterns, trends and connections into the future.   
Data mining can be conducted in at least two ways.   
Firstly, it can be conducted by relying on a previously known profile or model so as to find 
the occurrence of a pattern within a dataset.17  This is commonly referred to in the literature 
as “subject based” searches or “goal oriented” searches.18  The profiler in this type of data 
mining develops a theory or a hypothesis about a particular subject or pattern and then seeks 
to find the frequency of that theory within a range of datasets.  Subject based searches 
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15 S. Vanderlooy, J. Verbeck and J. Van Den Herik, ‘Towards Privacy Preserving Data Mining in Law 
Enforcement’ (2007) 2(4) Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology 202, 204. 
16 De Rosa (n9), 3. 
17 J. Han and M. Kamber, Data Mining: Concepts and Techniques (Morgan Kaufmann, 2001), 8-9. 
18 T. Zarksy, ‘Governmental Data Mining and its Alternatives’ (2011) 116 (2) Penn State Law Review 285, 
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develop what is commonly referred to as ‘statistical models’ which use algorithms to 
discover the closest match or the frequency of that model or profile within the searchable 
dataset.19  This data mining approach commonly uses ‘machine learning methods’20 to 
improve the accuracy of relationship between the different types of information in the 
databases.  This data mining approach is considered a “supervised method” as it starts with 
“strong suspicions or clues concerning a specific event, person or small groups of events 
and/or persons”.21  The use of subject based searches by law enforcement officers are aimed 
at being a temporary mechanism to enhance the operation of the law by providing law 
enforcement officers with greater knowledge on particular occurrences. 
Secondly, data mining can also be conducted in a less formalised way to identify previously 
unrecognised patterns and trends in information within an array of different databases.22  
This approach is commonly identified in the literature as “pattern-based” searches or “global 
based” searches.  Pattern based searches are considered “fishing expeditions” where law 
enforcement officers aim to “fish” for unknown patterns in vast arrays of data as they usually 
operate in an unstructured and unsupervised way.  The results yielded from these fishing 
expeditions can be used in future data mining exercises as relevant search criteria.23  This 
data mining approach can be considered more permanent in character as it is primarily aimed 
at enhancing law enforcement officer’s general knowledge.  
                                                             
19 P. Adriaans and D. Zantinge Data Mining (Addison Wesley, 1996), 34-36. 
20 ‘Machine learning methods’ is the use of digital algorithmic programmes which automatically improve the 
accuracy of a search for information as more and more data is imputed into the programme.  For example, 
the more an individual searches on ‘Google’ the more accurate the search returns will become as ‘Google’ is 
able to make more successful connections between the individual and the searchable data.  
21 Vanderlooy et al (n15), 203. 
22 Han and Kamber (n17), 8-9. 
23 N. Memon, D. Hicks and H. Larsen, ‘How Investigative Data Mining Can Help Intelligence Agencies to 
Discover Dependence of Nodes in Terrorist Networks’ (2007) 4632 Lecture Notes in Computer Science 430, 
430-435. 
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The final phase in ‘the knowledge discovery “process is the interpretation and evaluation 
of the results” yielded from ‘the data mining’ phase.24  After the data has been ‘mined’ for 
patterns and trends the profiler will firstly interpret the results and then evaluate them for 
their usefulness.  Patterns and trends that can be considered useful will be retained for further 
analysis or adjustment so as to repeat the knowledge discovery process to improve the 
quality of the results yielded.  Therefore, it is evident that knowledge discovery processes 
are by their nature “incremental and iterative’ that need to be conducted repeatedly so as to 
identify the significance of “patterns and trends” gleaned from different forms of data.25  
It is noteworthy that all knowledge discovery processes involving the use of data mining 
approaches involve a significant reliance on the use of mathematical algorithms in 
connecting the data together so as to identify patterns and trends of significance.26 As 
identified in the five phases above, the use of algorithms is employed at two key stages in 
the construction of terrorist profiles.  Firstly, in the pre-processing of data phase where 
algorithms assist in eliminating irrelevant information from the datasets and thereby assist 
in creating meaningful datasets and secondly at the data mining phase where a further 
algorithm is required to elicit key trends and patterns from the newly constructed pre-
processed dataset.   
A particular concern is the reliance on ‘individuals’ to create specific algorithms capable of 
pre-processing an array of different forms of data into one significant and meaningful 
dataset, and further creating a secondary algorithm which is capable of identifying the 
patterns and trends in the newly created dataset.  In at least two stages in the construction of 
a profile, this process is contingent upon an individual creating multiple algorithms so as to 
                                                             
24 ibid. 
25 Devedzic (n5), 621. 
26 N. Memon, J. Farley, D. Hicks and T. Rosenorn, Mathematical Methods in Counterterrorism (Springer 
Publications, 2009), 2-8. 
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correctly attach the appropriate weight and significance to individual pieces of information 
contained within the array of different databases.  It is arguable that where an algorithm fails 
to correctly attach the appropriate weight to particular pieces of information, any profiles 
constructed will be highly defective and deficient in being able to assist law enforcement 
officers identify individuals likely to be engaged in terrorist acts or preparatory activities.  
The use of knowledge discovery processes and data mining methods and techniques in 
criminal justice has emerged in a variety of different types of applications.  For example, 
Dahbur and Muscarollo found that data mining methods could reveal as much as ten times 
more connections between different data concerning armed robbery cases than in 
comparison to human law enforcement officers’ trawls of the same databases.27  Similarly 
Blockand et al and De Bruin et al have found that data mining methods could reveal useful 
relationships from a collection of datasets containing information such as marital status, 
previous criminal history and previous intoxicating substance abuse history so as to develop 
a typical profile containing likely characteristics of repeat offenders.28  Furthermore, data 
mining has also been used by Adderley and Musgrove to identify common characteristics 
of sex offenders by drawing upon a range of databases of the convicted sex offenders.29  
These examples illustrate that data mining becomes a process of connecting pre-existing 
known information together into significant and meaningful knowledge that may be capable 
of assisting law enforcement officers in the prevention and detection of crime. 
                                                             
27 K. Dahbur and T. Muscarello, ‘Classification System for Serial Criminal Patterns’ (2003) 11(4) Artificial 
Intelligence and Law Volume 251, 251-255. 
28 A. Blokland, D. Nagin and P. Nieuwbeerta, ‘Life Span Offending Trajectories of a Dutch Conviction 
Cohort’ (2005) 43(4) Criminology 919, 919-925.   J. De Bruin, T. Cocx, W. Kosters, J. Laros and J. Kok, 
‘Data Mining Approaches to Criminal Career Analysis’ in C. Clifton and N. Zhong (eds) IEEE International 
Conference on Data Mining (IEEE Computer Society, 2006), 171-177. 
29 A. Adderley and P. Musgrove “Data Mining Case Study: Modelling the Behaviour of Offenders who 
Commit Serious Sexual Assaults” in F. Provost and R. Srikant (eds) ACM SIGKDD International 
Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data mining (Association for Computer Machinery, 2001), 215-
220. 
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3.2.3 Knowledge Discovery Processes and Data Mining – Summary 
It is evident that the use of data mining methods and approaches form part of a broader 
knowledge discovery process to identify implicit knowledge contained within vast arrays of 
databases.  The first three phases of the knowledge discovery process are aimed at 
identifying, enhancing and pre-processing the available information into searchable datasets 
which data mining methods and approaches can be applied so as to identify implicit patterns 
and trends contained within the searchable data.   
The final phase of the knowledge discovery process is primarily aimed as being an 
interpretative and evaluative exercise of the newly discovered knowledge where the profiler 
seeks to identify the significance of the new implicit knowledge identified from the 
information in the databases.  These data mining approaches are contingent upon the access 
to vast arrays of information which is held in both public and private databases.  
 
3.2.4 The Evaluation of Knowledge Discovery Processes and Data Mining Approaches in 
light of Established Profiling Methods 
It was identified and explained in chapter two that the construction of profiles generally can 
occur in two ways: either deductively or inductively.  The construction of profiles created 
using deductive profiling approaches essentially react to crimes already committed as the 
profiles are constructed by using forensic evidence and victim reports.  This profiling 
approach adopts a reactive methodology where the profile purports to be rationally or 
logically deducted following a thorough analysis of the available and relevant information.  
It is arguable that there are at least three significant similarities between the use of deductive 
profiling methods and the use of knowledge discovery processes which adopt subject based 
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data mining approaches in the construction of profiles.  Firstly, deductive profiling methods 
adopt a reactive methodology on the basis of pre-existing known information.  Similarly, 
knowledge discovery processes adopting subject based data mining approaches can be 
considered primarily reactive to a specific event or group of events.  Secondly, deductive 
profiling methods rely exclusively on pre-existing known information as the basis to 
logically deduce the profile of the likely characteristics of the offender.  Similarly, 
knowledge discovery processes adopting a subject based data mining approach relies 
exclusively on pre-existing known information.  Finally, deductive profiling approaches 
seek to develop typologies as a way to identify likely offender characteristics.  Similarly, 
knowledge discovery processes adopting subject based data mining approaches seek to 
develop a hypothesis and find the replication of that hypothesis within the databases.  
Therefore, it is evident that there are close similarities between deductive profiling methods 
and knowledge discovery processes that adopt subject based data mining approaches in the 
construction of profiles.   
Additionally, in chapter two a distinction was drawn between scientific and non-scientific 
deductive profiling approaches.  This distinction rested upon the fact that scientific 
deductive profiling sought to test, validate and replicate the accuracy of the profiles through 
the adoption of elements of science disciplines such as investigative psychology.  It is 
arguable that knowledge discovery processes which adopt pattern based data mining 
approaches can be considered a form of scientific deductive profiling. The core feature of 
knowledge discovery processes which adopt pattern based data mining approaches that 
makes this process ‘scientific’ is that fact that the process embraces the ability to test the 
replication and validation of the yielded results at the ‘interpretation and evaluation’ phase 
of the knowledge discovery process. 
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In contrast to deductive profiling, it was also identified and explained in chapter two that the 
construction of profiles can also be created by using inductive profiling methods.  The 
construction of profiles using inductive profiling methods uses analytical methods to prevent 
crimes which have not already occurred.  The defining feature of inductive profiling is its 
dependence upon a statistical analysis of previous offending records to identify the common 
characteristics of known offenders so as to allow the profiler to make predictions about likely 
offender characteristics.   
It is arguable that there are at least three significant similarities between inductive profiling 
approaches and knowledge discovery processes which adopt pattern-based data mining 
approaches.  Firstly, inductive profiling approaches are contingent upon a vast array of 
information in different databases.  Similarly, knowledge discovery processes adopting 
pattern-based data mining approaches rely upon a vast array of different databases as the 
basis to identify patterns and trends from the information.  Secondly, inductive profiling 
approaches can be considered an inferential process whereby the profiler makes a sequence 
of rational judgements about the information gleaned from previous criminal records and 
databases which lead to an overall conclusion of likely offender characteristics.  Similarly, 
knowledge discovery processes adopting pattern-based data mining approaches become an 
inferential process whereby the profiler has to make a sequence of rational judgements about 
the information identified from the databases.  Finally, inductive profiling approaches rely 
substantially on probabilities and statistics as the basis to identify patterns and trends in the 
information.  Similarly, knowledge discovery processes adopting pattern-based data mining 
approaches also rely upon probabilities and statistics in identifying trends and patterns in the 
data at the interpretation and evaluation phase in the knowledge discovery process.  
Therefore, it is evident that knowledge discovery processes adopting a pattern-based data 
mining approach can be considered an inductive profiling approach.  
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In summary, knowledge discovery processes can embrace both deductive and inductive 
profiling approaches.  It is evident that the distinction between deductive and inductive 
approaches in the context of knowledge discovery processes is largely contingent upon the 
type of data mining approach employed. 
 
3.3 The Application of Knowledge Discovery Processes and Data Mining by Law 
Enforcement Officers 
As noted above, this chapter aims to evaluate formal terrorist profiling by conducting an 
analysis of different forms and manifestations of formal terrorist profiling practices in 
Germany and the US. Additionally, it has been noted above that the evidence of formal 
terrorist profiling can be difficult to find as states seek to remain silent on its use within 
counter-terrorism policy.  However, Germany and the US, to varying degrees, have 
acknowledged the use of knowledge discovery processes which embrace data mining 
methods in their counter-terrorism policy.   
The discussion in this section will now turn to examine the application of data mining 
methods and approaches by Germany and the US.  The use of knowledge discovery 
processes within German law enforcement policy can be considered a knowledge discovery 
process which has adopted a subject based data mining approach.  This application of formal 
terrorist profiling can be characterised a form of deductive profiling.   
Alternatively, the use of knowledge discovery processes within the US can be considered a 
form of pattern-based data mining and therefore be characterised as being an inductive form 
of profiling. 
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The distinction between these two types of terrorist profiling methods can be considered 
significant for the purposes of evaluating terrorist profiling methods.  In particular, it was 
argued in chapter two that deductive profiling methods could be classified as being 
ineffective in the context of terrorism.  The comparisons between the German and the US 
application of formal terrorist profiling provides an opportunity to re-examine and re-
evaluate the effectiveness of these individual profiling methods in the context of terrorism 
with a view to testing and measuring the extent to which terrorist profiling may be 
considered useful as part of the process of identifying individuals engaged in acts of 
terrorism or preparatory activities. 
3.3.1 The Application of Knowledge Discovery Processes and Data Mining Approaches in 
Germany 
The application of knowledge discovery processes and data mining approaches in Germany 
is manifested through a “special method of profiling using data screening” which is 
commonly referred to as “Rasterfahndung”.30  ‘Rasterfahndung’ cannot be easily translated 
into English, however, it has been defined as the automatic processing and screening of an 
array of public and/or private databases in an attempt to assist law enforcement officers 
identify likely terrorists and terrorist characteristics.31 Additionally, ‘Rasterfahndung’ 
schemes have been characterised in the literature as being ‘dragnet’ ‘fishing’ investigations 
where law enforcement officers ‘fish’ for individuals likely to engaged in terrorism through 
a trawl of private and public databases.32  Therefore, Rasterfahndung schemes can be 
considered knowledge discovery processes that adopt subject based data mining approaches 
                                                             
30 D. Ramierz, J. Hoopes and T. Quinlan, ‘Defining Racial Profiling in a Post September 11th World’ (2003) 
40(3) American Criminal Law Review 1195, 1195-1197. 
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9/11/01 (Diplomica Verlag, 2008), 42.  
32 S. Aust, Der Baader-Meinhof-Komplex (2nd Ed, Goldmann Publishing, 1998), 211.  See also: D. Hauser, 
Baader und Herold – Beschreibung eines Kampfes (Alexander Fest Verlag Publishing, 1997). 
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as they most commonly start with known information and seek to identify the frequency of 
that known information in different collections of databases.   
The application of Rasterfahndung profiling schemes in Germany in a counter-terrorism 
context has emerged in two separate periods in recent history.   
The first Rasterfahndung scheme emerged during the course of the 1970s and 1980s which 
related to the development of a knowledge discovery process using data mining to assist law 
enforcement officers in identifying individuals who were likely to be members of the “Red 
Army Fraction” (RAF).  The RAF emerged as a domestic terrorist group that engaged in a 
number of bomb and shooting attacks throughout Germany which primarily focused on US 
military basis in opposition to western capitalism.33  Whilst there were three generations of 
RAF terrorists, it was the latter generation which created considerable difficulty for German 
law enforcement officers to detect.34  The threat of terrorism from the first two generations 
of the RAF was managed by German law enforcement officers infiltrating the RAF and 
utilising intelligence to counteract their presence within Germany.35  However, the third 
generation of the RAF lived covertly within Germany which challenged traditional policing 
methods to detect and trace their presence. As a result, law enforcement officers developed 
alternative counter-terrorism approaches, such as Rasterfahndung schemes, to assist in 
identifying individuals who were likely to be members of the RAF.   
The legal basis for proactive Rasterfahndung schemes in Germany in the 1970s and 1980s 
was originally attributable to the decision in B v F.36  The Constitutional Court held that 
                                                             
33 W. Achelpohler and H. Niehaus, ‘Data Screening as a Means of Preventing Islamist Terrorist Attacks on 
Germany’ (2004) 5(5) German Law Journal 495, 496-498. 
34 W. Heinz, ‘Germany: State Responses to Terrorist Challenges and Human Rights’ in A. Brysk (ed), 
National Insecurity and Human Rights: Democracies Debate Counterterrorism (University of California 
Press,2007),162  
35 ibid. 
36 BVerfGE, 1 B v F 1/74. 
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Article 2, Sec 3 Sen 1 of the German Constitution placed a positive obligation “on the state” 
to proactively safeguard “the right to life” within Germany.37  Additionally, as a result of 
counter-terrorism domestic laws enacted during the 1970s and 1980s, law enforcement 
officers were given increasing levels of flexibility in managing the threat of terrorism 
through preventative measures.38   
As a result of increasing violence and an increasing threat of violence emanating from the 
RAF during the 1970s and 1980s, law enforcement officers sought to develop 
Rasterfahndung schemes to assist in identifying individuals likely to be engaged in 
terrorism.  The development of Rasterfahndung as part of counter-terrorism policy was 
commonly viewed by the German government as being essential in securing its “obligation 
to protect the right to life of the” German people as guaranteed by the German Constitution.39  
In effect, the right to life case allowed the German government to construct a basic right to 
security which necessitated specific policies to discharge their obligation to protect the right 
to security.40  The use of Rasterfahndung schemes was presented in the German media as 
necessary to manage the threat of terrorism.41 
The application of the RAF Rasterfahndung profiling approach involved starting with the 
hypothesis that members of the RAF rented their apartments under a pseudonym.42  
                                                             
37 O. Lepsius, ‘Freiheit, Sicherheit, Terror Die Rechtslage in Deutschland’ in T. Jagger, A. Hose and K. 
Oppermann (eds), Transatlantische Beziehungen, Sicherheit – Wirtschaft – Offenlichkeit (VS Verlag fur 
Sozialwissenschaften, 2005), 322. 
38 For example, Gesetz zur Anderung der Strafprozessordnung 1978 and Gesetz zur Bekampfung des 
Terrorismus 1987 provided law enforcement officers with greater specialist preventative powers to manage 
the threat of terrorism emanating from rise of the RAF. 
39 Lepsius (n37), 322. 
40 For a discussion on the construction of the right to security on the basis of the state’s obligation in the 
Constitution to proactively protect the right to life please see: M. Kutscha, ‘Mehr Innere Sicherheit durch 
weinger Freiheit’ in  Humanistische Union e. V (ed), Innere Sicherheit als Gefahr(Berlin: Humanistische 
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(2005) 82(3) Burgerrecht und Polizei Clip 16. 
41 Heinz (n34) at p. 165-167. 
42 P. Butz, I. Todlicher and W. Willi, Die Geschichte Der RAF (Rowohlt Berlin, 2005), 25-29. 
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Additionally, it was commonly believed that RAF members routinely paid for their goods 
and services in cash including essential services such as electricity43  As a result, the first 
phase in the knowledge discovery process involved law enforcement officers ‘selecting’ 
databases which could be used to assist in the identification of individuals living in Germany 
paying for essential services and goods in cash.  This involved law enforcement officers 
gaining access to utility company records so as to identify the reoccurrence of the generated 
hypothesis. 
The second phase in the knowledge discovery process involved the pre-processing of this 
information into databases which only contained relevant information by removing 
information that could mislead the knowledge discovery process.  This involved removing 
individuals who paid for their services by way of credit transfer, direct debit and cheques as 
the inclusion of this information was considered likely to obscure the identification of the 
repetition of the hypothesis. 
The third phase in the knowledge discovery process involved the transformation of this 
information into searchable datasets through the creation of a data warehouse which 
contained a master database of all individuals paying for goods and services in cash.  The 
fourth phase involved the actual data mining which revealed the names and addresses of all 
of those individuals who paid for their utility bills in cash.  The final phase involved 
interpreting and evaluating any results yielded from the data mining.  This involved cross 
checking all of the identified names and addresses by the law enforcement officers against 
public databases so as to eliminate those individuals not considered to be a member of the 
RAF. Hilbrans identified that after a trawl of a significant “number of public and private 
databases” the application of the RAF Rasterfahndung profiling scheme identified only one 
                                                             
43 ibid. 
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significant member of the RAF, Rolf Heissler, who was subsequently prosecuted for 
terrorism offences.44 
The second Rasterfahndung scheme was developed and applied in direct response to the 
September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks in the US as it became evident that an active cell of the 
al-Qaeda terrorist organisation had covertly lived and operated in Germany prior to the 
terrorist attacks. As a result of an active cell of al-Qaeda being able to live and operate 
covertly within German borders, it rejuvenated a desire amongst law enforcement officers 
to use Rasterfahndung schemes to assist in the identification of other ‘sleeper’ terrorists that 
may have remained within Germany after the terrorist attacks.  
According to public information, the second Rasterfahndung scheme emerged immediately 
after the September 11th terrorist attacks and involved a knowledge discovery process which 
also adopted a subject based data mining approach.45  This process involved the trawl of 
approximately 8 million public and private databases affecting almost ten per cent of the 
national German population which sought to identify the occurrence and pattern of a pre-
determined hypothesis.46  Similar to the RAF Rasterfahndung application of terrorist 
profiling, law enforcement officers started with known information, as it was primarily 
reactive to the September 11th terrorist attacks.  The known information consisted of the 
following factors/characteristics: 
“Male, aged 18 to 40, (ex-)student, Islamic religious affiliation, native 
country or nationality of certain countries, named in detail, with 
predominantly Islamic population.”47 
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The subject based data mining approach sought to identify individuals who matched some 
or most of the known factors/characteristics living within Germany.  The 
factors/characteristics were developed from the actual characteristics of those individuals 
who were involved in executing the September 11th terrorist attacks.48  The selection of the 
factors/characteristics was prepared by a specialist co-ordinated group of law enforcement 
officers within the “Federal Criminal Police Office”, the “Federal Border Security Office” 
and the “Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution”.49 
The first phase in this Rasterfahndung profiling application involved the selection of 
databases which provided the basis to find the frequency of the known profile.  This involved 
the selection of private and public databases including university registrars, police 
residential registries and national alien registries so as to identify those individuals who 
matched some or most of the known information.50  The second phase involved the pre-
processing of the available databases by law enforcement officers seeking so as to eliminate 
irrelevant information likely to obscure the value of identified patterns.  In this case the 
removal of irrelevant information included any characteristics outside of the known 
hypothesis from the available database.  The removal of the irrelevant information resulted 
in third phase of ‘transformation’ which created a data warehouse of searchable datasets 
likely to find the repetition of the known hypothesis.   
The fourth phase involved the performance of the actual data mining and in litigation seeking 
to challenge the legality of using a knowledge discovery process to identify individuals for 
greater official scrutiny, it was reported that the searches of these databases resulted in the 
                                                             
48 National Research Council (n45), 219. 
49 B v R 518/02 (Bundesverfassungsgericht, 4th April 2006), para 8. 
50 ibid. 
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creation of 31,988 records of individuals from across Germany which were considered by 
law enforcement officers as being worthy of further investigation in interests of preventing 
terrorism.51   
The contents of the yielded results varied from state to state within Germany but common 
details included the primary source database, the name and address (including previous 
known addresses) of the ‘suspect’, their place of birth, nationality, marital status, gender and 
their tax history with the German Revenue and Customs.52  Additionally, the information 
elicited from university records also indicated their chosen course of study and the duration 
of their visit to Germany.53   
Additionally, it was further discovered during the course of the litigation challenging the use 
of the Rasterfahndung profiling scheme that law enforcement officers had inappropriately 
included information from other databases not originally requested in their judicial 
Rasterfahndung authorisation application to identify ‘sleeper’ terrorists following the 
September 11th terrorist attacks.  As part of the legal process law enforcement officers 
seeking to use a Rasterfahndung scheme must indicate in their judicial application for 
authorisation the searchable databases they intend to conduct their searches.  It emerged that 
law enforcement officers had searched databases containing information on new pilot 
licences and individual applications made for licences for handling radioactive waste in 
Germany.54  The inclusion of these two additional databases resulted in subjecting an 
additional 1,187 individuals to greater levels of official scrutiny who did not actually match 
any of the identified searchable factors/characteristics.55  It is evident from the litigation that 
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the inclusion of these databases, as part of the searchable dataset, was part of a zealous 
attempt by law enforcement officers to purposely widen the search in seeking to identify 
individuals likely to be engaged in terrorism which was based on previously known 
information.  This demonstrates that in this particular case an additional 1,187 individuals 
were identified as being individuals likely to be engaged in acts of terrorism or preparatory 
activities due to the human interference in ‘the knowledge discovery process’.   
The final phase in the Rasterfahndung knowledge discovery process involved interpreting 
and evaluating any results yielded from the data mining exercise.  During the course of the 
litigation challenging the validity of the Rasterfahndung profiling schemes as a basis to 
identify individuals likely to be engaged in terrorism or terrorism activities, it was identified 
that the compiled list of suspected terrorists was whittled down from 31,988 individuals to 
1,689 individuals.56  This process involved law enforcement officers identifying individuals 
that were not considered a terrorist threat.  For example, some of the initially identified 
individuals had already left Germany whilst others were present in Germany on legitimate 
grounds.57   However, it is noteworthy that whilst the German law enforcement officers 
subjected over 1600 individuals to greater levels of scrutiny, there were no charges brought 
forward against any identified ‘suspect’ on grounds of terrorism.58   
It is evident that the two applications of the Rasterfahndung profiling schemes in Germany 
represent a knowledge discovery process which employed subjected based data mining 
approaches.  The search of public and private databases identified a number of individuals 
for greater official scrutiny who were suspected of being involved in terrorist acts or 
preparatory activities.  Both applications of Rasterfahndung schemes adopted a reactive 
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58 National Research Council (n45), 215-216. 
 119 
methodology in reaction to specific events and known information from specific events and 
as such can be considered a form of deductive profiling.  For example the first 
Rasterfahndung scheme reacted with known information on RAF members and additionally 
the second Rasterfahndung scheme was also reactionary to the events of the September 11th 
terrorist attacks.  This approach to knowledge discovery demonstrates the ability of subject 
based data mining approaches as the basis to identify individuals for further investigation 
by law enforcement officers.   
The effectiveness of knowledge discovery processes and data mining as part of terrorist 
profiling is explored in detail below after examining the US manifestation of formal terrorist 
profiling.   
3.3.2 The Application of Knowledge Discovery Processes and Data Mining Approaches in 
the US 
The use of ‘knowledge discovery processes’ embracing ‘data mining’ approaches have 
manifested in three different ways in the US; governmental administrative agency 
knowledge discovery processes, law enforcement knowledge discovery processes and 
national security knowledge discovery processes.59  Each of these knowledge discovery 
processes exist to assist different governmental agencies identify different types of 
individuals engaged in an array of behaviour depending on the aim of the profiler.  The first 
two manifestations of knowledge discovery processes primarily exist outside of the context 
of terrorism and are aimed at identifying individuals engaged in criminal activity.  For 
example, in governmental administrative agency knowledge discovery processes, the US 
Internal Revenue Service utilise knowledge discovery processes to identify individuals 
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underpaying or avoiding their tax obligations.60  Additionally the use of knowledge 
discovery processes within law enforcement has been used by the FBI as a basis to 
investigate serious crime across America.61  However, in the context of terrorism there has 
been an array of different knowledge discovery processes over the past decade which has 
emerged as a direct consequence of the September 11th terrorist attacks.  Therefore, this 
section concentrates on the identification and analysis of knowledge discovery processes 
pursued in the context of terrorism.   
Following the September 11th attacks the media,62 academic commentary63 and 
governmental reports64 all emphasised that “law enforcement and security agencies” held 
adequate information to identify the terrorists who committed the September 11th attacks 
prior to the commission of the attack but their systems fundamentally failed to “connect the 
dots” in advance of the terrorist attacks.65  This raised a significant concern that law 
enforcement officers and agencies did not have an effective framework to identify patterns 
in information which could alert law enforcement officers of the likelihood of a terrorist 
attack.   Furthermore, the apparent inability of US law enforcement agencies to proactively 
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manage the threat of terrorism resulted in a profound re-evaluation of the role that law 
enforcement agencies played in managing the threat of terrorism.66  Many “agencies, such 
as the FBI and the CIA”, shifted focus from prosecuting acts of terrorism and preparatory 
activities to proactively managing the threat of terrorism by seeking to prevent its occurrence 
through the development of schemes and frameworks which would assist in identifying 
likely terrorists.67 
Consequently, in the aftermath of September 11th three main knowledge discovery processes 
were developed specifically to assist in managing the threat terrorism.  These included 
knowledge discovery processes to assist in identifying financial transactions likely to be 
associated with terrorism or preparatory activities, knowledge discovery processes to assist 
in identifying individuals worthy of further investigation at ports, and general knowledge 
discovery processes to assist in identifying individuals likely to be engaged in terrorism or 
preparatory activities.  It is important to note that law enforcement officers have employed 
various knowledge discovery processes at ports before the September 11th attacks, however, 
it was the September 11th attacks that provided the impetus to further develop and refine the 
knowledge discovery processes used at US ports. 
Although it is possible to categorise these knowledge discovery processes by their area of 
focus, the Homeland Security Act 2002 (HAS) provided a broad framework which 
encouraged and facilitated the development of knowledge discovery processes to assist in 
the identification of likely terrorists where section 201(d)(14) provides the “Undersecretary 
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for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection” in “the Department of Homeland 
Security” with the specific power to  
“… establish and utilise a secure communications and information 
technology infrastructure, including data mining and other advanced tools, 
in order to access, receive and analyse data and information in furtherance 
of the responsibilities of this section….”68  
Therefore, the terrorist attack on September 11th became the catalyst which resulted in a race 
to develop new and existing knowledge discovery frameworks and processes capable of 
identifying patterns and trends in human activity which could indicate terrorism acts or 
preparatory activities.  
Each knowledge discovery process manifestation will be identified and explained 
individually so as to understand the different ways formal terrorist profiling methods can be 
applied to identify individuals engaged in terrorism or preparatory activities. 
3.3.2.1 Knowledge Discovery Processes in Financial Transactions 
Knowledge discovery processes assisting in identifying financial transactions likely to be 
associated with terrorism or preparatory activities have been perceived as holding significant 
potential to not only frustrate the ability of terrorists to engage in acts of terrorism by 
freezing terrorist funds but also hold the potential to identify terrorist groups.69  As terrorists 
require capital to fund terrorism and inevitably leave a financial trail in the preparation and 
execution of acts of terrorism, it would appear logical to create the necessary framework to 
identify financial transactions and activities likely to be associated with terrorism or 
preparatory activities.   
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Therefore, the “United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act 2001” (US PATRIOT Act) and the 
subsequent USA Freedom Act 2015 (USA FA) facilitates knowledge discovery processes 
in financial transactions and activities by obligating financial institutions not only to 
“monitor and report” on financial transactions but also “financial institutions are required 
to” establish a means of discovering patterns in financial activities which may be associated 
with terrorism or preparatory activities.70  Additionally, other financial services such as 
cheque cashing centres, post offices and payment centres such as Western Union are also 
required to register with the US Department of Treasury so as to ensure the broadest range 
of financial activities can be monitored to assist in managing the threat of terrorism.71 
It is significant that the US Department of Treasury has refused to be drawn upon the exact 
requirements and obligations placed upon the financial institutions but rather has indicated 
“that financial institutions report on certain transactions that are determined to have a high 
degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, regulatory, intelligence and counter-terrorism 
matters”.72   It would appear that “certain transactions” requires the existence of 
predetermined criteria for identifying transactions which can be considered “useful”.  The 
“Financial Crimes Enforcement Network” (FinCEN) was created by US Department of 
Treasury to administer information gleaned from financial institutions merit worthy of 
further investigation by law enforcement officers.  The FinCEN assists, manages and retains 
information gathered under the US Patriot Act in an attempt to identify individuals engaged 
in terrorist and general crimes.  Furthermore, the FinCEN provides guidance to financial 
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institutions in the information that might lead to the identification of financial activities merit 
worthy of further investigation.73  
The process employed by financial institutions can be considered a knowledge discovery 
based approach employing data mining approaches to connect information together so as to 
identify meaningful patterns and trends worthy of further investigation.  Financial 
institutions must issue “Suspicious Activity Reports” (SAR) to the US Department of 
Treasury when they detect transactions likely to be associated with criminality or terrorism.  
In particular, the process of identifying SAR reports depend upon the existence of an 
infrastructure capable of linking different transactions indicative of terrorism. 
In light of the guidance information for financial institutions provided by FinCEN it is 
possible to discern the knowledge discovery process assisting in identifying financial 
transactions associated with terrorism or preparatory activities.  The guidance framework 
provided by FinCEN assists in identifying indicators capable of alerting financial institutions 
of financial activities thought to be associated with criminality or terrorism.  For example, 
FinCEN identify a key characteristic of funds likely to be associated with criminal 
enterprises or terrorist enterprises are large sums of money with no legitimate explanation 
of their origin.74 
Knowledge discovery processes embracing data mining approaches adopt both pattern based 
and subject based approaches in assisting in identifying information. For example, FinCEN 
recommends that the first stage in identifying a suspicious activity is to identify the 
background of the company or individual associated with transaction so as to investigate 
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whether the transaction history of their client can be considered of a legitimate origin.75  
Therefore the first phase in identifying financial activities must begin with a selection of 
internal databases which will provide the financial institution with a diverse range of 
information about their client.  The second phase will involve pre-processing that 
information by eliminating those individuals not thought to be associated with either 
criminality or terrorism.   
Financial institutions will inevitably have to conduct an assessment of their client’s account 
and history to determine whether they can be considered ‘legitimate’.   The third phase will 
involve transforming the pre-processed information into searchable data which will consist 
of historical data, raw data and integrated data of their client’s activities.  These three types 
of data will be capable of assisting financial institutions determining whether the financial 
transaction/activities can be considered suspicious on grounds of criminality or terrorism.  
The fourth phase uses the transformed data by identifying financial activities and 
transactions which are not considered to be of a legitimate origin.  The final phase will 
involve continually re-evaluating the information contained within their internal databases 
so as to investigate whether financial transactions can be considered legitimate. 
It is clear that knowledge discovery processes employed in financial institutions to detect 
criminality and terrorism largely depend upon pattern based data mining approaches to 
identify patterns and trends in client accounts that merit further investigation firstly by the 
financial institution and secondly by law enforcement officers.  The US Department of 
Treasury indicated that it has received 1,049,149 SAR reports up to 2007 with a further 
additional 15,994,484 currency exchange reports which merited closer examination in the 
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interests of terrorism and criminality.76  According to the US Department of the Treasury 
the US Patriot Act provides the mechanism to assist law enforcement officers in identifying 
the funding of terrorist or terrorist organisation in addition to suspicious financial activity 
by the co-operation of financial institutions.77  
3.3.2.2 Knowledge Discovery Processes at Ports 
Over the course of the past half century there have been a number of documented knowledge 
discovery schemes employed in aviation security which have been aimed at identifying 
individuals who are likely to be engaged in terrorist activities.  This knowledge discovery 
process has existed pre and post the September 11th attacks.  Therefore, it is noteworthy that 
the development of knowledge discovery processes at ports has been subjected to 
developmental progression where each knowledge discovery process has been subsequently 
developed in an incremental way in an attempt to enhance the ability of law enforcement 
officers to identify likely terrorists.  There have been four attempts to develop a fully 
integrated and enhanced knowledge discovery process capable of identifying individuals 
likely to be associated with terrorism or preparatory activities.  
The first manifestation of a knowledge discovery process employed at US airports was 
termed “the Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening System” (CAPPS) which was 
aimed at identifying individuals at airports for greater scrutiny by law enforcement 
officers.78   The CAPPS knowledge discovery process operated by employing a subject 
based data mining approach which required airlines to search databases identified by “the 
Federal Aviation Administration” (FAA) for the names of individuals considered “to be 
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associated with terrorism”.79  For example, the FAA held databases of key information such 
as names, date of birth and country of origin of ‘suspected’ terrorists which was utilised by 
airlines to cross checking their customer names against the FAA database.   
The operation of CAPPS knowledge discovery process existed to assist in identifying known 
individuals pre-determined as being associated with terrorism so they could be identified by 
law enforcement officers prior to their security screening at the airport.  However, whilst 
this system may be classified as being a knowledge discovery process, it is more akin to a 
watch list which was developed solely on the basis of known information on terrorists.  The 
processes applied by this knowledge discovery process did not follow the typical identified 
phases of knowledge discovery discussed above, but rather only involved airlines searching 
for known information in predetermined and pre-constructed databases.  Therefore, this 
system suffered from a fundamental weakness as it depended upon highly relevant 
information from the FAA who relied upon law enforcement information on terrorists. 
The CAPPS system was subsequently developed into the CAPPS II knowledge discovery 
process in the aftermath of September 11th which sought not only to employ subject based 
data mining approaches in knowledge discovery but also required pattern based data mining 
approaches to enhance security at airports.80  The fundamental distinction between CAPPS 
and CAPPS II is the fact that CAPPS II sought to identify patterns and trends in travel which 
may indicate a risk of terrorism.81  Additionally, the obligation placed on the airline 
companies to search databases shifted to the newly created Transport Security Agency 
(TSA) which undertook a more direct role in managing the threat of terrorism in the aviation 
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industry by administering the information supplied by airlines.  This information included 
passenger records which consisted of “full name, address, date of birth and phone 
number”.82  Therefore, the CAPPS II was aimed to “confirm a passenger's identity and 
score any potential terrorism-related threat to aviation.”83   
In considering the knowledge discovery process it is evident that the TSA engaged in the 
five phases inherent in any knowledge discovery processes identified and discussed above.  
In particular, the first phase involves the TSA attaining information from the airlines 
operating in the US and information from one or governmental databases on suspected 
terrorists.  The second phase progresses to eliminating inaccurate information from the 
commercial databases provided by airlines with the third phase transforming the information 
into searchable data.  At this stage in the knowledge discovery process, the fourth phase 
involved applying methods and techniques to confirm passengers’ identity against their risk 
of terrorism.   
The fourth phase created three tiers of knowledge in categorising the risk of individual likely 
to be terrorists.84 Firstly, those individuals who were not considered to be a terrorist risk 
were placed on a green list to indicate that they did not require additional airport screening.  
Secondly, those individuals who were identified on foot of a pattern-based data mining 
search would be placed on a ‘yellow’ list to indicate that they required some additional 
security screening at airport.  Finally, those individuals who had known links to terrorism or 
terrorism activities were placed on a ‘red’ list to indicate that those individuals were at the 
highest risk of terrorism and should normally be refused permission to travel at airports.  The 
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classification of an individual on a green, yellow and red list was highly contingent upon the 
historical, raw and integrated data contained within the databases at the transformation stage.  
The final phase of the CAPPS II system required a continual reassessment of the information 
at the generated at the third phase so that individuals placed on lists at the fourth phase could 
be continually reviewed against the threat of terrorism. 
Although the CAPPS II knowledge discovery system sought to strengthen the weaknesses 
of the previous CAPPS system by actively validating the identity of travellers against an 
individual assessment of the risk of terrorism, it was retired in 2004 in favour of an 
alternative system called “Secure Flight”.85  The rationale underpinning the development of 
the CAPPS II system into the Secure Flight system rested in a belief that airlines 
inconsistently collected information in their passenger records.  In essence, the development 
of the Secure Flight system can be considered an attempt to require airlines to collect specific 
information thought to assist in the identification of individuals likely to be engaged in 
terrorism or preparatory activities.  Secure flight placed a greater requirement on airlines to 
collect a broader range of information than simply “name, address, date of birth and phone 
number” but also required other personal information such as the passenger’s gender and 
their full flight itineraries including:  
“(1) departure airport, (2) aircraft operator, (3) departure date, (4) 
departure time, (5) arrival date, (6) scheduled arrival time, (7) arrival airport 
code, (8) flight number and (9) the operating carrier”.86 
Similar to the two previous manifestations of aviation security knowledge processes, Secure 
Flight embraces a “subject based and pattern based data mining” approaches as it seeks to 
identify individuals on the basis of pre-existing known information in addition to patterns 
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on the basis of travel.87 The Secure Flight knowledge discovery process operates a two tiered 
system for assisting in the identification of likely terrorists.  Firstly, passengers intending to 
fly in to or out of a US airport would be cross-matched against a ‘Terrorism No-Fly database’ 
developed by the Department of Homeland Security.88  Any passenger name appearing on 
the terrorism database would automatically be prohibited from flying within the US.  
Secondly, the TSA would also cross-match passenger names against a ‘Selectee’ list so as 
to identify passengers requiring heightened security checks at US airports.89 
It is the ‘Selectee list’ that is of most interest as the ‘No-Fly database’ is directly connected 
with known information on terrorist gleaned by law enforcement intelligence.  The first 
phase in the knowledge discovery process of Secure Flight is the selection phase where the 
TSA uses information from commercial airlines in addition to law enforcement databases 
containing information on terrorists.  The second phase in the Secure Flight knowledge 
discovery process involves the pre-processing of the selected information.  This involves 
removing individuals not likely to be considered terrorists either in light of the full data 
provided by the commercial airline or alternatively due to information contained within the 
law enforcement database.  The third phase in this knowledge discovery process involves 
transforming the pre-processed data into a search dataset capable of identifying individuals 
merit worthy of further investigation prior to their airport security screening.  The fourth 
phase is aimed at conducting the searches on the dataset to identify those individuals for 
closer scrutiny at the airport.  The final phase involves re-evaluating all of the information 
in the dataset in an attempt to enhance the accuracy of the information. 
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A more recent attempt to enhance aviation security further by relying upon knowledge 
discovery processes has been “the development of the Automated Targeting System” (ATS) 
which evaluates the terrorist risk not only of passengers but also of all cargo entering and 
leaving the US.90  The ATS knowledge discovery process utilises both “subject based” and 
“pattern based data mining techniques” to identify individuals and/or cargo which is likely 
to be linked to acts of terrorism or terrorism activities.  The process exists by requiring all 
commercial organisations operating in the movement of goods or people in the US, whether 
by land, air or sea, to collect the personal information of individuals in addition to cargo 
information which can be cross checked with various security risk databases within the US 
by the TSA.91  The phases involved in the ATS knowledge discovery process involved is 
very similar to the Secure Flight knowledge discovery process except that it also applies to 
cargo in addition to individual passengers. 
3.3.2.3 General Knowledge Discovery Processes – The Total Information Awareness 
Scheme 
The most controversial knowledge discovery process employed in the US has been 
considered the “Total Information Awareness Scheme” (TIA) which was renamed as the 
“Terrorism Information Awareness” scheme (TIA).92 The TIA knowledge discovery process 
was premised upon the ability of searching substantial public and private databases through 
the use of pattern based data mining approaches.  In essence, the TIA knowledge discovery 
process was akin to allowing US law enforcement officers to search uncontrollably through 
an increasing range of public and private databases to identify individuals for greater 
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scrutiny as terrorist suspects.  However, it is significant to note that the TIA scheme was not 
actually used by law enforcement officers as it had not excelled beyond the developmental 
stage due to Congress withdrawing funding amid concerns about the scheme’s potential to 
collect, store and disseminate vast arrays of citizen information.  Although, it was reported 
in the New York Times in 2012 that many aspects of the scheme was used by the ‘National 
Security Agency’ (NSA) in the detection of terrorism.93 
It was proposed that the first phase in the TIA scheme would consist of law enforcement 
officers identifying vast arrays of public and private information held on individuals in 
public and private databases.94  This process was considerably expansive using commercial 
credit based agencies such as ‘Check Point’, ‘Experian’ and ‘Lexis-Nexis Personal Reports’ 
in addition to publically held databases to identify individual likely to be associated with 
terrorism.95  The second phase involved pre-processing that the information collected from 
the different databases by removing individuals not suspected of terrorism.  It was aimed 
that law enforcement databases and intelligence could be used as a basis to remove 
individuals from the database.96   The third phase was aimed at transforming the data into a 
number of searchable datasets with key information on individuals likely to be engaged in 
terrorism.  The fourth phase involved identifying individuals matching the criteria 
established by the Department of Homeland Security which identified individuals likely or 
suspected as being engaged in terrorism or preparatory activities.  The final phase was 
proposed to be a review phase which would continually review the operation of the databases 
to ensure that each dataset was accurate and relevant. 
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The origins of the TIA knowledge discovery process can be traced to the “Defence 
Advanced Research Projects Agency” programme which was subsequently rebranded into 
the TIA programme when Congress has removed its funding due to the privacy concerns 
raised by collecting and searching a growing number of private and public databases with 
only a general aim of finding suspicious patterns indicative of terrorism activities.  After a 
further eight months of development the TIA knowledge discovery process was closed down 
by Congress withdrawing its funding on the basis of the privacy concerns raised by the 
development of a nationwide ‘open’ database to facilitate the trawl of vast arrays of personal 
information.   
3.3.2.4 Knowledge Discovery Processes in the US – Summary 
It is evident that there are a broad range of documented knowledge discovery processes in 
the US which have emerged in the context of managing the threat of terrorism stemming 
from the September 11th terrorist attacks.  The US knowledge discovery processes adopt a 
dissected mix of pattern based and subject based data mining approaches to assist law 
enforcement officers in the identification of individuals likely to be engaged in terrorism 
acts or preparatory activities.  It is also evident that each knowledge discovery scheme has 
sought to incrementally progress from the previous manifestations of knowledge discovery 







3.4 An Evaluation of Knowledge Discovery Processes in the Context of Terrorism 
As discussed above, the use of knowledge discovery processes in counterterrorism involves 
the use of data mining approaches in two separate ways – either “subject based data mining 
approaches” or “pattern based data mining approaches”.97 
“Subject based data mining approaches” typically start with a specific known subject and 
will seek to search for more meaningful information on that subject.  For example, in the 
German Rasterfahndung profiling schemes, discussed above, the law enforcement officers 
sought to conduct subject based enquiries to identify individuals who bore similar known 
characteristics as those anticipated by law enforcement officers.  Additionally, subject based 
enquires carry the potential to uncover other links/connections with individuals unknown to 
law enforcement officers by discovering terrorist associations.  This type of knowledge 
discovery can be considered a form of deductive profiling as it exhibits a number of the key 
characteristics of scientific deductive profiling methods. 
Alternatively, there are pattern-based approaches which involve a predictive model based 
upon identifying patterns of behaviour which raise the suspicion of terrorism.  For example, 
pattern based enquiries will allow law enforcement officers to search for individual people, 
places, terrorist targets etc. by matching information within the dataset with a specific 
hypothesis of behavioural patterns.  For example, the US knowledge discovery process 
developed for financial transactions seeks to identify trends and patterns based upon 
patterned behaviour likely to raise the suspicion of financing terrorism.  This type of 
knowledge discovery can be considered a form of inductive profiling as it exhibits a number 
of the key characteristics of inductive profiling methods. 
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In either of these knowledge discovery processes data mining is aimed at assisting in the 
identification of individuals engaged in terrorism or preparatory activities by being the 
process to identify the trends and patterns which would otherwise remain unknown in the 
datasets.  For example in the subject-based enquiries data mining is aimed at assisting in the 
identification of any potential links between individuals by searching the datasets.  
Additionally within the pattern-based enquiries data mining can be used as a basis to identify 
the unknown patterns within the dataset to elicit key behavioural trends. 
The study of these methods raises the issue as to whether formal terrorist profiling can be 
considered ‘effective’ as an assistive tool for law enforcement officers in identifying 
individuals likely to be engaged in terrorism or preparatory activities.  In the introductory 
chapter above, a conceptual framework to measure/test the effectiveness of terrorist profiling 
was developed with a view to applying it to knowledge discovery processes as a formal 
terrorist profiling method.  It can be recalled that there are arguably three core elements in 
creating an analytical framework capable of measuring/testing the ‘effectiveness’ of terrorist 
profiling.  These including examining the input processes used to construct profiles, the 
output processes which assess the use of the profile in the field and thirdly the broader impact 
of the use of the profile.   
3.4.1 Assessing/Measuring the Effectiveness of Terrorist profiling 
As discussed and debated in the introductory chapter above the ‘effectiveness’ of terrorist 
profiling can be assessed/measured by reference to three separate indicators of effectiveness.   
Firstly, the input effectiveness involves conducting a utilitarian assessment of the methods 
used in the construction of terrorist profiles so as to assess whether the methods are capable 
of identifying likely terrorist characteristics that can be used in the construction of terrorist 
profiles.  For example, in both manifestations of formal terrorist profiling in Germany and 
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US, terrorist profiling can be found in an enabling statute with case law considering its use 
and application by law enforcement officers.  The legal frameworks facilitating formal 
terrorist profiling in both the German and US manifestations have concentrated in providing 
law enforcement officers the power to rely upon profiling as an assistive tool in managing 
the threat of terrorism.   
Secondly, the output effectiveness involves conducting an assessment of the application of 
formal terrorist profiles by law enforcement officers so as to assess whether the methods are 
capable of identifying individuals likely to be engaged in terrorism or preparatory activities.  
For example, the German manifestation of formal terrorist profiling only identified one 
individual associated with terrorism despite identifying over 30,000 suspects.  Similarly, in 
the US financial transaction knowledge process over 1 million records were identified and 
it remains a mystery as to whether these records actually assisted in identifying individuals 
likely to be engaged in terrorism or preparatory activities.   
Thirdly, it is contended that in order to fully address the assessment of the effectiveness of 
formal terrorist profiling, it is necessary to go beyond the utilitarian assessment into 
assessing the broader consequences of terrorist profiling.  As noted in chapter one, this 
involves questioning the cost or associated cost of terrorist profiling is so significant that it 
begins to undermine the very rationale of using terrorist profiling as part of a 
counterterrorism policy that is aimed at preventing, detecting and prosecuting those likely 
to be involved in terrorism or its preparatory activities.  
3.4.2 The Input Assessment of the Effectiveness of Constructing Formal Terrorist Profiles 
In chapter two a number of shortcomings was identified in the use of deductive and inductive 
profiling methods in the context of terrorism which may be valid in respect of knowledge 
discovery processes and data mining.   
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In particular, two key criticisms made in chapter two of scientific deductive profiling where 
the heavy reliance upon pre-existing information contained in databases as the basis to 
predict the occurrence of future characteristics and the use of typologies and hypothesis in 
the development of profiles.  In the context of knowledge discovery approaches relying upon 
subject based data mining approaches, it is likely that relying exclusively on pre-existing 
known information fails to appreciate the ability of terrorists to adopt their techniques in 
executing terrorist acts.   
For example, the manifestation of terrorism in the September 11th attacks illustrated a failure 
to appreciate the ability of terrorists to turn common items such as planes into lethal weapons 
capable of inflicting destruction on an unprecedented scale.  Furthermore, the use of 
typologies and hypothesis in the German use of Rasterfahndung knowledge discovery failed 
to yield positive results in identifying likely members of the RAF and ‘sleeper’ terrorists.  
Furthermore, in the US CAPPS knowledge discovery process it was evident that the reliance 
upon the FAA’s known information on terrorists failed in allowing law enforcement officers 
identify the terrorist attackers who committed the September 11th attacks. 
This may demonstrate that knowledge discovery processes adopting a subject based 
approach may be restricted in its capacity to identify individuals likely to be engaged in 
terrorist acts or preparatory activities. 
The shortcomings in the use of inductive profiling methods in the context of terrorism were 
also identified in chapter two.  In particular, it was identified that a common weakness in 
developing statistical models in terrorism is the fact that acts of terrorism occur relatively 
infrequently.  As a result it may not be possible to develop adequate models to identify or 
accurately interpret the results yielded from an application of a knowledge discovery process 
adopting a pattern based data mining approach. 
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Furthermore, Thuraisingham argues that there are at least six challenges in using data mining 
processes and methods in the context of terrorism.98 
Firstly, it is not evident “that the data mining process” can fully manage “the false positives 
and false negatives” from the processed data which result from the actual data mining.99  In 
particular, a false positive is where the application of an algorithm makes an incorrect 
connection between different information in the dataset which results in identifying an 
individual who is not connected to terrorism in any way.  Alternatively, a false negative is 
the direct opposite where an algorithm fails to draw together the different information in the 
data set to make the connection to identify a terrorist.  The occurrence of either is a key 
challenge for the use of data mining as someone identified from a false positive will become 
subject to an official suspicion by law enforcement officers with the potential of being 
stigmatised as being a ‘terrorist’ whilst a false negative could result in a terrorist attack 
occurring undetected.  A false negative or positive can occur because the information 
contained within the data sets may be considered of poor quality due to inaccuracies or 
incomplete information about specific individuals.100 
For example, in the second German Rasterfahndung application of knowledge discovery the 
inclusion of databases on individuals who had acquired an airplane licence directly led to 
the inclusion of 1,187 who were not considered a risk of terrorism.  This can be considered 
a false positive as the knowledge discovery process had identified individuals likely to be a 
terrorist threat when the opposite was the case. Furthermore, in considering the US TIA 
knowledge discovery process it is arguable that the inclusion of mass public and private 
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databases could have created specific difficulties of false positives and negatives simply due 
to the patterns identifiable from mass availability of personal data. 
Secondly, it is not evident that knowledge discovery processes can actually deal with real 
time events.101  Events can occur either in real time or non-real time.  Real time events 
require an immediate response from law enforcement officers.  An example of a real time 
threat is the use of chemical weapons without detection or warning by a terrorist group.  As 
it has been identified above, data mining requires vast arrays of available information which 
is analysed over time to draw out patterns and trends.  The fact that real time events are 
immediate would appear to challenge the ability of data mining to identify individuals 
engaged in these acts of terrorism. 
For example, the first and second German Rasterfahndung knowledge discovery processes 
can be considered reactive to particular terrorist events.  As terrorist events occur in real 
time it is difficult to appreciate the way in which this form of terrorist profiling could assist 
law enforcement officers in the identification of individuals likely to be engaged in terrorist 
activities in response to a real time terrorist attack.  Additionally, the development in the 
aviation security knowledge discovery processes in the US is evidence of the fact that the 
changing nature of terrorism threats requires a continual development of data mining 
techniques in order to take into account new forms and threats of terrorism.  This is 
demonstrated in the weaknesses and deficiencies within the CAPPS system into the CAPPS 
II system.  As terrorism events typically occur in real time, it is arguable that existing 
knowledge discovery processes may not be capable of identifying new emerging acts of 
terrorism. 
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Thirdly, it is evident that knowledge discovery processes using data mining approaches 
require data to be structured into a pre-processed form.  As multimedia networks have 
emerged as an unstructured form of potentially valuable data, it is arguable that existing 
knowledge discovery processes are challenged to use multimedia databases, such as 
Facebook and Twitter, as multimedia databases tend to contain unstructured and interactive 
datasets.   Previous research on data mining has allowed the development of algorithms to 
mine structured data sets which contain information in a specific format and structure.   
However, with the rise of social multimedia there is an increasing vast array of important 
information continually emerging on social networks which are unstructured databases.  The 
ability of algorithms to process unstructured data is a challenge that grips computer 
programmers and software developers.  The fundamental challenge is the ability to create a 
programme and algorithm that can turn unstructured data into useful structured data so as to 
make the information useful for data mining.   
Fourthly, a further challenge in data mining in the context of terrorism is actually ‘joining 
all the dots’ together to identify important trends and patterns within the datasets.  This 
involves being able to connect the structured data with the unstructured data to identify 
relevant patterns and trends to make predictions about future terrorist threats. 
For example, in relation to the development of knowledge discovery processes in the US, it 
emerged during the National Commission on the September 11th investigation of the terrorist 
attacks that significant pieces of intelligence and information was available to law 
enforcement officers in the US which could have allowed the identification of some of the 
actual al-Qaeda members involved in executing the terrorist attacks.  For instance, known 
individuals suspected of terrorism lived in the US under their real names and undertook 
flight training lessons over a considerable period prior to the occurrence of the terrorist 
attacks. 
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Fifthly, there is still a significant amount of data which is a major challenge to obtain as it 
is unclassified an array of different jurisdictions across the world.  This is data that is 
contained within databases but remains outside of the reach of data miners due to security 
or jurisdictional constraints.  In the detection and prevention of international terrorism, the 
jurisdictional boundaries on information is likely to frustrate the ability to fully identify 
significant databases which may be capable of assisting in the identification of individuals 
found in  
Finally, the major challenge for data mining is the fact that many consider its use a breach 
of the right to privacy.  Throughout much of the early literature, data mining is presented as 
a dichotomy between security and liberty.102   The fundamental problem with data mining 
is the fact that governments are accumulating large qualities of personal information about 
individuals who may not in fact be engaged in any terrorist activities which may be 
considered a violation of their right to privacy.  The law on privacy differs greatly from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction; however, more recently the focus in academic literature has been 
on the development of systems within technology to ensure the protection of privacy when 
data mining occurs.103 
For example, the US TIA knowledge discovery process invoked a thorough investigation by 
the US Congress which eventually led to its withdrawal due to the refusal of the US Congress 
to continue to fund this application of knowledge discovery. 
In summary it is evident that the discussion in this section cannot conclusively prove that 
the manifestations of formal terrorist profiling demonstrate input effectiveness.  This is 
largely due to the absence of official information to allow a conclusive evaluation to be made 
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on these manifestations of formal terrorist profiling.  The problem with making a conclusive 
assessment is to do with the methodological limitations of this thesis which are not 
necessarily connected with the methods/approaches inherent in manifestations of formal 
terrorist profiling.  As a result, it is contended that for the analytical purposes, the discussion 
in this chapter shows to a reasonable degree of probability that the profiling 
methods/approaches analysed in this chapter have some input effectiveness.  This argument 
is made on the basis that profiling by its very nature is an iterative process that improves 
over time and these profiling manifestations have demonstrated that they are reviewable 
over time with the potential of being improved. 
3.4.3 The Output Assessment of the Effectiveness of the Application of Formal Terrorist 
Profiles 
The output assessment of the effectiveness of the application of terrorist profiles involves 
considering the direct and indirect evidence available to demonstrate whether law 
enforcement officers were able to identify individuals likely to be engaged in terrorism or 
preparatory activities.  In the case of the thesis this involves an evidenced based assessment 
of the application of the formal terrorist profiling methods applied in the German and US 
manifestations. 
In the German manifestation of formal terrorist profiling it is evident that the profiling 
scheme was only capable of actually identifying one individual suspected of terrorism or 
preparatory activities.  In light of the fact that no direct evidence other than one positive 
identification of a suspected terrorist, it can be concluded that there may be little evidence 
to support the use of formal terrorist profiling schemes as a basis to identify individuals for 
arrest and prosecution.  Furthermore, in considering the US manifestations of formal terrorist 
profiling it is not evident how many individuals were actually identified in the detection of 
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terrorism.  The DHS website indicates that since 2010 5,700 passengers have been identified 
through “pre-departure vetting” as being inadmissible to the US on grounds of being 
suspected terrorists or being connected with terrorist groups.104  Furthermore, formal 
terrorist profiling methods have identified on average 1750 “suspicious” passengers on a 
yearly basis from around an annual 239 million passengers.105  While the statistics do not 
provide information on how many of these individuals were charged or indeed prosecuted 
with terrorism offences, at minimum it demonstrates the capacity of this manifestation of 
formal terrorist profiling to assist law enforcement officers identify individuals for enhanced 
screening.  However, considering the absence of the key statistics of arrest and prosecution 
we cannot conclude whether formal terrorist profiling methods are capable of being of 
assistance to law enforcement officers in the prevention, detection and prosecution of 
terrorism.  This reveals a complicated picture on the examination of the usefulness of 
terrorist profiling that may be considered a methodological challenge relating to the 
application of profiles in the determination of the output effectiveness of formal 
manifestations of terrorist profiling. 
It would appear that in German and US manifestations of formal terrorist profiling there is 
little actual evidence to allow the conclusion that formal terrorist profiling methods can be 
considered as being effective as an assistive tool for law enforcement officers in the 
identification of individuals engaged in terrorism or preparatory activities.  
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3.4.4 The Impact of Formal Terrorist Profiling Methods 
It can also be recalled from the introduction chapter above that a further measure of 
effectiveness is to analyse the impact of formal terrorist profiling.  This involves questioning 
whether the discernable impact or likely impact of formal terrorist profiling may be 
considered as outweighing its usefulness as a counterterrorism tool.  Specifically, the 
assessment of impact is about questioning whether there is any evidence on the individual 
manifestations of formal terrorist profiling that serves to undermine the input and output 
effectiveness to the point that the state’s moral authority and legitimacy to govern is 
undermined by law enforcement officer use of this type of terrorist profiling. 
 (A) Germany 
A key concern revealed by the discussion on the German Rasterfahndung terrorist profiling 
scheme was the fact that it required significant amounts of personal data.  This effectively 
meant that the German state had to engage in snooping exercises on its citizens by collecting, 
storing and analysing vast arrays of personal and public information about its citizens in an 
attempt to identify those likely to be engaged in terrorism.   
In light of the determination of the German Constitutional Court in B v F106 this collection, 
storing and analysis of personal information was so significant that it represented an 
infringement of an individual’s “right to informational self-determination”.107  Although the 
Court acknowledged that the state’s need to protect against the threat of terrorism was a 
higher ranking constitutional consideration in contrast to the protection of an individual’s 
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right to informational self-determination, the concern with the Rasterfahndung scheme 
related to the sheer array of the private information collected, stored and analysed.108   
In a subsequent case, B v R109 the German Constitutional Court followed the reasoning 
adopted in B v F.  Specifically, the Court concluded that the practice of engaging in a broad 
collection and analysis of online data belonging to potential suspects which involved the 
retrieval of information from their social networking profiles so as to identify whether they 
could be classified as being potential terrorists was contrary to their right to informational 
self-determination.110 
The core issue that is revealed by the use of this manifestation of terrorist profiling, which 
may erode its effectiveness as a counterterrorism tool, is whether the necessity for such 
levels of state surveillance of its citizens can be considered a cost outweighs the usefulness 
of this manifestation of terrorist profiling.   The use of any counterterrorism tool is inevitably 
going to involve a conflict and tension between the state’s right to achieve security and the 
need to protect fundamental human rights and norms.111  However, the fact that the state has 
to sink to the depths of effectively engaging in broad fishing expeditions to make this 
manifestation work or potentially work goes to the very heart as to whether this 
manifestation of terrorist profiling can be considered as being potentially harmful by 
denying citizens their fundamental rights.  Therefore, the concern here as identified by the 
German Constitutional Court is the fact that this level of state surveillance lowers the state 
to the same level as the terrorists by the denial of fundamental rights.   
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 (B) The United States 
The discussion on the manifestations of the US examined various terrorist profiling schemes 
adopted in relation to pre-screening airport passengers and a general terrorist profiling 
scheme referred to as the TIA profiling scheme.  In a similar way to the German terrorist 
profiling manifestation, these schemes reveal a need for significant quantities of personal 
information so as to allow the law enforcement officer make sense of the data in the 
identification of those likely to be terrorists. 
The level of concern with these schemes was exposed by the US Congress withdrawing 
funding of the TIA profiling scheme on the basis of apprehensions it held about the need for 
the state to effectively engage in mass collection, storing and analysis of private data.112  
However, there has been a report in the New York Times which suggests that even though 
Congress formally withdrew funding of this profiling scheme, the US National Security 
Agency is allegedly still using profiling scheme in its covert surveillance operations within 
the US.113 
An issue that emerges about these general terrorist profiling schemes, which may be 
classifiable as being manifestations of formal terrorist profiling, is the fact that significant 
amounts of personal data is necessary to make them useful or potentially useful to law 
enforcement officers in the detection, deterrence and prosecution of terrorists.  The fact that 
the US Congress withdrew the funding of the TIA scheme may be evidence of a deeper 
concern that this type of terrorist profiling is more than likely to outweigh any perceived 
usefulness in assisting with the prevention, detection or prosecution of likely terrorists.  
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Therefore, it may be the very type of conduct that calls into question the legitimacy of the 
state, which could compromise the state’s ability to engage in any meaningful countering of 
terrorism. 
In the context of the passenger pre-screening profiling schemes including the CAPPS, 
CAPPS II and Secure Flight schemes, there is some qualitative evidence that reveals some 
people continuously experience intensive scrutiny without any apparent objective reason for 
the selection for enhanced examinations.  For example, Chadrasekhar identified that since 
the terrorist attacks on the September 11th, 2001 there has been an aura of suspicion on 
passengers who are identifiable from their passenger information as being potentially 
Muslim.114  Other research, such as Kleineralso found similar evidence to support the 
contention that those individuals most likely to be subjected to enhanced scrutiny ports tend 
to be Muslim which may have been identifiable from their passenger information.115  
However, it has been argued by Cavusoglu et al that the Secure Flight profiling programme 
has the ability to reduce the inconvenience of airport security by ensuring that only those 
likely to be suspects will be subjected to enhance screening at airports so long as it is 
continually reviewed for to ensure its accuracy in practice.116 
Although these qualitative studies are narrow in their focus, they do provide some evidence 
to at least note a concern with the use of passenger profiling schemes that relate to a potential 
risk that some passengers may unjustifiably become the focal point of suspicion.  It further 
raises the issue as to whether this type of conduct is something that the state should be 
engaged in as part of its counterterrorism strategy.  The danger posed by such profiling 
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schemes is that the application of these schemes in practice may end up being 
counterproductive. 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter was aimed at identifying, explaining and evaluating formal terrorist profiling 
methods so as to investigate to what extent (if at all), and in what ways (if any) terrorist 
profiling may be useful as part of the law enforcement process of identifying individuals 
engaged in acts of terrorism and associated preparatory activities. 
In considering the formal terrorist profiling methods, it is evident that they do provide a 
basis to at minimum identify individuals who may or may not be engaged in terrorism or 
preparatory activities. 
The six challenges identified by Thuraisingham combine to create four fundamental 
limitations on the use of formal terrorist profiling as being an assistive tool capable of being 
considered effective in identifying individuals engaged in terrorism or preparatory 
activities.117  
Firstly, whilst it can be argued that data mining represents an important tool which may be 
powerful in identifying trends and patterns inherent in datasets which would otherwise 
remain unknown, it requires two highly skilled individuals to ensure the smooth running of 
any data mining activities; a technical specialist capable of writing the computer language 
necessary to extract the data from the data sets and a skilled data analyst who is capable of 
interpreting the results for practice. 
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Secondly, whilst it has been identified above that data mining does carry the potential for 
identifying patterns and trends which would otherwise remain unknown, the results of data 
mining do not reveal the actual value of the patterns or the trends.  Therefore, in some 
instances the results from data mining may be impossible to interpret as being important or 
unimportant.  The data mining process for counter-terrorism must have a system for 
managing the large data results which emerge from data mining which are not capable of 
being used for identifying potential terrorist threats. 
Thirdly, whilst data mining is capable of making connections between different types of 
information, it does not automatically always recognise the underlying relationship between 
individuals and terrorist threats.  For example, if an individual is continually buying last 
minute flights data mining techniques may be able to reveal the names of the passengers, 
their destinations and the frequency of their travel but it may fail to provide actual reasons 
as to why last minute flights are being purchased.  There may be a variety of reasons aside 
from the obvious terrorist perspective including reasons relating to the individual’s work or 
personal life.  Therefore, the effective use of data mining requires that the process and 
techniques within data mining may sometimes require greater human input so as ‘to make 
sense of the data’ results. 
Finally, the greatest limitation upon data mining within the context of terrorism is the fact 
that there is a significant amount of unknown information on terrorists.  As information on 
terrorists can be largely intelligence based, it tends to be national security sensitive which is 
only released security cleared law enforcement officers within individual countries. 
Therefore, it is arguable that formal terrorist profiling may not necessarily be considered 
ineffective but rather it may be considered limited in its ability to assist in identifying 
individuals engaged in terrorism or preparatory activities.  However, the discussion on 
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impact questioned whether the broader impact of these terrorist profiling schemes eroded 
the usefulness of the profiling scheme as a counterterrorism tool.  The challenge with these 
manifestations of terrorist profiling is whether the potential effectiveness of the construction 
and application of profiles is cast in doubt by the broader impact of their use in practice to 
the point that any discernable usefulness of terrorist profiling is eroded.   
It is important to acknowledge, that the manifestations of terrorist profiling considered in 
this chapter were reviewable.  This reviewability may partially make them somewhat more 
acceptable in contrast to other manifestations of terrorist profiling which are examined in 
chapters four and five.  For instance, the German Rasterfahndung scheme was subject to 
review and control in the German Constitutional Court. Additionally, the criticism of the 
pre-passenger profiling schemes in the US ultimately led to their reviewability with the aim 
of improving their application in practice.  Specifically, CAPPS to CAPPS II improved by 
using passenger travel data in combination with public information before selecting 
individuals for enhanced scrutiny.118  The further reform of CAPPS II into the Secure Flight 
programme in 2010 allowed for greater use of known terrorist watch lists as the basis to 
support the identification of passengers for enhanced screening in addition to relying merely 
on their passenger data.   
As counterterrorism raises a tension between achieving security and human rights, then at 
minimum manifestations of formal terrorist profiling may provide some basis to allow the 
protection of human rights to be accommodated within counterterrorism policy given that 
manifestations of formal terrorist profiling are reviewable.  In final conclusion an argument 
may be made that formal manifestations have the potential to be capable of assisting law 
enforcement officers identify those likely to be involved in terrorism or its associated 
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preparatory activities.  Although the impact of such manifestations of terrorist profiling call 
into question the legitimacy of a state’s counterterrorism policy but nevertheless may be 





CHAPTER 4: BEHAVIOURAL PROFILING: THE CONSTRUCTION AND 




As a result of the limitations evident from the discussion on the manifestations of formal 
terrorist profiling in the previous chapter, a question arises as to whether other profiling 
methods/approaches can be adopted in combination with formal terrorist profiling so as to 
minimise or address any of the identified limitations.   
 
Therefore, the primary exploratory aim of the discussion in this chapter is to analyse 
behavioural terrorist profiling so as to assess whether this manifestation of profiling can 
resolve some of the limitations evident in the manifestations of formal terrorist profiling 
examined in the previous chapter. This exploration will inevitably involve assessing whether 
behavioural profiling can be considered an independent form of formal profiling or whether 
it exists purely as a complementary form of profiling to support other forms of profiling. 
 
The definition of behavioural profiling can be considered a contentious issue throughout the 
literature which means that there is no internationally agreed formal definition of 
behavioural profiling in the context of terrorism.  From a theoretical perspective, behavioural 
profiling concentrates on identifying physiological human traits that “contribute to 
predicting behaviour” 1 so as to measure “bodily behaviours such as key-stroke behaviour, 
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gait and facial expressions” as a basis to assist law enforcement officers select individuals 
for enhanced scrutiny.2   
 
The discussion in chapter two did not examine behavioural profiling methods/approaches as 
it is not classified as being a manifestation of formal profiling in comparable terms with 
those manifestations of profiling examined in chapters two and three.  Behavioural profiling 
can be distinguished from the other manifestations of profiling methods/approaches 
analysed in chapters two and three as it does not rely on information about any sensitive 
characteristics, such as race, ethnicity, gender, religion etc.  Specifically, behavioural 
profiling is reliant on identifying and measuring physical bodily movements that transcend 
the common sensitive characteristics used in other forms of profiling.  It is argued that 
behavioural profiling has some elements of a formalised and systematic process to construct 
and apply profiles but falls a little short of the systematic processes commonly evident in 
manifestations of formal terrorist profiling.  As a result it is contended that the manifestation 
of behavioural terrorist profiling examined in this chapter is on the profiling spectrum set 
out in chapter one but moves towards the informal end of the profiling spectrum. 
 
In the context of the thesis, it is argued that behavioural profiling can be defined as being 
any process aimed at preventing, detecting and managing the threat of terrorism that 
concentrates exclusively on identifying and measuring human bodily movements as a basis 
for selecting individuals for further and/or enhanced levels of scrutiny.   However, due to 
the contentious nature of defining behavioural profiling in the context of terrorism, it will 
be necessary to revisit the definition attributable to behavioural profiling later in the chapter 
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in light of the discussion and evaluation of behavioural profiling methods/approaches and 
the examination of the manifestations of behavioural profiling. 
 
The aim of this chapter is explored in three parts below.  In the first part, the discussion 
concentrates on identifying, explaining and evaluating the theory underpinning the 
methods/approaches used to construct behavioural profiles.  The identification and 
explanation of the behavioural profiling methods/approaches assists in conducting an 
evaluation of these methods in the context of terrorism prior to examining different 
manifestations of behavioural profiling.  The second part progresses to consider different 
manifestations of the application of behavioural profiling in two countries so as to assess 
whether the theory of behavioural profiling is evident in the practical application of 
behavioural profiling.  The countries selected are Israel and the US as both provide a 
different perspective on the application of behavioural profiling approaches in the context 
of terrorism.  In the final section a conclusion draws on the analysis of the construction of 
behavioural profiles and the different manifestations of the application of behavioural 
profiling so as to test whether behavioural profiling can be used as a basis to address the 
limitations of formal terrorist profiling. 
 
We shall now progress to identifying, explaining and evaluating the profiling 
approaches/methods used to construct behavioural profiles. 
 
4.2 The Construction of Behavioural Profiles 
As noted above, behavioural profiling refers to a process capable of assisting with the 
identification and measurement of human physical traits so as to assist in making predictions 
about human behaviour.  The primary aim of this section is to identify, explain and evaluate 
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the methods/approaches used to construction of behavioural profiles so that we can analyse 
the applicability of behavioural profiling methods/approaches in the context of preventing 
and detecting terrorism.   
 
It is contended that in order to analyse behavioural profiling methods/approaches we need 
to firstly categorise various behavioural profiling approaches so that we can appreciate the 
way behavioural profiling can occur.  Secondly, we need to progress by examining the 
various methods/approaches that can be used to profile human behaviour so we can fully 
analyse the applicability of these profiling methods in the context of terrorism.  Finally, in 
light of the categorisation and explanation of behavioural profiling methods/approaches we 
need to evaluate their applicability in the context of terrorism. 
 
4.2.1 The Categorisation of Behavioural Profiling 
According to the literature profiling methods/approaches used to construct behavioural 
profiles can be categorised in three different ways including ‘biometric profiling’, 
‘psychometric profiling’ and ‘sociometric profiling’.3   
 
We shall identify and explain each of these categories before progressing to explaining the 
different behavioural profiling methods/approaches.  However, we can note that each of 
these behavioural profiling categories can be applied collectively or individually so as to 
construct behavioural profiles depending on the aim of the profiling exercise as each of these 
approaches analyse human behaviour in different ways.  
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(a) Biometric Profiling 
The term “biometric” in the context of behavioural profiling is taken as referring “to the 
scientific and technological measurement of either physiological or behavioural human 
characteristics” so as to make predictions about future behaviour.4  Biometric behavioural 
profiling concentrates on identifying and measuring two aspects of an individual’s physical 
features, the physical biometric and the behavioural biometric so as to construct a 
behavioural profile.5   
 
Firstly, the physical biometric involves assessing physical characteristics such as finger 
prints, iris recognition and facial recognition so as to recognise pre-known physical 
features.6 For example, law enforcement officers can use physical biometric profiling where 
they have physical evidence from a crime scene or previous police records about a known 
criminal or terrorist so as to identify individuals at sensitive locations such as airports, 
seaports and land ports.  Although the physical biometric can be considered as being relevant 
only where law enforcement officers have pre-known information about a particular 
terrorist, the point of interest to this chapter is that this category of behavioural profiling 
demonstrates that behavioural profiling can be used in connection with other human 
characteristics to assist in identifying individuals for enhanced investigation.  This is 
important in the context of this chapter as it provides an insight into the ways in which law 
enforcement officers may be able to rely on behavioural profiling in the context of terrorism.  
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Secondly, the behavioural biometric involves identifying and measuring other physical 
characteristics such as emotional recognition, sweating profusely, an elevated pulse rate and 
irregular respiration patterns which may indicate that an individual is under some form of 
stress indicative of attempting to conceal something from law enforcement officers. 7  This 
form of behavioural profiling concentrates on identifying common “habits of the body” 
which may be considered as a “signature” of an automated behaviour performed by the 
individual unconsciously.8  For example, if an individual in a security line in an airport or 
port exhibits characteristics such as sweating uncontrollably and/or breathing irregularly it 
may indicate to law enforcement officers the necessity to subject that individual to an 
increased level of security, such as questioning, so as to assess whether they merit an 
enhanced level of screening.  Behavioural biometric profiling relies on identifying body 
traits rather than known knowledge about an individual as the basis for identification for 
further scrutiny.9 
 
(b) Psychometric Profiling 
Psychometric profiling concentrates on evaluating an individual’s physical behaviour such 
as  
“human cognition, emotion, motivation and behavioural tendencies, as well 
as a plethora of observed traits further describing certain behaviours such as 
speaking and walking”.10   
 
Although at first instance it may be considered quite similar in nature to biometric 
behavioural profiling as it focuses on physical bodily behaviours, this form of profiling 
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involves concentrating on identifying emotions and gestures that demonstrate an individual 
may be concealing something so that law enforcement officers may subject them to an 
enhanced level of security.11 
 
(c) Sociometric Profiling 
Sociometric profiling concentrates on assessing an individual’s social connections including 
“interpersonal, intragroup, intraorganisational and intracultural aspects of an individual’s 
biological, psychological and social functioning”.12  For example, sociometric profiling 
involves assessing an individual’s social connection with known terrorist groups or terrorist 
networks so that law enforcement officers can make some predictions as to their capacity to 
commit terrorist or criminal acts.   
 
It is important to emphasise here that sociometric profiling can be distinguished from the 
previous two forms of behavioural profiling as it adopts a broader concept of ‘behaviour’ by 
analysing an individual’s social connections and interactions as the basis for predicting 
future behaviour, whereas the previous two forms concentrates on individual human 
behavioural traits.   
 
(d) Summary 
While it may be possible to further categorise and refine behavioural profiling approaches, 
it is contended that the focus of this chapter is to evaluate whether behavioural profiling may 
be capable of addressing the limitations of formal terrorist profiling and not to trace the 
origins and history of behavioural profiling.  Hence, the examination of behavioural 
                                                             
11 J. Hayfron-Acquah, M. Nixon and J. Carter, ‘Automatic gait recognition by symmetry analysis’ (2003) 
24(13) Pattern Recognition Letters 2175, 2175-2176. 
12 IBPP (n3), 6. 
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profiling in this chapter serves a different function in contrast to the examination of the 
criminal profiling methods examined in chapter two.  Specifically, the discussion in this 
chapter examines behavioural profiling so as to question whether it can be adopted to 
minimise the limitations of the manifestations of formal profiling already examined in 
chapter three.  In light of the discussion in this chapter it is evident that behavioural profiling 
approaches, such as biometric and psychometric approaches, can measure human physical 
traits so as to assist in the identification of individuals for further investigation. This form of 
profiling relies on physical bodily movements and expressions as the basis to identify and 
select individuals for further scrutiny and notably relies less on sensitive characteristics data 
such as age, race, ethnicity, gender, religion or country of origin. 
 
As noted above each of these behavioural profiling approaches can be employed by law 
enforcement officers collectively or individually which we will discuss in more detail below 
when we consider the different manifestation of the application of behavioural profiles by 
law enforcement officers.  However, it is sufficient to identify here that the choice of 
behavioural profiling approach will largely depend on the aim of the profiling exercise.  For 
example, biometric profiling may assist in identifying known individuals by separating 
known physical and behavioural characteristics, psychometric profiling may assist by 
identifying individuals purely on behavioural characteristics, while sociometric profiling 
may assist in identifying an individual based on their social connections.   
 
4.2.2 The Behavioural Profiling Methods/Approaches 
We can also note that each of the behavioural profiling categories concentrate on identifying 
and measuring behavioural characteristics as a basis to assist law enforcement officers select 
 160 
individuals for enhanced investigation.  According to Yannopoulos et al13 there are three 
core human behavioural characteristics including ‘emotion’, ‘gesture’ and ‘gait’ that are 
capable of assisting in making predictions about future behaviour and are employed in the 
behavioural profiling categorises identified above.  We shall now turn to identify and explain 
each of these behavioural profiling approaches/methods. 
 
(a) The Assessment of Emotion 
According to Fasel and Luettin14 and Scherer15 individual human emotion can be identified 
and measured so as to predict future behaviour by segregating the analysis of human emotion 
into three distinct stages.   
 
The first stage involves the profiler identifying and selecting the required human emotion 
by drawing on the study of human psychology to identify common human emotions.16 For 
example anger, fear, worry, etc are all human emotions that may be identifiable from an 
individual’s facial expressions or body composure or movement.17    Over recent decades 
there has been considerable work conducted by various psychologists to identify and explain 
different human emotions identifiable from human behaviour.18 
 
The second stage involves categorising the selected emotion into different classes according 
to body parts so that individual body movements can become predicative of human 
                                                             
13 Yannopoulos et al (n4), 111-115. 
14 Fasel and Luettin, (n8), 259-261. 
15 K. Scherer, ‘On the nature and function of emotion: A component process approach’ in K. Scherer and P. 
Ekman (ed), Approaches to Emotion (Erlbaum, 1984), 293-294. 
16 Fasel and Luettin (n8), 263. 
17 P. Plutchik, The Psychology and Biology of Emotion (Harper Collins College Publishers, 1994), 58-59. 
18 For example: K. Scherer, R. Banse and H. Wallbott, ‘Emotion inferences from vocal expression correlate 
across languages and cultures’ (2001) 32(1) Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 76, see also: K. Scherer, 
‘Vocal communication of emotion: A review of research paradigms’ (2003) 40(1) Speech Communication 
227. 
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emotion.19 For example, a profiler may classify rapid eye movements with fear or worry, or 
a profiler could classify frequent “movements in voice or eyebrow corner motions in face 
analysis” with anger or worry.20 
 
The final stage involves drawing on the previous two stage so as to apply and interpret 
individual human behaviour to identify individuals by their exhibition of emotion.21   
 
The three stage process of identifying, categorising and applying human emotion so as to 
identify individuals may assist law enforcement officers to select individuals for enhanced 
investigation.   
 
(b) The Assessment of Gesture 
According to Nespoulous et al “the notion of gesture is to embrace all kinds of instances 
where an individual engages in movements whose communicative intent is paramount, 
manifest and openly acknowledged.”22  Gestures can be classified into two common 
manifestations, those gestures that follow communication and those that are unconscious 
gestures occurring naturally as part of human interaction.23 In the context of terrorism both 
forms of gestures may assist law enforcement officers in making behavioural predictions 
about specific individuals. 
 
                                                             
19 Fasel and Luettin (n8), 265. 
20 Yannopoulos  et al (n4), 111. 
21 Fasel and Luettin (n8), 266. 
22 J. Nespoulous, P. Perron and A. Lecours, The Biological Foundation of Gestures: Motor and Semiotic 
Aspects (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1986), 25-26. 
23 S. Lozano and B. Tversky, ‘Communicative gestures facilitate problem solving for both communicators 
and recipients’ (2006) 55(1) Journal of Memory and Language 47, 49-51. 
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In a similar process to the assessment of human emotion, the recognition of gesture as the 
basis to predict human behaviour can form a three stage process.24  The first stage involves 
identifying and selecting the gesture required by the profiler by drawing on the study of 
human gesture.25  The second stage involves classifying different gestures with different 
body parts so that different gestures can become correlated with different predicative 
intentions.26  The final stage involves applying the previous two stages so as to identify 
individuals for enhanced investigation. 
 
(c) The Assessment of Gait: 
The assessment of gait involves concentrating on analysing human body and muscle 
movements so as to make predictions as to an individual’s future behaviour.27   Gait can be 
assessed in at least two ways, firstly the human body can be reduced to a silhouette where 
profilers concentrate exclusively on body and muscle movements, or alternatively profilers 
concentrate on individuals so as to assess their body and muscle movements.28   
 
The process of assessing gait can be divided into a two-stage process which firstly 
concentrates on “a feature extraction phase … [where] motion information is extracted” 
from the target audience.29  Secondly, the assessment of gait becomes a “matching phase” 
                                                             
24 K. Patwardhan and S. Roy, ‘Hand gestures modelling and recognition involving changing shapes and 
trajectories using a Predictive EigenTracker’ (2007) 28(3) Pattern Recognition Letters 329, 330-332. 
25 K. Oka, Y. Sato and H. Koike, “Real-time fingertip tracking and gesture recognition” (2002) 22(6) 
Computer Graphics and Applications 64, 66-67. 
26 D. Demirdjian, T. Ko and T. Darrell, ‘Untethered Gesture Acquisition and Recognition for Virtual World 
Manipulation’ (2005) 8(4) Virtual Reality 222, 225-226.  
27 R. Collins, R, Gross and J. Shi, ‘Silhouette-based human identification from body shape and gait’ [2002] 
IEEE International Conference on Face and Gesture Recognition 351, 352-354. 
28 P. Phillips, S. Sarkar, I. Robledo, P. Grother and K. Bowyer, ‘Baseline results for the challenge problem of 
human ID using gait analysis’ [2002] IEEE International Conference on Automatic Face and Gesture 
Recognition 130, 131-134. 
29 Yannopoulos  et al (n4), 113. 
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where particular gait movements are matched to the extracted phase so that individuals can 
be selected for investigation.30 
 
(d) Summary 
The identification and explanation of the selected behavioural profiling methods/approaches 
above demonstrate that these methods/approaches seek to identify and measure human 
behavioural traits as the basis to select individuals for investigation.  An important point to 
emphasise is that these profiling methods/approaches do not depend on information about 
sensitive characteristics but rather are entirely focused on physical behavioural traits so as 
to discern whether the individual can be considered as being worthy of an enhanced level of 
investigation by law enforcement officers.  The assessment of emotion, gait and gesture 
reveals a process that draws substantially on psychology as being an indicator of human 
behaviour.  We shall now proceed to evaluate their applicability in the context of terrorism 
so as to assess whether these profiling methods/approaches represent a way to address some 
of the limitations identified in chapters two and three of the other forms profiling. 
 
4.2.3 An Evaluation of Behavioural Profiling Methods/Approaches 
We can recall that in categorising behavioural profiling above, a distinction was drawn 
between biometric, psychometric and sociometric profiling.  According to the literature 
there are two inherent criticisms that can be made of this categorisation.   
 
Firstly, according to Canhoto and Backhouse the characterisation of behavioural profiling 
as being biometric, psychometric and sociometric may be criticised as being artificial in 
                                                             
30 ibid. 
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nature.31  In particular, this approach arguably tends to over-elaborate the distinction 
between the different forms of behavioural characteristics.  For example, some of the 
profiling characteristics can be considered as being very similar in nature, for example 
sweating can be classified as being either psychometric or biometric depending on the 
perspective of the profiler.  It is arguable that any critique of this form of profiling must 
commence by questioning the validity of the distinctions made between each categorisation 
of behavioural profiling as it reveals the necessity of considerable discretion on the part of 
the profiler affecting the construction and consequently the application of behavioural 
profiling. 
 
However, it may be argued that by compartmentalising different human traits into ‘distinct’ 
categories it can assist the profiler to adopt a wide approach so as to consider the broadest 
range of human characteristics used in the identification and selection of individuals for 
further investigation. It may be argued that in absence of these distinctions it may lead 
profilers to concentrate on a narrow range of physiological characteristics, whereas these 
distinctions may assist in the separation and analysis of physiological traits making it easier 
to identify behavioural traits worthy of further investigation by law enforcement officers. 
 
Secondly, according to Pentherick and Ferguson32 “the reliability and validity” of 
behavioural profiling is closely connected to two interrelated assumptions, the “behavioural 
consistency assumption and the homology assumption”.33  “The behavioural consistency 
assumption assumes that” each individual will replicate the same or similar behaviours when 
                                                             
31 Canhoto and Backhouse (n5), 55-59. 
32 W. Petherick and C. Ferguson, ‘Behavioural Consistency, the Homology Assumption and the Problems of 




committing the same or similar offence.34  Additionally, the homology assumption contends 
that individuals engaging in the same or similar offences will exhibit the same or similar 
behaviours that are capable of being identifiable. 
 
This would suggest that the reliability of behavioural profiling is contingent on the 
individual conducting crimes or terrorist offences in the same or similar way so as to exhibit 
common characteristics capable of being discerned by the law enforcement officer.  
According to Canter a central premise of all forms of profiling is that “the way an offender 
carries out a crime on one occasion will have some characteristic similarities to the way 
he/she carried out crimes on other occasions”.35  However, as Canter later acknowledges 
“a more conceptual challenge to determining consistency, as in all human activity, is that 
some variation and change is a nature aspect of human processes”.36  Furthermore, 
according to Shoda et al any analysis and understanding of the consistency of human 
behaviour must appreciate “the importance of considering person-situation interactions 
which means that” behavioural consistency can be altered by the external physical 
environment.37  For example, individuals facing security control barriers at ports and airports 
may be affected by the physical environment of the airport which may alter their discernible 
behavioural traits resulting in false positives or false negatives. 
 
Consequently, we may argue that any profiling approach substantially reliant on individuals 
exhibiting the same or similar behavioural traits may be flawed as individual human 
                                                             
34 ibid. 
35 D. Canter, ‘Psychology of Offender Profiling’ in R. Bull and D. Carson (eds), Handbook of Psychology in 
Legal Concepts (Wiley Publishing, 1995), 347. 
36 D. Canter, ‘Offender Profiling and Investigative Psychology’ (2004) 1 Journal of Investigative Psychology 
and Offender Profiling 1, 4. 
37 Y. Shoda, W. Mischel and J. Wright, ‘Personality Processes and Individual Differences’ (1994) 67(4) Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology 674, 674. 
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behaviour can be altered by the physical environment, thereby questioning whether 
individuals will exhibit common characteristics in pressurised environments and the degree 
an individual’s behaviour can be altered by the physical environment.   
 
In the context of terrorism there may be an issue as to whether terrorists share the same or 
similar behavioural traits discernible by law enforcement officers.  Research conducted by 
Mokros and Alison indicates that there is a common correlation between offender 
characteristics and criminal offences which means that offenders can be classified or 
grouped according to specific behavioural traits.38  For example, Woodhams and Toye 
identify that offenders who commit the same criminal offences not only frequently share 
characteristics such as “age, ethnicity, employment status, criminal history and distance 
travelled from home to the offence location” but also they frequently shared behavioural 
traits in the preparation and execution of their offences.39   
 
However, in the context of terrorism the correlation between terrorists and terrorist offences 
may not always be as comparable as criminal offences.  In particular, the degree of similarity 
between terrorists engaged in preparing and executing terrorist acts may not necessarily be 
of similar nature comparable to criminal offenders in their pursuit of crime.  For example, 
extensive research conducted by Crenshaw40 and Horgan41 suggests that terrorists are not 
readily recognisable by their behavioural traits as they are commonly classifiable as being 
                                                             
38 A. Mokros and L. Alison, ‘Is Offender Profiling Possible? Testing the Predicted Homology of Crime Scene 
Actions and Background Characteristics in a Sample of Rapists’ (2002) 7 Legal and Criminological 
Psychology 25, 25-26. 
39 J. Woodhams and K. Toyle, ‘An empirical test of the assumptions of case linkage and offender profiling 
with serial commercial robberies’ (2007) 13(1) Psychological, Public Policy and Law 59, 62-65. 
40 M. Crenshaw, ‘Have Motivations for Terrorism Changed?’ in J. Victoroff (ed) Tangled Roots: Social and 
Psychological Factors in the Genesis of Terrorism (ISO Press, 2006), 51-61. 
41 J. Horgan, ‘The search for the terrorist personality’ in A. Silke (ed) Terrorist, Victims and Society: 
Psychological Perspectives on Terrorism and its Consequences (Wiley Publishing, 2003), 3-37. 
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“normal” and non-distinctive individuals lacking discernible features or traits.42  This may 
mean that terrorists may not exhibit any discernible behavioural traits no more than any 
‘normal’ individual.  Furthermore, a study of suicide bombers undertaken by Lester et al 
found that attempting to identify common traits between suicide bombers may not only be 
inaccurate but may be considered extremely difficult.43  Therefore, substantial research on 
terrorist characteristics may suggest that it may not be possible to identify common 
behavioural traits from those individuals engaged in terrorism or preparatory activities.  This 
creates a question as to whether behavioural profiling methods/approaches can be used to 
construct behavioural profiles aimed at identifying and selecting terrorists or potential 
terrorists for further scrutiny.  
 
Therefore, we can conclude that the approaches used in the construction of behavioural 
profiles are subject to similar limitations identified in relation to other forms of profiling in 
chapters two and three above.  The discussion throughout this chapter demonstrates that 
there are two key limitations surrounding the applicability of behavioural profiling 
methods/approaches used in the construction of behavioural profiles in the context of 
terrorism. 
 
Firstly, the identification and explanation of the behavioural profiling methods/approaches 
above reveals that profilers have considerable discretion in the construction of profiles 
involving substantial individual judgements relating to the categorisation of particular 
behavioural traits.  A key concern raised by the discussion of behavioural profiling methods 
is the fact that behavioural profiling requires individual profilers to make determinations as 
                                                             
42 R. Schouten, ‘Terrorism and the Behavioural Sciences’ (2010) 18(6) Harvard Review of Psychiatry 369, 
374-375. 
43 D. Lester, B. Yang and M. Lindsay, ‘Suicide Bombers: Are Psychological Profiles Possible’ (2004) 27 
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 283, 283-286. 
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to human emotion, gait and gestures which ultimately involves an interpretation of human 
behaviour. 
 
Secondly, the examination of the behavioural profiling also reveals considerable issues as 
to the reliability and relevance of behavioural profiling in the context of terrorism.44  In 
considering the issue of reliability, according to Popper the profiler “can never know if one 
is dealing with a statistical average or a statistical anomaly” when considering behavioural 
traits.45 There may be a problem relying on particular traits in light of a growing body of 
literature questioning whether terrorists exhibit common characteristics or traits capable of 
detection through behavioural profiling approaches.  In considering the further issue of 
relevance, terrorists may be capable of subverting known behavioural traits so that they can 
consciously avoid behavioural detection in sensitive locations such as airports and ports.    
 
Consequently, it is evident that the discussion of the behavioural profiling 
methods/approaches raises a considerable issue as to whether this form of profiling can be 
considered capable of being applied in the context of terrorism.  While the theory 
underpinning behavioural profiling asserts that it relies on non-sensitive characteristics in 
the construction and application of behavioural profiles, it may be contended there is a 
substantial concern as to whether we can apply these profiling methods/approaches in the 
context of terrorism as a consequence of the identified limitations. 
 
We can recall that a key theme of this research is to conduct an evaluation of the 
effectiveness of terrorist profiling as being an assistive tool for identifying individuals 
                                                             
44 Petherick and Ferguson (n32) 55-57. 
45 K. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Routledge, 2003), 14-15. 
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engaged in terrorism or preparatory activities.  The first step in the theoretical framework 
presented in the introductory chapter above involves assessing/measuring the effectiveness 
of terrorist profiling by conducting an assessment of the “input effectiveness” of terrorist 
profiling which concentrates on the methods/approaches used to construct terrorist profiles.  
In light of the identified concerns of this form of profiling we may conclude that there are 
substantial limitations evident from the identified behavioural profiling methods/approaches 
which may question the classification of the ‘input effectiveness’ of behavioural profiling in 
the context of terrorism. 
 
However, despite this concern we shall now progress to examine the different manifestations 
of behavioural profiling in the context of terrorism. 
 
4.3 The Application of Behavioural Profiling Approaches in the Context of Terrorism 
As identified in the introduction above this section will undertake an examination of the 
different manifestations of the application of behavioural profiling approaches in Israel and 
the US so as to assess the application of behavioural profiling approaches in assisting law 
enforcement officers manage the threat of terrorism.  Israel is selected as it is commonly 
regarded as being one of the first countries to apply behavioural profiling 
methods/approaches so as to prevent and detect terrorism.   The US is selected as it is one 
of the few countries officially recognising the adoption of behavioural profiling to assist in 






4.3.1 The Application of Behavioural Profiling in Israel 
Israel has faced a growing “frequency of terrorist acts and the number of deaths and injuries 
that result have steadily increased during the past 20 years”.46  Israel is frequently classified 
in the literature as being “the epicentre of terrorist activity”.47  This has resulted in the 
development of proactive counter-terrorist strategies that are capable of assisting law 
enforcement officers manage the threat posed by terrorism.  According to Harris the 
development and origin of contemporary behavioural profiling as an assistive tool for law 
enforcement officers to prevent, detect and limit terrorist attacks in aviation can be traced to 
Israel.48   
 
The development and adoption of behavioural profiling in Israel’s aviation sector has been 
lauded in the literature as being the “most successful aviation safety system in the world” as 
law enforcement officers have “successfully defended itself from terrorist attacks”.49  The 
apparent ‘success’ of defending the aviation sector from terrorist attack has been commonly 
attributed in the literature to its development and application of behavioural profiling.50  
Furthermore, the successful detection of “an explosive device on an El Al fight from Tel Aviv 
in 1986” is commonly used by the Israelis in support of their aviation security ‘system’.51   
 
This initial praise attributed to behavioural profiling in Israel appears to contradict the 
identified limitations above on the application of behavioural profiling in the context of 
                                                             
46 J. Weiner, ‘Terrorism: Israel’s Legal Responses’ (1987) 14 Syracuse Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 183,  183. 
47 D. Harris, Good Cops: The Case for Preventive Policing (The New Press, 2005) 214-215.  
48 ibid, 214. 
49 D. Harris, ‘New Risks, New Tactics: An Assessment of the Re-Assessment of Racial Profiling in the Wake 
of September 11, 2001’ (2004) 4 Utah Law Review 913, 941.   
50 Harris (n47), 214. 
51 R. Whitaker, ‘Behavioural profiling in Israeli aviation security as a tool for social control’ in E. Zureik, D. 
Lyon and Y. Abu-Laban, Surveillance and Control in Israel/Palestine (Routledge, 2011), 378. 
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terrorism.  Therefore, this manifestation of behavioural profiling can serve as a good means 
to assess whether the identified limitations are evident in practice. 
 
According to Hasisi and Weisburd the contemporary development of aviation security can 
be traced to 1968 “after the hijacking of an El Al aircraft” by terrorists which resulted in 
“Israel developing terrorist profiles that have been employed ever since”.52  It is important 
to remember that behavioural profiling forms part of a multi-layered counter-terrorist 
strategy aimed at managing the threat of terrorism.53  However, aviation security at Israeli 
airports involve at least “four circles of security” which centre on employing behavioural 
profiling approaches as a means to identify individuals worthy of enhanced levels of 
scrutiny.54    
 
Firstly, there is a designated “airport zone” at the external perimeters of the airport where 
law enforcement officers commonly rely on psychometric profiling to identify ‘suspicious’ 
individuals.55  This ‘circle of security’ involves conducting an assessment of vehicles and 
individuals entering the perimeters of the airport zone where law enforcement officers will 
use “technology such as weight sensors, trunk X-rays and undercarriage scans … to inspect” 
vehicles while “face to face interaction between passengers and the airport staff is the most 
important part of” this ‘circle of security’.56  This reveals that law enforcement officers rely 
on psychometric profiling as one way to identify individuals for investigation prior to their 
entry into the airport buildings.  
                                                             
52 B. Hasisi and D. Weisburd, ‘Going Beyond Ascribed Identities: The Importance of Procedural Justice in 
Airport Security Screening in Israel’ (2011) (45)(4) Law and Society Review 867, 873. 
53 Whitaker (n51), 377. 
54 Hasisi and Weiburd (n52), 873. 
55 ibid. 
56 B. Hasisi, ‘Ethnic Profiling In Airport Screening: Lessons from Israel, 1968-2010’ (2012) 41(2) American 
Law and Economics Review 517, 532. 
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Secondly “inside the terminal and inside the aircraft” biometric and psychometric profiling 
aid law enforcement officers to identify individuals’ worth of enhanced questioning.57  In 
addition to the previous layer of screening conducted at the perimeters of the airport, 
passengers at the entrance and throughout the airport buildings are continually screened by 
specialist law enforcement officers for discernible behavioural traits.  While it would be 
extremely useful to know the discernible behavioural traits employed by law enforcement 
officers, this information is not publically available as if it was known it may assist terrorists 
subvert detection techniques. 
 
Thirdly, law enforcement officers examine pre-known passenger information provided by 
airlines so as to identify potential terrorists. This layer of security is “mainly based on 
databases and intelligence sources which create watch lists” and is also reliant on “data 
mining systems” which “collect dozens of pre-boarding data items from external sources, 
mainly airlines and travel agencies, about passengers’ flight habits, flight itinerary, travel 
record, whether a car was rented, whether the passenger is flying alone, meal preferences 
and other data that can inferred from the ticket.”58  This demonstrates that this manifestation 
of behavioural profiling is complemented by other formal terrorist profiling methods such 
as data mining so as to maximise the potential for behavioural profiling to identify 
individuals engaged in terrorism or preparatory activities. 
 
Fourthly, the final layer of security involves the use of “special questioning” techniques at 
the airport by law enforcement officers who seek to distinguish between legitimate travellers 
                                                             
57 Hasisi and Weiburd (n52), 873. 
58 Hasisi (n56), 532. 
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and individuals likely to be engaged in terrorism.59  Behavioural profiling allegedly assists 
law enforcement officers to identify individuals for ‘special questioning’ in addition to 
assessing the responses to the questions asked by law enforcement officers. 
 
At the centre of behavioural profiling in Israel is the observation of an individual’s “body 
language” so as to make predictions as to whether they merit “special questioning”.  As 
distinct from other forms of profiling, this form does not rely on information about any 
sensitive characteristics but rather concentrates on identifying the individual solely on an 
individual’s physical conduct and interaction.  It can be argued that behavioural profiling, 
in part, can be considered akin to the traditional policing principle of “reasonable suspicion” 
where individuals are not subjected to enhanced levels of security unless they create a 
reasonable suspicion of criminality or in this case terrorism activities.60   
 
Although the information available on the application of behavioural profiling in Israel can 
be considered limited, in an interview given by Rafi Ron who was the Israeli former Head 
of Aviation Security at Ben Gurion Airport to the US Congress revealed two significant 
pieces of information on the application of behavioural profiling in Israel.61  
 
Firstly, Ron revealed that behavioural profiling is applied to assist law enforcement officers 
make ‘intelligent decisions’ in the identification and selection of individuals for enhanced 
levels of screening so that passengers can be systematically screened in real time without 
causing a substantial interference to the operation of Israeli airports.62  This can be 
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considered significant as we can recall in chapter three we identified that one of the core 
limitations of formal terrorist profiling methods was its inability to screen passengers in real 
time.  This information may indicate that behavioural profiling may be able to assist in the 
screening of passengers in real time so that the threat of terrorism may be reduced.  We will 
return to this point in the conclusion below. 
 
Secondly, Ron also revealed that law enforcement officers employed biometric profiling of 
physical characteristics of known terrorists in addition to behavioural biometric profiling by 
concentrating on identifying individuals who exhibited physical characteristics such as 
emotional distortions, sweating profusely, elevated pulse rates and/or irregular breathing 
patterns.63  This can be considered significant as it may demonstrate that in this 
manifestation of behavioural profiling law enforcement officers applied a combination of 
physical and behavioural biometric profiling so as to identify and select individuals for 
enhanced screening.  This may indicate that the effectiveness of behavioural profiling as an 
assistive law enforcement tool to identify and select individuals for enhanced screening may 
be contingent on law enforcement officers having some pre-known biometric information 
on terrorists. 
 
According to Harris behavioural profiling approaches in Israel are primarily conducted by 
‘highly trained’ individuals who undergo specialist courses to firstly identify behavioural 
traits worth of investigation and secondly in questioning techniques so as to be able to illicit 
key information from passengers selected for enhanced screening.64   It can be recalled that 
in the previous section we identified a concern that considerable discretion was exercised by 
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the profiler in categorising behavioural traits used in the construction of behaviour profiles.  
It may be contended that this concern may, in part, be addressed by the existence of an 
adequate level of training so that behavioural profilers can be trained to minimise any 
potential distorting effect by human input in the process of constructing behavioural profiles.   
 
However, there is some evidence that questions the quality of the training undertaken by 
staff engaged in behavioural profiling screening in Israel.  For example, Blumenkrantz 
uncovered that behavioural screening is often undertaken by individuals not specifically 
trained in behavioural profiling approaches.65  While this evidence may be considered 
inconclusive, it demonstrates the potential for deficiencies in the operation of behavioural 
profiling if the profiling process allows either untrained or poorly trained personnel to 
engage in behavioural profiling. 
 
In summary, we can conclude that while much remains unknown about the precise operation 
of behavioural profiling in Israel, it is contended by the authorities that the behavioural 
profiling approaches used by law enforcement officers assists in managing the threat of 
terrorism by maintaining a zero terrorist attack statistic at Israeli airports.  However, while 
the official authorities may advance behavioural profiling as a key assistive tool for law 
enforcement officers in Israel, we must question the effectiveness of behavioural profiling 




                                                             
65 Z. Blumenkrantz, ‘Haaretz probe: Israel airport security often carried out by untrained employees’ Haaretz, 
11th January 2010, available at: https://www.haaretz.com/1.5083877 (accessed 12th June 2018). 
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4.3.2 An Assessment of the Effectiveness of Behavioural Terrorist Profiling in Israel 
As identified in the introductory chapter above the effectiveness of terrorist profiling can be 
evaluated by considering (a) the ‘input effectiveness’ which concentrates on the 
methods/approaches used in the construction of behavioural profiles, (b) the ‘output 
effectiveness’ which concentrates on assessing the application of the behavioural profiles 
and (c) the ‘impact effectiveness’ which concentrates on assessing the broader impact of 
behavioural profiling.  
 
In assessing the input effectiveness of this manifestation of behavioural profiling it is evident 
that Israel relies on some of the behavioural profiling approaches identified in the previous 
section.  In particular, biometric and psychometric behavioural profiling approaches are 
employed by law enforcement officers at Israeli airports to assist in identifying and selecting 
individuals for enhanced levels of screening.  When we conducted an assessment of the 
behavioural profiling approaches in the previous section we identified two key concerns 
regarding the input required from profilers in the construction of behavioural profiles and 
additionally there were concerns regarding the reliability and relevance of behavioural 
profiling in the context of terrorism.   
 
In considering the first concern, the discretionary input required from the profiler in the 
construction of behavioural profiles, there is evidence to demonstrate that Israel contends 
the existence of an advanced training programme so as to train profilers in the skill of 
behavioural profiling and in questioning techniques.  However, the existence of evidence to 
demonstrate that some law enforcement officers may be engaging in behavioural profiling 
without any training can be identified as an issue of concern capable of affecting the 
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assessment of behavioural profiling.  Furthermore, the absence of information as to the 
content of training courses may also be identified as an issue of concern. 
 
In considering the second concern, the reliability and relevance of behavioural profiling in 
the context of terrorism, there is little or no evidence to demonstrate the reliability and 
relevance of this manifestation of behavioural profiling in the context of terrorism.  The 
literature is remarkably silent on providing key statistics on the use of behavioural profiling 
in Israel.  In particular, it may be contended that key evidence capable of demonstrating the 
reliability and relevance of this manifestation of profiling would be statistics on the number 
of individuals subjected to enhanced screening in addition to the number of terrorist plots 
foiled as a consequence of the application of behavioural profiling. 
 
The absence of key information makes it difficult to classify the input effectiveness of this 
form of behavioural profiling as being effective.  Consequently, in order to classify the input 
effectiveness of this manifestation of behavioural profiling we would need more information 
on the methods/approaches used by Israel so as to determine whether they are capable of 
addressing the generic limitations of behavioural profiling identified above. 
 
In assessing the ‘output effectiveness’ of behavioural profiling we need to consider the 
application of behavioural profiles by law enforcement officers in Israel.  It is evident from 
our discussion above that the literature lends support to behavioural profiling by identifying 
the “success” of law enforcement officers being able to maintain a zero terrorist attack 
statistics at Israeli airports since its introduction.  In order to conduct an assessment of the 
output effectiveness of behavioural profiling it is contended that this will involve, in part, an 
assessment of the statistics to demonstrate its capability to identify potential terrorists.   
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It is challenging to conclusively assess the ‘output effectiveness’ of the application of 
behavioural profiles given the absence of official statistics on law enforcement officer usage 
of this type of profiling.  However, this is a methodological limitation of this thesis given 
the lack of information on profiling generally. Nevertheless, it is contended that this 
limitation does not necessarily take away from the analysis in this chapter.  Specifically, it 
is argued that even if one example were found to demonstrate that this type of profiling 
worked, it would not necessarily support a general conclusion to be drawn that this type of 
profiling works.  It can be recalled that the discussion in chapter two identified that profiling 
by its nature needs to be an iterative process that needs to review the construction and 
application of profiles in the field.   The more significant question here relates to why this 
information is not publically available.  It may be to do with the fact that law enforcement 
officers feel it is not necessary to publish it or the success rate of this type of profiling is 
simply unknown.  It is contended that in the absence of this information, this type of profiling 
may be best classified as moving more towards the informal end of the profiling spectrum. 
 
In assessing the “impact effectiveness” we need to consider broader evidence of the impact 
of behavioural profiling in Israel beyond the construction and application of behavioural 
profiles.  This is to determine whether the effect or likely effect and associated cost of this 
type of profiling can be considered as outweighing any potential usefulness.  In recent 
newspaper reports there has been a growing collection of evidence to demonstrate a negative 
impact of the use of behavioural profiling at Israeli airports affecting particular ethnic 
minority communities.  For example, in an article appearing in the “Associated Press” 
concerning the application of behavioural profiling at Ben Gurion Airport Arabs complained 
that they were frequently subjected to ‘enhanced questioning’ without any reasonable 
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justification.66  Similarly in an article by Donnelly considerable concerns were raised that 
specific ethnic minority communities were being subjected to disproportionate searches and 
questioning at Ben Gurion Airport as a result of the creation of ‘specialist’ search areas 
within Ben Gurion Airport used by individuals with the appearance of particular ethnic 
origins.67 A key concern identified by Derfner was the fact that law enforcement officers at 
Ben Gurion Airport appeared to allow stereotypes to influence the process of selecting 
individuals for enhanced questioning and screening.68  While Blumenkrantz identified that 
official attempts were undertaken to address any perception that particular ethnic minorities 
were subject to official suspicion by law enforcement officers at Israeli airports, it remains 
to be seen as to whether ethnic minority communities continue to be subjected to an 
unjustifiable distinction in treatment at security control areas.69 
 
This evidence reveals that some ethnic minorities may be facing “racist treatment” or at least 
there is a perception of “racist treatment” at Israeli airports employed under the guise of 
behavioural profiling.  This is where law enforcement officers only employ behavioural 
profiling as a means to stop particular individuals on their own individual intuition as 
opposed to the exhibition of behavioural traits.   Although this may be considered evidence 
of a number of isolated incidents, it can be contended that in the absence of official statistics 
it is extremely difficult to conclusively determine the impact of this type of profiling in the 
detection and prevention of terrorism.   
 
                                                             
66 Associated Press, ‘Israel’s airport security: Arabs complain they face racist treatment when boarding 
planes’, Associated Press, 19th March 2008.   
67 S. Donnelly, ‘A New Tack for airport screening: behave yourself’ Time, 17th May 2006.  
68 L. Derfner, ‘Stereotyping security’ Jerusalem Post, 22nd March 2007. 
69 Z. Blumenkrantz, ‘Mazuz moves to limit racial profiling at Ben-Gurion Airport’, Haazretz, 4th June 2008. 
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Furthermore, it can be recalled that a core rationale of behavioural profiling is the fact that 
it exclusively relies on information about non-sensitive characteristics by focusing on 
physical behavioural traits.  Although the theory and the official support for the use of 
behavioural profiling asserts that it does not rely on information about sensitive 
characteristics, this manifestation of behavioural profiling provides evidence that contradicts 
this core rationale which may serve to demonstrate its unsuitability as a tool to assist law 
enforcement officers identify individuals engaged in terrorism or preparatory activities.  It 
may be argued that the impact that flows from using behavioural terrorist profiling is such 
that ethnic minorities either are facing “racist treatment” or have a perception of “racist 
treatment” which allow us to at least question whether this cost is worth paying in the context 
of counterterrorism.  It may be argued that if a counterterrorism policy, such as behavioural 
terrorist profiling, operates in such a way that ethnic minorities feel under official suspicion 
then this type of conduct lowers the state to the same level of the terrorists thereby losing 
the state’s legitimacy to govern. 
 
In light of this discussion it can be argued that the issues related to the construction and 
application of behavioural profiling in addition to the potential impact of behavioural 
terrorist profiling means that it is unlikely to be considered a useful tool that is capable of 
assisting law enforcement officers detect, deter and prosecute those likely to be involved in 







4.3.3 The application of behavioural profiling in the US 
In the aftermath of September 11th 2001 the US adopted a number of ‘new’ approaches 
aimed at assisting law enforcement officers manage the threat of terrorism within the US.70  
One such development has been the adoption of behavioural profiling in sensitive locations 
such as airports and ports.  The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) introduced 
behavioural profiling through the development of SPOT “Screening Passengers by 
Observation Techniques” where law enforcement officers from the Transport Security 
Agency (TSA) “observe travellers’ faces for hints that they may be a security risk”.71   SPOT 
forms part of a broader counterterrorism strategy referred to as the ‘Behavioural Detection 
and Analysis’ (BDA) programme.72  It is significant to note that this manifestation of 
behavioural profiling represents only one counter-terrorism strategy which forms part of a 
multi-layered counter-terrorism strategies all aimed at assisting law enforcement officers to 
proactively manage the threat of terrorism. 
 
SPOT operates by observing “passengers for certain physical and physiological 
characteristics and reactions”.73   Commonly law enforcement officers “work in pairs and 
scan passengers at security checkpoints for signs of specific behaviours listed on the 
officer’s checklists”.74  As a consequence of the high numbers of passengers travelling 
through airports, law enforcement officers observe passengers simultaneously so as to 
identify and select individuals exhibiting the pre-defined traits.  Similar to the Israeli 
scheme, SPOT allegedly does not rely on sensitive characteristics such as race or ethnicity 
                                                             
70 J. Florence and R. Friedman, ‘Profiles in Terror: A Legal Framework for The Behavioural Profiling 
Paradigm’ (2010) 17 George Mason Law Review 423, 423. 
71 ibid. 
72 TSA, TSA Behavior and Detection Analysis Program’ available at: 
https://www.tsa.gov/news/testimony/2013/11/14/tsa-behavior-detection-and-analysis-program (accessed 2nd 
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73 T. Frank, ‘Body Language Can Blow their Cover’, USA Today, December 28ths 2005. 
74 P. Shaukovsky, ‘Airport Profilers: They’re Watching You’, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, December 25th 2007. 
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but rather concentrates on singling individuals out for heightened security on the basis of 
their behaviour.75 
 
The central aspect of SPOT concentrates  
“on an individual’s subtle behaviour and appearance – in particular, facial 
micro-expressions like raising the inner corners of the eyebrows so that 
brows slope down from the centre of the forehead, the cheeks become elevated 
and the corners of the lips slightly dip”.76  “Other signs of visual suspicion 
can include body language and gestures such as slumped posture or excessive 
pocket patting”.77  
 
The existence of these physical traits are thought to reveal key information to law 
enforcement officers capable of assisting in the identification and selection of individuals 
for enhanced screening. 
 
SPOT involves law enforcement officers screening passengers by scoring their physical 
bodily behaviours according to “some thirty possible suspicious behaviours each with an 
assigned numerical score”.78  Therefore, according to Wock SPOT aims to rely on 
“objective criteria to determine when individuals are trying to disguise emotion”.79  When 
individuals are identified and selected for further scrutiny law enforcement officers typically 
subject them to an enhanced security screening involving “intrusive questioning, pat-downs 
or baggage inspections” with the potential for further subsequent re-examinations which 
may involve law enforcement officers searching governmental databases so as to identify 
any other relevant information on the passenger intending to travel.80  The training provided 
                                                             
75 Donnelly (n67). 
76 P. Ekman, ‘How to Spot a Terrorist on the Fly’, Washington Post, October 29th 2006. 
77 Florence and Friedman (n70), 426. 
78 J. Karp and L. Meckler, ‘Which Travellers Have Hostile Intent? Biometric Device May Have the Answer’, 
Wall Street Journal, August 14th 2006. 
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by the TSA consists of a four day instruction course on “behaviour observation and analysis” 
with a further 24 hours of field training at an airport before the law enforcement officer 
commences observation as a behavioural observation officer.81 
 
It is evident from the available information on SPOT that it “relies on the Facial Action 
Coding System (FACS)”.82  The FACS system relies on facial emotion recognition first 
developed by Ekman and Friensen83 which was aimed at deciphering forms of human 
deception through understanding facial emotions.84 “According to Ekman and Friensen 
faces manifest each emotion similarly irrespective of race, ethnicity or gender”.85  
Consequently, SPOT can be classified as being a form of psychometric profiling which 
primarily concentrates on facial expressions as the means to identify individuals for 
investigation. 
 
In the aftermath of September 11th 2001 the DHS maintained “a list of indicative behaviours 
of suicide bombers” on its webpage relating to Al Qaeda terrorists.86  The list was collated 
from known information about Al Qaeda suicide bombers which identified loose clothing, 
“pale face from recent shaving of beards” and individuals who “[do] not respond to 
authoritative voice commands or direct salutation from a distance” in addition to “eyes 
[appearing] as focused and vigilant” and the “suspect may be carrying heavy luggage, bag 
or wearing a backpack” as representing key behavioural traits indicative of suicide 
                                                             
81 Florence and Friedman (n70), 427. 
82 Karp and Meckler (n78). 
83  P. Ekman and W. Friesen, Unmasking the Face: A Guide to Recognising Emotions from Facial Expressions 
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86 J. Richie and J. Mogul, ‘In the Shadows of the War on Terror: Persistent Police Brutality and Abuse of 
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bombers.87  We may recall that in the previous section we identified a substantial concern 
from research conducted by Crenshaw88 and Horgan89 that there may be no discernible traits 
indicative of terrorists.  This list of characteristics may demonstrate that the US authorities 
view some behavioural characteristics as being indicative of suicide bombers which 
questions the validity of the assertions made by Crenshaw and Horgan. 
 
In order to assess/measure the effectiveness of SPOT as a manifestation of behavioural 
profiling we must employ the three step theoretical effectiveness framework identified in 
the introductory chapter.  We can recall this involves (a) assessing the ‘input effectiveness’ 
by concentrating on the methods/approaches used in the construction of behavioural 
profiles, (b) assessing the ‘output effectiveness’ by concentrating on the application of 
behavioural profiles and (c) assessing the ‘impact effectiveness’ by concentrating on the 
broader impact of the construction and application of behavioural profiling. 
 
However, prior to commencing with an assessment of the effectiveness of this manifestation 
of behavioural profiling Florence and Friedman identify three generic limitations of the 
SPOT programme which affect any assessment/measurement of its effectiveness. 90  
 
Firstly, SPOT concentrates almost exclusively on facial emotions as the key behavioural 
trait which has been criticised by a number of experts who suggest “expressions do not 
reflect the inner feelings of the expresser”.91 Secondly, SPOT relies heavily on the FACS 
                                                             
87 US Department of Homeland Security, Advisory – Maintaining Awareness Regarding Al Qaeda’s Possible 
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programme created by Ekman and Friesen92 which only draws on a pre-determined number 
of facial expressions.  The mere fact that we know there are thirty facial expressions listed 
on the SPOT programme may tend to suggest that it fails to appreciate “the total repertoire 
used by a person during his daily life”.93  Thirdly, SPOT has been developed in a laboratory 
environment which leads Florence and Friedman to question whether it can be applied 
outside of laboratory conditions.94 
 
4.3.4 An Assessment of the Effectiveness of Behavioural Terrorist Profiling in the US 
Aside from these identifiable limitations we shall now progress to conduct an assessment of 
the effectiveness of this manifestation of behavioural profiling in light of the framework 
identified above. 
 
In considering the ‘input effectiveness’ of this manifestation of behavioural profiling we 
must consider the methods/approaches used in the construction of behavioural profiles.   We 
may recall that two key concerns identified above in relation to this behavioural profiling 
method/approach centred on the input required by the profiler in the construction of 
behaviour profiles and the reliability and relevance of the applicability of behavioural 
profiling in the context of terrorism.    
 
In light of our discussion above on this manifestation of behavioural profiling we can 
identify that behavioural profilers undergo some training in the construction of behavioural 
profiles which may address some of the concerns relating to the discretionary input required 
                                                             
92 Ekman and Friesen (n83). 
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by the profiler.   However, whether this training can be considered adequate is open to 
question as there is no information available on the content of the training provided by the 
TSA.   
 
In particular, Kleiner argues that “a mere four days of classroom training on observation 
and questioning techniques and three days of field practice”  was substantially deficient.95 
According to Kleiner any behavioural profiling training programme requires a fundamental 
understanding of psychology which cannot be taught in four days and limited field practice.  
Furthermore, Kleiner argues that longer training “alone does not seem to be the answer, 
because human beings, [are] not error proof machines”.96  This may indicate that the 
problem of training simply exposes a much bigger problem that as humans apply 
behavioural profiles the entire behavioural profiling process is subject to human error.  
 
In considering the concerns raised above relating to the reliability and relevance of 
behavioural profiling in the context of terrorism, the US manifestation suggests that the 
official view attaches considerable value to behavioural profiling.  The DHS watch list of 
indicative behaviours of suicide bombers developed in response to September 11th 2001 
suggests that the official view is contrary to the extensive research conducted by Crenshaw97 
and Horgan.98  In the absence of any evidence to demonstrate the applicability of behavioural 
profiling methods/approaches in the context of terrorism, it is difficult to classify the input 
effectiveness of this manifestation of behavioural profiling. 
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In considering the ‘output effectiveness’ we must assess the application of SPOT by law 
enforcement officers.  There has been some conflicting evidence on the usefulness of SPOT 
as an assistive tool for law enforcement officers.  A formal review of SPOT undertaken by 
the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) in 2013 concluded that the TSA did not 
have reliable statistics to demonstrate the usefulness of SPOT.99  In light of this report the 
TSA undertook a review of its SPOT technique, which resulted in limiting the funding, and 
scope of the programme by removing it from smaller airports.  A further formal review 
conducted by GAO in 2017 also found that the TSA still had no evidence that SPOT was 
actually capable of assisting law enforcement officers identify individuals likely to be 
engaged in terrorism.100   
 
However, the US Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) presented an alternative view on 
the usefulness of SPOT.  TAC is an advisory committee composed of industry experts and 
Government officials that advise the US Department of Commerce, amongst other matters, 
on technical matters relating to the use of technology.  According to TAC, the use of SPOT 
by law enforcement officers was nine times more capable of identifying those likely to be 
involved in terrorism in contrast to other identification techniques, such as a purely 
randomised selection of individuals for enhanced screening.101   
 
It is unclear from TAC’s report as to how it arrived at this determination but it seems that 
the GAO required specific evidence to prove that SPOT was capable of actually identifying 
terrorists.  In light of the GAO’s two formal reviews of SPOT, it would seem that the TSA 
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does not have this evidence otherwise they would have presented this to the GAO.  However, 
other statistics on the use of SPOT has been presented by Kaye in the Washington Post in 
2009 that reveal 98,805 passengers were subjected to enhanced security screening at airports 
across the US as a consequence of SPOT with 9,854 of these passengers necessitating 
official interview under caution and a total of 813 resulting in arrest for terrorism and non-
terrorism offences in 2009.102 There are currently no statistics available on the successful 
prosecution of those individuals arrested and the TSA does not provide specific details 
revealing the behavioural characteristics meriting the subjection of passengers to enhanced 
security screening.103  
 
From a utilitarian perspective, the evidence of the usefulness of SPOT is hotly contested.  
The GAO casts doubt on the ability of SPOT to actually identify terrorists.  However, the 
TAC report and the statistics presented by Kaye on SPOT tend to demonstrate that it may 
be capable of assisting law enforcement officers to identify individuals worthy of enhanced 
screening at airports.  Although the official statistics are silent on the number of prosecutions 
and the number of likely terrorists identified by the application of SPOT in addition to the 
silence on the indicative behavioural characteristics for selecting individuals for enhanced 
screening, the statistics demonstrate SPOT’s capacity at a purely utilitarian level to identify 
individuals for enhanced screening.  Consequently, at a minimum level we can contend that 
SPOT may be considered ‘output effective’ as the information available on SPOT 
demonstrates it is at least partially capable of identifying some individuals at airports across 
the US. 
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However, in order to conduct a full assessment of this manifestation of behavioural profiling 
we must go beyond the input and output assessment of effectiveness by assessing the ‘impact 
effectiveness’.  In a similar manner to the discussion above on Israel, the objective here is 
to determine whether there is any evidence to suggest that the cost associated with this type 
of terrorist profiling calls into question its potential usefulness.   
 
A common critique identifiable in the literature of behavioural profiling programmes such 
as SPOT is that they operate as a legitimising guise to facilitate racial profiling either in 
reality or on the basis of a perception.104  If we consider the list provided by the DHS on 
indicative behaviours of suicide bombers, identified above, we may conclude that the DHS 
has not provided any justification for the contents of this list and in fact may be classified as 
being “culturally and racially insensitive” to particular ethnic minority communities.105  In 
particular, the pale face taken as indicative shaving beards, the apparent inability to respond 
to ‘authoritative commands’  and the presence of heavy luggage at airports does not appear 
to respect the individual autonomy exercisable by individuals practicing their religious or 
their cultural heritage who may be travelling through US airports.   
 
Although we do not know the list of thirty indicative behavioural characteristics used by the 
TSA to identify individuals for enhanced screening at US airports, according to Meyer and 
Ravich the TSA’s early behavioural indicative characteristics affected particular ethnic 
minority communities without an appreciation of legitimate motivations may affect the 
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broader impact of using behavioural profiling as a basis for identifying individuals.106  In 
particular, it is contended by Meyer the consequences of using this form of terrorist profiling 
is that particular ethnicities become the focal point for official suspicion by law enforcement 
officers which is not based on any justification for the selection of individuals.107  
Additionally, Ravich poses the question as to whether behavioural profiling is in fact 
‘rational or racist’ and concludes that the evidence available on SPOT reveals that particular 
ethnic communities appear to be disproportionately focused on by law enforcement 
officers.108   
 
The problem with this form of terrorist profiling in contrast to the manifestations of formal 
terrorist profiling examined in chapter three is the fact that there is not sufficient information 
to review its application so as to discern its likely impact.  The concerns raised in the 
academic studies above may point to serious issues that raises the alarm whether the 
consequences of using this form of terrorist profiling outweighs its usefulness.  Even if some 
of the evidence above is an accurate snapshot of the impact of the SPOT programme it may 
be argued in a similar way to the Israeli manifestation that this is the very type of conduct 
that is likely to be counterproductive by compromising fundamental human rights.  As a 
result, it may be argued that the likely cost of using this form of profiling as a 
counterterrorism tool may be considered as being dangerously close to being 
counterproductive in detecting, deterring and prosecuting those likely to involved in 
terrorism or its associated preparatory activities.  It may be argued that the development of 
a profiling process must be subject and open to review by collecting sensitive information 
on those stopped and search by law enforcement officers so as to determine whether 
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particular ethnic minorities are subject to disproportionate investigation by law enforcement 
officers.  This would at least allow for some of the concerns about its application to be 
addressed and improved over time similar to manifestations of formal terrorist profiling so 
as to minimise its impact on particular ethnicities. 
 
The discussion on SPOT reveals a disparity between the theory of behavioural profiling 
advocating the reliance on non-sensitive characteristics and the reality of the potential for 
its use against ethnic minority communities.  Although there is no evidence to demonstrate 
an official intention by US authorities to apply the SPOT behavioural profiling programme 
as a means to single out ethnic minority communities as a source of suspicion for law 
enforcement officers.  The discussion demonstrates the potential for the singling out of 
ethnic minority communities, which is sufficient to characterise SPOT as being ineffective. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
The primary aim of this chapter was to consider whether behavioural profiling approaches 
used in the construction of behavioural profiles and their application by law enforcement 
officers can represent a way to address the limitations identified of formal terrorist profiling 
in chapter three.   
 
In the first section above we considered the various approaches used in the construction of 
behavioural profiles which were categorised as being primarily “biometric profiling”, 
“psychometric profiling” and “sociometric profiling”.  The examination of the behavioural 
profiling methods/approaches revealed that the theory of behavioural profiling is aimed at 
assisting law enforcement officers to identify individuals for investigation solely premised 
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on discernible physical characteristics such as an assessment of human emotion, gait and 
gesture. 
 
However, the applicability of these profiling approaches in the context of terrorism raised 
considerable concerns as to whether terrorists or likely terrorists exhibit indicative 
behavioural characteristics capable of being identified through the behavioural profiling 
approaches.  In particular, the ‘reliability and validity’ of behavioural profiling approaches 
assumes that each likely terrorist would exhibit the same or similar behaviour each time they 
engage in an act or preparatory act of terrorism.   
 
Furthermore, the homology assumption assumes that terrorist behaviour can be considered 
as being the same or similar across groups of terrorists.   In the first section above we 
identified literature which questioned the validity of whether terrorists exhibit any particular 
behaviour discernible through behavioural profiling.  Consequently, we must acknowledge 
that the use of behavioural profiling approaches to construct behavioural profiles of likely 
terrorists will be limited by the notion that terrorists are common ‘everyday’ individuals who 
do not exhibit particular or discernible traits. 
 
In the second section above we progressed to consider two different manifestations of the 
application of behavioural profiling in Israel and the US.  In considering the Israeli 
manifestation, we noted that there is insufficient information to characterise this 
manifestation of behavioural profiling as being capable of assisting law enforcement officers 
in the detection and prevention of terrorism.  Furthermore, there is some evidence to 
demonstrate a negative impact on ethnic minority communities that raises considerable 
difficulties as to whether behavioural profiling in the context of terrorism is simply a guise 
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for law enforcement officer to select individuals for enhanced screening without any 
justifiable reasons or rationale.   
 
The potential negative impact of behavioural profiling questions whether the Israeli 
manifestation of behavioural profiling can actually be considered as being a form of 
behavioural profiling in light of our discussion of the generic behavioural 
methods/approaches above.  In particular, we noted in the introduction that a key dimension 
of behavioural profiling was the fact that it did not rely on the availability of information 
about sensitive characteristics.  However, in our analysis of the Israeli manifestation we 
found that there was some evidence to demonstrate a mismatch between the theory and the 
practice where racial and ethnic minorities were being disproportionately targeted by law 
enforcement officers using a process labelled as being ‘behavioural profiling’.  At this stage 
in the thesis it contended that in light of our discussion of the generic behavioural profiling 
methods/approaches the Israeli behavioural profiling process cannot be considered a form 
of behavioural profiling supported by our analysis of the behavioural profiling 
methods/approaches.  
 
We also considered the manifestation of behavioural profiling in the US through the TSA’s 
development of the SPOT programme.  While there is more information available on SPOT 
it is evident from our discussion on the US that there are considerable limitations in using 
SPOT to identify individuals for enhanced screening.  The limitations affecting the input 
and output assessment/measurement of effectiveness may question whether behavioural 
profiling can be considered as being an appropriate tool to assist law enforcement officers 
identify and select individuals for enhanced screening.  The only positive aspect of this form 
of profiling is its apparent ability to screen passengers in real time which was cited as a key 
 194 
limitation of formal terrorist profiling methods in chapter three.  However, in light of the 
concerns raised by the construction and application of behavioural profiling it is contended 
that the concerns far outweigh the advantage of being able to screen passengers in real time. 
 
The general definition of behavioural profiling provided in the introduction tends to support 
the notion that behavioural profiling exclusively identifies individuals on the basis of their 
physical activity and interaction in public.  However, the disparity between the theory of 
behavioural profiling which advocates that behavioural profiling does not rely on sensitive 
characteristics such as race, age, gender, ethnicity, religion, country of origin etc, and the 
reality in practice in Israel and to a lesser extent in the US reveals an issue of considerable 
importance which is unresolved by this chapter. In particular, the apparent application of 
behavioural profiling disproportionately to ethnic minority communities raises the question 
as to whether the application of behavioural profiling in the context of terrorism can be 
considered a form of racial profiling.  In particular, the two manifestations of behavioural 
profiling reveal a considerable contradiction between the theory of behavioural profiling as 
relying exclusively on information about non-sensitive physical characteristics and the 
reality in practice of this form of profiling being directed at ethnic minority communities 
without any specific justification.   Therefore, when we consider racial profiling in chapter 
five below we will need to return to this issue so as assess whether behavioural profiling in 
the context of terrorism can be categorised as a form of racial profiling in light of the 
discussion in chapter five. 
 
In final conclusion we may argue that while there are considerable concerns identifiable in 
the section above examining the behavioural profiling methods/approaches that questions 
the applicability of this form of profiling in the context of terrorism.  The generic criticisms 
 195 
of the behavioural profiling methods/approaches question the applicability of behavioural 
profiling in the detection and prevention of terrorism. 
 
Furthermore, the two manifestations of behavioural profiling demonstrate additional 
concerns as to the suitability of behavioural profiling as an assistive tool capable of 
identifying individuals likely to be engaged in terrorism or preparatory activities.  The 
discussion and analysis of the construction and application of behavioural profiles reveals 
considerable tension between the methods/approaches used in the construction of 
behavioural profiling and its application in the context of terrorism which questions whether 
the identified manifestations of behavioural profiling above can actually be regarded as 
being behavioural profiling. 
 
Consequently, it is argued in light of the analysis of the manifestations of behavioural 
profiling in the context of terrorism cannot sufficiently address the limitations identified of 
the formal terrorist profiling methods discussed in chapter three. 
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This chapter progresses the examination of terrorist profiling by exploring manifestations 
that may be classifiable as being closer towards the ‘informal’ end on the terrorist profiling 
spectrum.  In order to examine manifestations of informal terrorist profiling, this chapter 
assesses the exercise of police powers, as the basis for demonstrating that some uses of 
police powers may be capable of being classified as an example of informal terrorist 
profiling.  These police powers include police initiated stop and searches, the use of powers 
of arrest and the power to engage in identity checking and the searches of premises of 
premises. 
 
The argument advanced in this chapter is that certain manifestations of profiling can be 
classified as being ‘informal’ where two criteria are met. 
 
Firstly, no formal acknowledgement is made by the state that some sort of profiling is 
being/may be being used. Indeed, it is common for the state to refuse to recognise or 
acknowledge the use of profiling in the police powers. These police powers appear as part 
of their available apparatus of tools and mechanisms to assist in detecting, deterring and 
preventing acts of terrorism or associated preparatory activities.   
 
Secondly, manifestations of informal profiling do not exhibit the same level of a systematic 
process, approach or structure in contrast with manifestations of formal terrorist profiling 
such as those manifestations already considered in chapter three. 
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It is important to acknowledge here that those manifestations of terrorist profiling that move 
towards the informal end of the profiling spectrum are classified as being informal on the 
basis of available evidence.  As a result, the discussion throughout this chapter draws upon 
an array of available evidence in different countries so as to demonstrate to quite a high 
degree of probability that some uses of police powers may constitute examples of informal 
terrorist profiling.   
 
The discussion in this chapter is set out in three parts. 
 
The discussion in the first part begins by examining stop and search powers in England and 
Wales and argues that there is a high probability some uses of this power may be considered 
examples of informal terrorist profiling. This argument is advanced on the basis of an 
examination of both the construction and application of the various counterterrorism 
statutory provisions authorising the power to stop and search.  The focus of the discussion 
is on England and Wales, given that there is an array of available data on law enforcement 
officer use of this power. The construction of the power to stop and search is examined so 
as to discern the permissible types of information/criteria capable of being included when 
exercising this power and to further consider whether the statutory framework places 
controls or limits on the use of such information/criteria as the basis for exercising the 
powers.  Additionally, the application of this power is also examined because the evidence 
demonstrates there is a high probability some exercises of the power may be considered as 
at least showing the hallmarks of a profiling process, but it falls far short of the sort of 
systematic “formal” profiling processes examined in chapter three.  
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The second part of the chapter examines other evidence of informal terrorist profiling based 
on the use of a range of police powers including the police power to engage in identity 
checking, targeted raiding of premises and the use of arrest powers.  In this part of the 
chapter, the discussion draws upon evidence from other jurisdictions including Germany, 
Italy and France as the basis to support the contention that some uses of police powers may 
be capable of constituting examples of informal terrorist profiling given that they are not 
acknowledged as a profiling tool and on the basis of the evidence it seems highly probable 
that there may be no formalised process at the construction/application stages in contrast to 
manifestations of formal profiling examined in chapter three. 
 
The third part of the chapter evaluates the usefulness of informal terrorist profiling in 
assisting law enforcement officers identify, detect or deter acts of terrorism or preparatory 
activities. 
 
It is acknowledged that not every use of police powers will represent an example or be 
evidence of informal terrorist profiling.  Rather, the discussion throughout this chapter 
examines the general application and use of discretionary police powers to support the thesis 
that in some instances it would seem highly probable that law enforcement officers may be 
using their powers to engage in profiling practices tantamount to informal terrorist profiling.  
A further issue that arises from the study of informal profiling is whether this type of 
profiling is classifiable as being a form of deductive or inductive profiling.  It is 
acknowledged that the examples of the use of discretionary police powers considered in this 
chapter are difficult to classify as being either a form of deductive or inductive profiling.  
This difficulty relates to the apparent absence of the systematic processes evident in other 
types of profiling considered in chapter three.  As a result, the examples of informal profiling 
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considered in this chapter could be a deductive profiling approach where the law 
enforcement officers may be using their powers on the basis of past knowledge of terrorism 
crimes as the basis to identify or select individuals for questioning or screening.  Further, it 
can equally be argued that the examples of informal profiling considered in this chapter may 
be a form of inductive profiling where law enforcement officers may be identifying their 
suspects on the basis of a profile constructed using raw data.  Consequently, it is best to 
consider examples of informal profiling as being either deductive or inductive depending on 
the way this type of profiling is used by individual law enforcement officers. 
 
5.2 Stop and Search in England and Wales 
It is necessary to examine two aspects of the power to stop and search in order to demonstrate 
to a high degree of probability that some uses of this power may be classifiable as examples 
of informal terrorist profiling. 
 
Firstly it is necessary to examine the construction of the power to stop and search so as to 
evaluate whether the statutory framework provides a basis to control the types of 
information/criteria that can be utilised in deciding whether to exercise powers of stop and 
search in any given situation and further to consider whether there is any data control 
processes comparable with the processes in manifestations of formal terrorist profiling 
examined in chapter three. 
 
Secondly, it will also be necessary to consider the use of the stop and search power by law 
enforcement officers as the basis to examine the output of these powers as a profiling 
tool/mechanism.  This will involve considering the statistical evidence on actual law 
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enforcement use of the power and various studies that have been conducted on this statistical 
data. 
 
5.2.1 The Power to Stop and Search in England and Wales 
As the power to stop and search has long been the subject of debate in the literature, there is 
no formally agreed definition of what constitutes a stop and search.1  However, the decision 
by a law enforcement officer to issue an instruction to a citizen “to stop initiates a coercive 
and intrusive process that is available to law enforcement agencies around the world”.2  
According to Harris,  
“[a] stop is a detention of a person by the police.  It differs from a seizure or 
an arrest in that it is presumed to be temporary.  A frisk is a search, but like 
a stop it is limited type of police action that … can include only a ‘pat down’ 
on the suspect’s outer clothing.  No further search – no reaching into a pocket 
or under a shirt – can take place”.3 
 
As a result, it may be argued that stop and search is best defined as being a temporary 
detention of a ‘suspect’ by a law enforcement officer in the pursuit of their policing duty so 
as to allow the officer to engage in a non-invasive, but nonetheless intrusive, search of a 
person and/or their property.  It can be argued that when individual officers are exercising 
this power, they are effectively selecting and identifying individuals for enhanced 
questioning and/or screening with the aim of preventing, detecting or deterring criminality 
and/or terrorism.  This selection ‘process’ on the part of an individual law enforcement 
officer involves making a distinction in treatment between those suspects subjected to a stop 
and search and those individuals who are not subjected to a stop and search.   In some 
instances, the decision to exercise this power may well be guided by the existence of 
																																																								
1 R. Delsol and M. Shiner, ‘Introduction’ in R Delsol and M. Shiner, Stop and Search: The Anatomy of a Police 
Power (Springer Publishing, 2015), 1. 
2 L. Weber and B. Bowling, ‘Introduction: Stop and Search in a Global Context’ in L. Weber and B. Bowling, 
(eds) (2012) Stop and Search: Police Power in Global Context (Routledge, 2012), 1-3. 
3 D. Harris, Profiles in Injustice: Why racial profiling Cannot work (New Press, 2003), 37. 
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suspicion on the part of the law enforcement officer.  However, in other instances as the 
discussion below will demonstrate, the law enforcement does not necessarily have to hold 
any suspicion.  As a result, it is contended that the very nature of the stop and search power 
may be considered in some instances as being akin to a profiling process simply on the basis 
that an individual officer may be selecting and identifying individuals for enhanced 
questioning and/or screening with the aim of preventing, detecting or deterring or terrorism. 
 
The legal framework allowing the use of stop and search powers can be characterised as 
being broad due to the extensive array of statutes affording the power to stop and search.  A 
common feature throughout stop and search powers in England and Wales is that law 
enforcement officers are given a high degree of discretion as to when they may exercise 
their right to engage in a stop and search.  This discretion may be considered as being akin 
to ‘low visibility policing’ and as such it can be quite difficult to identify those factors 
capable of influencing individual law enforcement officers when they exercise their 
discretion to stop and search.  As a result of this difficulty, it is necessary to examine the 
statutory powers as the basis to work out what factors can lawfully influence a law 
enforcement officer’s decision to exercise a stop and search. 
 
In England and Wales, there are a considerable number of laws which afford law 
enforcement officers the power to stop and search, but not all of these powers are necessarily 
relevant to assessment in this chapter.4  Bowling and Phillips identify “section 1 of the Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), section 23 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 
(MDA), section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (CJPO), section 47 
of the Firearms Act 1968 (FA) and sections” 47A-C of the Terrorism Act 2000 (TA) as 
																																																								
4 For a general list of police powers to stop and search please see: PACE Code A, Annex A. 
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being the most popular laws used by law enforcement officers to exercise the power of stop 
and search.5  In addition to these powers, section 53 and its Schedule 7 of the TA 2000 also 
provide a special power of stop and search at border entry points in ports and airports.   
However, as the primary focus of analysis in this chapter is on terrorist profiling, the 
discussion will only focus on the counterterrorism stop and search powers. 
 
The legal framework authorising the power to stop and search is commonly constructed in 
either of two ways; law enforcement officers will be afforded the power to stop and search 
so long as they have formed ‘reasonable suspicion’ about their suspect or in some instances 
law enforcement officers are not required to have formed any reasonable suspicion.  As a 
result of this distinction it is necessary to separately examine the construction of the power 
of stop and search with and without reasonable suspicion.  The objective here is to discern 
the types of information and criteria which may be permitted to be used as a basis for 
exercising the power. This provides a foundation for examining whether the statutory 
framework provides a process to manage/control the permissible information/criteria in a 
similar way to the processes evident to manifestations of formal terrorist profiling examined 
in chapter three. 
 
(A) Stop and Search Requiring Reasonable Suspicion 
Section 43(1) of the Terrorism Act 2000 (TA) provides law enforcement officers with the 
power to stop and search “a person whom [they] reasonably suspects to be a terrorist to 
																																																								
5 B. Bowling and C. Phillips, ‘Disproportionate and Discriminatory: Reviewing the Evidence on Police Stops 
and Search’ (2007) 70(6) The Modern Law Review 936, 937-938.  Section 59 of the Protection of Freedoms 
Act 2012 repeals section 44-47 of the TA 2000 and section 61 inserts 47A to C into the TA 2000.  
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discover whether he has in his possession anything which may constitute evidence that he is 
a terrorist.” 6 
Further, Code A of the PACE Code of Practice states: 
“[r]easonable grounds for suspicion is the legal test which a police officer 
must satisfy before they can stop and detain individuals or vehicles to search 
them under powers such as section 1 of PACE (to find stolen or prohibited 
articles) and section 23 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (to find controlled 
drugs). This test must be applied to the particular circumstances in each case 
and is in two parts:  
 
(i) Firstly, the officer must have formed a genuine suspicion in their own mind 
that they will find the object for which the search power being exercised 
allows them to search (see Annex A, second column, for examples); and 
(ii) Secondly, the suspicion that the object will be found must be reasonable. This 
means that there must be an objective basis for that suspicion based on facts, 
information and/or intelligence which are relevant to the likelihood that the 
object in question will be found, so that a reasonable person would be entitled 
to reach the same conclusion based on the same facts and information and/or 
intelligence.”7 
 
The existence of reasonable suspicion is to curtail and limit the circumstances in which a 
law enforcement officer can justifiably stop and search an individual and/their vehicle.  
From a profiling perspective, the requirement of ‘reasonable suspicion’ suggests that the law 
enforcement officer must go through a rational thought process before they decide to 
exercise their power to stop and search.  The law enforcement officer will form their 
reasonable suspicion about their suspect during this thinking process.  It is accepted that in 
some instances reasonable suspicion may be linked to other factors, such as the suspect being 
in an area that a terrorist incident has just occurred or their behaviour may be suspicious to 
the individual law enforcement officer. It would seem reasonable to argue that during this 
																																																								
6 Bowling and Phillips (n5), 938. See also the definition of a terrorist in section 40 of the Terrorism Act 2000.  
Also, please note that section 43A of the Terrorism Act 2000 creates a similar power in respect of stopping 
and searching vehicles so as to allow a law enforcement officer with reasonable suspicion “to  discover … [if] 
….the vehicle is being used for the purposes of terrorism”. 
7 Home Office, Code of Practice for the Exercise by Police Officers of Statutory Powers of Stop and Search, 
Code A (Home Office/TSO, 2014), 2.2. 
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thinking process, when forming reasonable suspicion, the individual officer may (in some 
instances) be engaging in an act of profiling as they are essentially selecting individuals for 
screening and/or enhanced questioning when there may be other factors to support 
reasonable suspicion. This may represent examples of profiling in conjunction with other 
factors such as a suspect’s suspicious behaviour. 
 
This process is not officially classified as being a profiling process because this power is 
aimed at allowing a law enforcement officer to allay their suspicions about a potential 
suspect. However, it is argued that the decision to stop and search a ‘suspect’ involves a 
degree of profiling as the individual law enforcement officer is making selections to identify 
individuals for screening and/or enhanced questioning.  This is due to the fact that a law 
enforcement officer must make a selection about who they are deciding to stop and search.  
This decision-making process created in statute does not delineate a systematic process in 
comparable terms with manifestations of formal profiling already discussed in chapter three.  
Rather the statute merely establishes a standard - reasonable suspicion - but does not specify 
with precision what this might be, or all the factors which might be relevant to meeting/not 
meeting the standard. 
 
Indeed, the concept of ‘reasonable suspicion’ in a law enforcement context may be 
considered as being ill-defined.  For example, Sanders et al  brand it “as being somewhat of 
a slippery concept”.8  The discussion earlier in the chapter was able to point to an academic 
definition but in a law enforcement context Smith and Grey identify that law enforcement 
“officers have long found it difficult to express in words their individual justifications for 
																																																								
8 A. Sanders, R. Young and M. Burton, Criminal Justice (Oxford University Press, 2010), 74. 
	 205	
exercising the power to stop and search”.9  It is akin to intuition or a ‘hunch’ on the part of 
the individual officer as to when a reasonable suspicion is formed about an individual and/or 
a vehicle.   
 
Although the statutory framework establishes a test that law enforcement officers must use 
before engaging in a stop and search, it is contended that it remains extremely difficult to 
pinpoint justifications for stop and search in practice which may create an opportunity for 
law enforcement officers to engage in informal profiling.  This means that an examination 
of the statute will not necessarily expose the factors that can influence a law enforcement 
officer in their decision to stop and search, rather the statute and its supporting Code only 
exposes the types of factors that cannot be taken into account.  This approach is not as 
systematic as the processes already considered in relation to manifestations of formal 
profiling in chapter three. 
 
The Code has been continually updated in an attempt to deal with the problems around the 
exercise of stop and search powers.  For instance, in paragraph 2.2B of the Code expressly 
states: 
“[r]easonable suspicion can never be supported on the basis of personal   
factors. This means that unless the police have information or intelligence 
which provides a description of a person suspected of carrying an article for 
which there is a power to stop and search, the following cannot be used, alone 
or in combination with each other, or in combination with any other factor, 
as the reason for stopping and searching any individual, including any 
vehicle which they are driving or are being carried in: 
 
(a) A person’s physical appearance with regard, for example, to any of the 
‘relevant protected characteristics’ set out in the Equality Act 2010, section 
149, which are age, disability, gender reassignment, pregnancy and 
maternity, race, religion or belief, sex and sexual orientation…., or the fact 
that the person is known to have a previous conviction; and 
 
																																																								
9 A. Smith and J. Gray, Police and people in London (Avebury, 1985), 8-15. 
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(b) Generalisations or stereotypical images that certain groups or categories 
of people are more likely to be involved in criminal activity.” 
 
Furthermore, paragraph 1.1 of the Code recognises that “[p]owers to stop and search must 
be used fairly, responsibly with respect for people being searched and without unlawful 
discrimination”.  
 
Despite these developments, it is evident that the Code may be considered as still lacking a 
clear, accessible and formalised framework in comparable terms with the types of 
processes/approaches comparable terms with the types of processes or approaches discussed 
in respect of manifestations of formal profiling when constructing profiles to identify those 
suspects to stop and search.   Nevertheless, the Code pinpoints the types of characteristics 
that should not be taking into account when forming reasonable suspicion.   
 
It is accepted that there is no clear answer as to how stop and search requiring reasonable 
suspicion could become more systematic in comparable terms with manifestation of formal 
terrorist profiling.  The very nature of these powers means that they exist as being 
discretionary low visibility policing tools that are nearly always going to involve some 
degree of informal profiling on the part of law enforcement officer, which is only 
constrained by the requirement of reasonable suspicion.  Other powers constrained by 
reasonable suspicion, such as the power of arrest, have a greater degree of oversight by law 
enforcement officers having to account for arrests at the police station.  Nevertheless, the 
informal nature of this process stands in direct contrast to the types of processes evident in 




(B) Stop and Search Without Reasonable Suspicion 
The British statutory framework also affords law enforcement officers the power to exercise 
a stop and search in some circumstances without any reasonable suspicion.  The argument 
explored in this section is that the creation of stop and search powers without the need for 
reasonable suspicion provides an even weaker means to control the types data that can 
inform a law enforcement officer’s decision-making process when deciding to stop and 
search their suspect. 
 
It is contended that the absence of the requirement of reasonable suspicion removes any 
degree of a formalised thinking process on the part of the individual law enforcement officer 
who is deciding to conduct a stop and search without reasonable suspicion.  The removal of 
reasonable suspicions slips further into a highly discretionary low visibility use of police 
powers that creates widespread opportunities for informal profiling with a very limited, if 
any, formalised process to assist in the identification of suspects.   
 
The counterterrorism power to stop and search without reasonable suspicion exemplifies an 
apparent ad hoc power that appears to have a very weak formalised or systematic process to 
control data types.  It is evident that the statutory framework does not control the types of 
data that may influence a law enforcement officer decision-making process in contrast to 
those manifestations of formal profiling considered in chapter three. 
 
The power to stop and search without reasonable suspicion is currently provided in two key 
statutory provisions, section 47A-C of the TA 2000 and section 53 along with Schedule 7 
of the TA 2000.  Each of these provisions will now be considered so as to demonstrate the 
	 208	
apparent absence of a process in comparable terms with those manifestations of formal 
profiling already considered in chapter three. 
 
   (i) Section 47A-C of the TA 2000 
The statutory power to stop and search in section 47A-C of the TA 2000 creates a two-tiered 
process that authorises a law enforcement officer to exercise a counterterrorism stop and 
search of individuals and/or vehicles without the need for reasonable suspicion. 
 
Firstly, a senior law enforcement officer must designate an area in which a law enforcement 
officer to engage in a stop and search without reasonable suspicion under section 47A(1) of 
the TA 2000.  This is considered to be an upper level process that seeks to control when and 
where stop and search without reasonable suspicion powers can be used by law enforcement 
officers at ground level.  As part of the authorisation process, the senior law enforcement 
officer must ensure that any authorisation of a location relates to specific locations and it 
can only be for a maximum of 14 days.  From a profiling perspective, this upper tier in the 
statutory framework is not a significant interest to the discussion in this chapter as the 
decision to authorise a location is about saying these powers shall be exercisable in the 
following area, whereas the decisions with which we are concerned are the individual 
decisions to exercise the power in specific situations against specific persons.  
 
This leads us to the second point. At this “lower level” since once an once an area has been 
authorised by the senior officer, section 47A(2) of the TA 2000 allows an individual officer 
to exercise the power to stop and search without reasonable suspicion.  The exercise of this 
power is of interest to the discussion in this thesis as it allows us to consider the permissible 
data a law enforcement officer can take into account when deciding to exercise a stop and 
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search as the basis to identify if any formalised process is likely to exist to control the types 
of data and the use of this data that influences the decision to exercise a stop and search. 
 
It is important to acknowledge that this counterterrorist power to stop and search has 
undergone significant review in recent years prior to its current formulation.  This review of 
the counterterrorist power to stop and search is due to the decision in Gillan and Quinton v 
The United Kingdom10 which assessed the compatibility of stop search powers against the 
requirements of the ECHR; namely the right to liberty (article 5 ECHR); and the right to 
privacy (Article 8 ECHR).  Although this review concerned both the upper and lower levels 
tiers of the stop and search power, the discussion here is directed at the lower levels so as to 
attempt to discern if a formalised process is likely to exist by any discernable evidence of 
control on the types of data that can be taken into account by law enforcement officers when 
deciding to exercise a stop and search. 
 
Prior to the current formulation of the power to stop and search in section 47A of the TA 
2000, the older formulation of this power permitted law enforcement officers to “stop and 
search pedestrians and/or vehicles within the geographical area confirmed in an 
authorisation for any articles of a kind which could be used in connection with terrorism 
regardless of whether” the individual officer held “grounds for suspecting the presence of 
articles of that kind”.11  A limitation on the decision making process to use of this stop and 
search power was the requirement that law enforcement officers to have regard to Code A 
of the PACE 1984.  The existence of the Code was and continues to be aimed at providing 
law enforcement officers with guidance on how they should exercise their discretion to stop 
																																																								
10 Gillan and Quinton v The United Kingdom, Application No. 4158 (12 January 2010). 
11 Terrorism Act 2000, section 45(1). 
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and search pedestrians and vehicles.  Therefore, Code A can be considered as being 
indicative of the factors that may influence an officer when they are deciding to select their 
suspect for a stop and search. 
 
The Gillan and Quinton decision decision exposed a number of weaknesses with the 
formulation of the suspicionless power to stop and search.  These weaknesses included the 
absence of direction/control on how law enforcement officers should use the guidance in the 
Code in conjunction with the power to stop and search, the statistical evidence on the use of 
the power to stop and search represented a source of grave concern for the court and the 
reviewability of the exercise of stop and search power in the domestic courts was weak.   
These weaknesses led the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) to concluded that “the 
safeguards within the [TA 2000] was highly inadequate to protect against abuse and misuse, 
the legislative framework was neither sufficiently circumscribed nor subject to adequate 
legal safeguards against abuse” which led the Court to conclude that the powers “not in 
accordance with the law” in breach of Article 8 of the ECHR.12 
 
Consequently, it may be argued that the Gillan case may be taken as evidence to suggest 
that the legal framework did not control adequately the use of suspicionless stop and search 
powers by advancing a clear formalised framework to guide the use of the stop and search 
power. 
 
The Government’s reaction to the Gillan decision resulted in a process of review, which 
resulted in the Terrorism Act 2000 (Remedial) Order 2011 that repealed sections 44-47 by 
inserting sections 47A to C into the TA 2000. 
																																																								
12 Supra (n10), para 87. 
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As part of the development of stop and search in the 2011 Order, the Home Secretary issued 
new guidance in the form of a revised version of the Code of Practice. This guidance 
essentially removed the use of suspicionless stop and search powers from law enforcement 
officers. Specifically, this new guidance allowed for stop and search to be authorised if it 
was “necessary to prevent acts of terrorism”.13  Therefore, this temporary reform only 
related to the upper level processes of the stop and search power and not to the lower level 
process. As a result, this early reform did not appear to create a more formalised process 
surrounding the decision on the part of individual officers to exercise of their power to stop 
and search within an authorised location. 
 
A further review of counterterrorism powers was instigated by the then Home Secretary and 
this was completed in January 2011.14  This review identified four core problems with the 
use of stop and search powers in England and Wales.   
 
Firstly, the “excessive use of stop and search powers”, secondly the “disproportionate use 
of stop and search on ethnic minority communities”, thirdly the “absence of terrorism 
convictions” as a result of using stop and search powers and finally the “errors evident in 
the process of authorising the use of stop and search powers”.15   
 
On the basis of section 10(2) of the HRA 1998, the Home Secretary adopted the “Terrorism 
Act 2000 (Remedial) Order 2011” as a temporary basis until the then the “Protection of 
Freedoms Bill” was enacted.  In response to the period of review the Home Secretary 
																																																								
13 Home Office, Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Code A (Home Office, 2011), para 2.18A. 
14 Home Office, Review of Counterterrorism and Security Powers (Home Office, 2011). 
15 ibid, 16. 
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tampered with the discretion exercised at the upper levels by senior law enforcement officers 
by reducing the authorisation period.  Furthermore, “the authorising officer had to 
reasonably suspect that terrorism would take place within” the particular location and the 
“authorisation was necessary to prevent terrorism”.  The only development of the lower 
levels of discretionary use of the stop and search power was the new guidance offered 
through a revamp of the Code of Practice A. 
 
The culmination of this review resulted in the enactment of the “Protection of Freedom Act 
2012” (PFA) which meant that the 2011 Order ceased to have effect.  However, section 61 
of the PFA 2012 effectively copied the provision already in the 2011 Order which placed 
the content of the 2011 Order provision of stop and search on to a permanent basis by 
inserting section 47A-C into the TA 2000. 
 
The level of change resulting from this development in the law is debatable. Specifically, it 
is contended that the newly reformed law on stop and search continues to allow law 
enforcement officers to engage in a profiling process that may be classifiable as being 
informal in light of an apparent absence of a sufficiently systematic process in direct contrast 
to those processes evident in formal manifestations of profiling. The only significant change 
related to the upper levels of control on the power to authorise an area for stop and search 
which is not relevant to this discussion in this chapter.16  From a 
profiling perspective any changes to the upper levels of discretion related to authorising an 
area are not significant, as the decision to authorise an area remains a policing operational 
																																																								
16 G. Lennon, ‘Stop and Search Powers in UK Terrorism Investigations: a limited judicial oversight’ (2016) 
20 The International Journal of Human Rights 634, 638-639. 
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matter, which does not necessarily involve any profiling process. Once an area is now 
authorised, the focus remains on the decision-making powers exercisable by individual law 
enforcement officers so as to question how the statute allows individual officers to make 
their selection of suspects for a stop and search.17 
There is little reform pursued in the context of the lower levels of discretion exercised by 
individual officers once an area has been authorised.  For example, the stop and search power 
in section 47A of the TA 2000 creates a degree of confusion over the state of mind the law 
enforcement officers must have to justify a stop and search.18  This confusion leaves open 
the potential that this police power can be used in an informal manner to profile suspects as 
it appears that this power may be exercisable outside of a formalised process in contrast to 
those manifestations of formal profiling considered in chapter three. 
 
Under the old law formulation of stop and search a law enforcement officer could only 
exercise the power to stop and search “whether or not the constable has grounds for 
suspecting the presence of articles of that kind”.19 The current formulation suggests that a 
law enforcement officer can exercise the stop and search power “whether or not the 
constable reasonably suspects that there is such evidence”.20  The problem with both the old 
and the new formulation is that the statutory framework does not require the law 





18 J. Ip, ‘The Reform of Counterterrorism Stop and Search after Gillan v United Kingdom’ (2013) 13(4) 
Human Rights Law Review 729, 740-741. 
19 Terrorism Act 2000, section 45(1). 
20 Terrorism Act 2000, section 47A(5). 
21 Ip (n18), 743. 
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As a result, the challenge here with this formulation is that it is difficult to discern the ‘state 
of mind’ a law enforcement officer must have before exercising their discretion.  It is 
possible to suggest at least two states of mind, one where the law enforcement officer has 
formed a subjective suspicion of their target but cannot objectively provide a reasonable 
ground for the formation of that suspicion.22  Alternatively, the law enforcement officer may 
not have any suspicion at all which may be considered akin to simple random searches.  The 
issue with both of these circumstances is that they appear at odds with the legal review 
undertaken by the House of Lords in Gillan.23  There appears to be no means to control the 
individual use of the power to stop and search through any process once an area has been 
authorised. 
 
The Code of Practice provides law enforcement officers with an objective list of factors to 
assist in “the selection of individuals or vehicles at random”. 24   According to the 
Independent Review of Terrorism Legislation, this part of the Code appears to legitimise the 
use of randomised searches despite the fact that the House of Lords was quite clear in 
disapproval of such searches.25  Further criticism of the inadvertent support of randomised 
searches was also criticised by the Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR).26  In the view 
of the JCHR, the inclusion of the word ‘random’ in the Code which is linked to the guidance 
																																																								
22 M. Zander, ‘Tighter Controls on Stop and Search – but will they make any difference?’ (2014) 178(37) 
Criminal Law and Justice Weekly 543, 543. 
23 ibid, 544. 
24 Supra (n13), para 4.1.1. 
25 D. Anderson, The Terrorism Acts in 2010, Report of the Independent Reviewer of the Operation of the 
Terrorism Act 2000 and Part 1 of the Terrorism Act 2010 (HMSO, 2011), 8.38-8.39.  Note that Lord Bingham 
concluded it would not be appropriate to stop and search individuals “who were obviously not terrorist 
suspects” while Lord Hope concluded that “purely random” searches were not desired.  Finally, Lord Brown’s 
view was that stop and searching “those regarded as presenting no conceivable threat” would likely represent 
a misuse of power. R (Gillan) v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [2006] UKHL 12, paras 63 -64, 30 & 50 
and 76. 
26 Joint Committee on Human rights, The Terrorism Act 2000 (Remedial) Order 2011: Stop and Search without 
Reasonable Suspicion (Second Report) (HMSO, 2011), para 34. 
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on the level of suspicion to justify a stop and search only serves to confuse the state of mind 
a law enforcement officer should have before deciding to exercise a stop and search.   
 
Therefore, it may be argued that the juxtaposition of “without reasonable suspicion” in the 
statutory provision and “random” in the objective guidance in the Codes represents a 
fundamental flaw to control the types of information/criteria that may be relied upon by a 
law enforcement officer deciding to engage in a stop and search.27  This absence of control 
in comparable terms with formal manifestations of profiling may be taken as evidence of 
the absence, or at least likely absence, of a process surrounding the exercise of a stop and 
search in comparable terms with the processes already considered in chapter three. 
 
  (ii) Section 53 and Schedule 7 of the TA 2000 
Let’s turn our discussion now to focus on section 53 and Schedule 7 of the TA 2000 as the 
basis to further explore the likelihood that the exercise of the power to stop and search 
without reasonable suspicion may not be as controlled as those manifestations of formal 
profiling considered in chapter three.  Paragraph 7(2) of Schedule 7 of the TA 2000 allows 
individual law enforcement officer or ‘examination officer’ as referred to in Schedule 7 of 
the TA 2000 “at a port or airport to stop and search an individual” so as “to determine 
whether they appear to be a person failing within section 40(1)(b) of the” TA 2000.  This 
effectively means that Schedule 7(2) of the TA 2000 affords an individual law enforcement 
officer the power to stop and search any person within a border area in a port or airport to 
determine whether they are “concerned in the commission, preparation of instigation of acts 
of terrorism”.28 
																																																								
27 Ip (n18), 745. 
28 Terrorism Act 2000, s. 40(1)(b). 
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As a result of the construction of this statutory power to stop and search, a question arises 
as to what state of mind the examination officer should have when they are exercising their 
power to stop and search a suspect.  It is clear from Paragraph 7(4) of Schedule 7 of the TA 
2000 that the examination officer does not have to form any reasonable suspicion that their 
suspect falls within section 40(1)(b) of the TA 2000.  Paragraph 7(2)(1) of Schedule 7 of the 
TA 2000 makes it clear that the purpose of the power is to allow an examining officer to 
“determine whether [the suspect] appears to be “involved in the commission, preparation or 
instigation of acts of terrorism”.   
 
In common with the other statutory provisions on the power to stop and search, there is also 
a ‘Code of Practice for Examining Officers’ that offers guidance on how this power to stop 
and search in Schedule 7 should be applied.29  In a similar way to the other Code, this Code 
expresses that a law enforcement officer should “make every reasonable effort to exercise 
the power in such a way as to minimise causing embarrassment or offence to a person who 
is being questioned”.  Furthermore, any exercise of the power must be “used proportionately, 
reasonably, with respect and without unlawful discrimination”.  Additionally, the decision 
to stop and search a suspect by an examining officer must not be “solely based on their 
perceived ethnic background or religion and a person’s perceived ethnic background or 
religion must not be used alone or in combination with each other as the sole reason for 
selecting the person for examination”. 
 
																																																								
29 Home Office, Examining Officers under the Terrorism Act 2000: Code of Practice (Home Office, 2009).  
Please note the Code has been reviewed and updated in 2015 with the Home Office, Examining Officers and 
Review Officers under Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000: Code of Practice (Home Office, 2016). 
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As a result of the 2015 review of the Code, there are a number of express factors listed that 
law enforcement officers may take into account when deciding whether to exercise a stop 
and search of a suspect.  These include  
§ “known and suspected sources of terrorism,  
§ individuals or groups whose current or past involvement in acts or threats 
of terrorism is known or suspected, and supporters or sponsors of such 
activity who are known or suspected,  
§ any information on the origins and/or location of terrorist groups,  
§ possible current, emerging and future terrorist activity, the means of 
travel (and documentation) that a group or individuals involved in 
terrorist activity could use emerging local trends or patterns of travel 
through specific ports or in the wider vicinity that may be linked to 
terrorist activity, 
§ [and] observation of an individual’s behaviour.”30   
 
These factors are not an exhaustive list, but they do provide a degree of insight into the types 
of information/criteria the law enforcement officer may be relying upon when deciding to 
exercise the power to stop and search.  Despite these reforms, as a result of the construction 
of the Code supposedly designed to offer examining officers guidance on how to use this 
power, the Code offers only guidance in the negative by outlining the ways in which the 
power cannot be exercised.  It is contended that this is not sufficient as it does not provide 
positive guidance in comparable terms with the guidance offered in manifestations of formal 
profiling already considered in chapter three.   
 
The construction of this statutory power to stop and search suggests that considerable 
discretion is given to the examining officer as to how to exercise a stop and search.  The 
problem with this is not the existence of discretion but rather whether there are any controls 
on the exercise of that discretion.  The lack of oversight on the exercise of this discretion 
																																																								
30 ibid, 19.  This reform of the Code were developed in response to Beghal v DPP [2015] EWHC 2573 
decision, which is discussed below. 
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may suggest that there is unlikely any formalised process available to the examining officer 
when they are deciding to exercise a stop and search under this statutory provision. 
 
There has been only one significant case of note, Beghal v DPP,31 which provides some 
insight on the likely existence of a process around the decision to exercise a stop and search. 
In Beghal the High Court confirmed that “the very purpose [of this power] is to ascertain 
whether the [suspect] so appeared” to be a terrorist.  The Supreme Court accepted that the 
use of the power to stop and search may involve “[s]ome degree of profiling of potential 
suspects for questioning …” but the requirement that the use of the power should only be 
exercised by drawing on “sources of [a] terrorist threat” and the requirement that ethnicity 
and religion should either together or separately should be a sole criterion was a sufficient 
basis to safeguard against the unlawful use of this power.  The problem with this acceptance 
is that there is no demonstrable process in comparable terms with the systematic processes 
already considered in manifestations of formal terrorist profiling with this type of profiling.  
Although, the reform of the Code of Practice, which was adopted in response to the problem 
exposed by this case, may be perceived as progress towards assisting law enforcement 
officers make better use of their powers in practice, a fundamental weakness is the Code still 
does not institute a process comparable with the manifestations of formal profiling in chapter 
three. 
 
As a result, the case law on the use of this power to stop and search has not been helpful to 
clarify the types of factors or characteristics that examining officers could rely on to justify 
their decision to stop and search.  This may suggest that the process is not as systematic in 
																																																								
31 [2015] EWHC 2573. 
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controlling the types of data and characteristics to be used as part of a profiling process in 
contrast to those manifestations of formal profiling already considered in chapter three. 
 
It is contended that the statutory framework advancing the power to stop and search under 
Schedule 7 of the TA 2000 is unlikely to have a sufficiently formalised process to control 
the data input at the point at which an examining officer is deciding to exercise their power 
to stop and search. Further, even if the Code provides a limited basis to control the types of 
data that an examining officer can take into account, there does not appear to be any process 
to control the use of this data in terms of the influence each data set can have on an examining 
officer’s decision comparable with manifestations of formal terrorist profiling in considered 
in chapter three. 
 
(iii) Summary 
In light of the discussion on the British counterterrorism statutory framework advancing the 
power to stop and search, it is contended that there is highly probability this statutory 
framework may have created a profiling process that is informal in contrast to those 
manifestations of profiling already discussed in previous chapters.  The discussion above 
identifies that the construction of the power to stop and search with and without reasonable 
suspicion creates a process for law enforcement officers to engage in selecting individuals 
and/or vehicles for their stop and search.   
 
Although, the exercise of this power is supported with Codes of Practice, the use of these 
Codes are not legally mandated requirements and can only be considered at best ‘guidance’ 
that law enforcement officers should follow.  As a result, it is difficult to discern the factors 
that may influence a law enforcement officer in their exercise of a stop and search and the 
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types of data actually used by individual officers exercising a stop and search.  Further, it 
does not appear that the construction of the power that there is no systematic process to 
control the usage of the permitted information/criteria in comparable terms with those 
formal manifestations of terrorist profiling examined in chapter three.  Consequently, it is 
argued that the lack of a process around the types of permitted information/criteria and the 
control on the use of this information/criteria falls far short of the processes evident in 
manifestations of formal terrorist profiling. 
 
5.2.2 The Use of Stop and Search Power by Law Enforcement Officers in England 
and Wales 
It is argued that the available evidence on the use of the power to stop and search by law 
enforcement officers in combination with the previous discussion on the construction of the 
counterterrorism stop and search powers, may be considered as showing that some uses of 
this power could be classified as being examples of informal manifestations of terrorist 
profiling.  This argument rests on the contention that there are at two key sources that assist 
in identifying some uses of the power to stop and search as being an example of informal 
terrorist profiling.   
 
Firstly, the statistics on the use of the power to stop and search by law enforcement officers 
reveals the frequency of this policing mechanism and further who has been the subject of 
stop and search powers.  It is contended that these statistics reveal that this power appears 
to be increasingly and frequently deployed in a manner that focuses on particular ethnic 
minorities without any discernible explanation for why this is happening other than that 
some form profiling is at play. However since we know that the Code of Practice says this 
should not happen/is not permitted, it is clear that it is "informal" in the sense that it lacks 
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any official basis, and is not "systematic", and bureacratized in the way in which those 
"formal" profiling systems examined in chapter three were explained. 
 
Secondly, there are a number of studies on people’s experiences of police powers that seem 
to support the statistical evidence that particular ethnicities are a focal point for suspicion 
without any objective justification. 
 
The continual growth in the disparity rate (discussed below) may be taken as evidence of a 
very strong likelihood that a weak process, if any, exists around the use of stop and search 
powers which may be accurately considered tantamount to an imprint of a profiling process, 
that falls far short of the types of profiling processes adopted in more formalised 
manifestations of profiling considered in chapter three. 
 
(i) The Statistical Evidence on the Use of Stop and Search 
From the perspective of profiling, an important aspect of the examination of the exercise of 
stop and search is to consider who has been the subject of suspicion by law enforcement 
officers.  This focus will allow us to identify the types of factors that may be influencing 
law enforcement officers in their selection of their suspects for stop and search as the basis 
to question the existence of a profiling process in comparable terms with the profiling 
processes discussed in chapter three. 
 
   (A) Limitations of the Available Statistical Evidence 
Before considering the disparities evident in those being stopped and searched in England 
and Wales, it is accepted that there are at least four limitations of the statistics.   
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Firstly, the vast majority of those subjected to terrorism stop and search power was located 
in London which has a greater diversity of ethnicity.32  As a result, it can be accepted that 
using stop and search powers in London is likely to involve stopping and searching a greater 
degree of individuals from a diverse range of ethnicities that is capable of impacting the 
recorded stop and searches.   Further, in research conducted by Fitzgerald and Sibbit, it was 
found that law enforcement officers were more likely to record stop and searches of non-
white ethnicities in contrast to the stop and searches of white ethnicities.33  The reason for 
this appeared to be due to a fear held by law enforcement officers that non-whites were more 
likely to complain and individual law enforcement officers sought to demonstrate they had 
followed procedure with non-white ethnicities.34  
 
Secondly, a further concern is that prior to the 1st April 2005 the ethnicity of those subjected 
to a stop and search was identified and recorded by individual law enforcement officers.35  
This creates the problem as to whether law enforcement officers were accurately equipped 
to consistently identify ethnicity as it is accepted that the identification of ethnicity is a 
sensitive and complex issue that is not always discernable visually.36  Further, the recording 
requirement for stop and search breaks down ethnicity according to four different types 
which is primarily based on ethnic appearance: White, Black, Asian and other.   
“White is recorded as representing white British, white Irish and other White 
individuals.  Black is recorded as being black Caribbean, black African and 
mixed white and black African.  Other is recorded as being ‘Chinese, other 
mixed and ‘other other’”.37   
 
																																																								
32 P. Waddington, K. Stenson and D. Don, ‘In proportion: race and police stop and search’ (2004) 44 British 
Journal of Criminology 889, 889-891. 
33 M. Fitzgerald and R. Sibbitt, Ethnic Monitoring in Police Forces: A Beginning (Home Office, 1997), 96-97. 
34 ibid. 
35 R. Delsol and M. Shiner, ‘Regulating stop and search: a challenge for police and community relations in 
England and Wales’ (2006) 14 Critical Criminology 241, 249-255. 
36 M. Banton, The International Politics of Race (Polity Press, 2002), 7-15. 
37 Equality and Human Rights Commission, Stop and Think: A Critical Review of the use of Stop and Search 
Powers in England and Wales (EHRC, 2015), 23. 
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The recording of ethnicities in this manner has been criticised by some, such as Rowe, on 
the basis that they do not always accurately reflect the actual ethnicity of those subjected to 
a stop and search.38 Specifically, Rowe contends that ‘white’ is being used an “omnibus 
category” that fails to appreciate different white ethnicities and that “Asian conflates sub-
groups that have sharply contrasting socio-economic profiles.”39  As a result, the recording 
of stop and search according to four discernable ethnicities may be considered as being 
exceptionally narrow and may not always be capable of recording accurately those 
ethnicities subjected to a stop and search. 
 
Thirdly, there are some concerns related to police recording of stop and search data where 
law enforcement officers sometimes either fail to record the occurrence of a stop and search 
or they fail to adopt a systematic and coherent approach to recording data.  For example, in 
a study conducted by the Home Office by Fitzgearld and Sibbit, it would found that police 
are not always systematic in their recording of stop and search data.40  Further, it was 
identified by Bland et al who observed 138 stop and searches that should have been recorded 
but found that only 37 of these stop and searches were actually recorded.41 Additionally, the 




38 M. Rowe, Introduction to Policing (Sage Publishing, 2018), 151-152.  
39 ibid, 152. 
40 M. Fitzgerald and R. Sibbitt, Ethnic Monitoring in Police Forces: A Beginning (Home Office, 1997), 62-65.  
See also: M. Fitzgerald, Report into Stop and Search (Metropolitan Police Service, 1999) and S. 
Choongh,‘Policing the Dross: A Social Disciplinary Model of Policing’ (1998) 38 British Journal of 
Criminology 623. 
41 J. Miller, N. Bland, and P. Quinton, Upping the PACE? An evaluation of the recommendations of the Stephen 
Lawrence Inquiry on stops and searches (Home Office, 2000), vii-viii. 
42 W. Macpherson, The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, Report of an Inquiry by Sir William Macpherson of Cluny 
(Home Office, 1999), Recommendation 61. 
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Fourthly, the application of the disproportionality test focuses on identifying any disparities 
between those who were actually stopped and searched purely on the basis of ethnicity 
against a majority ethnicity attributed to the general population.43  As this is a test that 
focuses on disparities between racial majorities and racial minorities, it may be argued that 
it fails to take into account the ethnicity of the population that is actually available to be 
stopped and searched.  It may be argued that some ethnicities have a higher availability rate 
than others due to lifestyle whilst other ethnicities may have a lower availability rate.44  This 
may impact the validity of any disparities identified.  There have been some studies 
conducted by the Home Office45 and Waddington et al46 that have sought to explore the 
impact of identifying disparities between the general versus the available population. These 
studies have tended to show there is a potential disparity between the available population 
and the general population, but that disparity is not sufficient to invalidate the conclusions 
drawn on any identified disparities based on a comparison between general majority 
population against minority population stopped and searched.  Consequently, this is a factor 
that should be kept in mind as a limiting factor but not an invalidating factor. 
 
Despite these limitations, it is argued that given the evidence of disparity considered below 
there remains considerable evidence to support the contention that law enforcement officers 
appear in some instances to using their stop and search power to identify likely suspects for 
questioning/screening in a manner that may be classifiable as being ad-hoc and likely to lack 
a process similar to those manifestations of profiling considered in chapter three. 
 
																																																								
43 Bowling and Phillips (n5), 945-946. 
44 M. Fitzgearld and R. Sibbit, Ethnic Monitoring in Police Forces: A Beginning (Home Office, 1997), 63-64. 
45 For example: ibid,  MVA and J. Miller, Profiling for Stops and Searches (Home Office, 2000), 84. 
46 P. Waddington, K. Stenson and D. Don, ‘In Proportion: Race and Police Stop and Search’ (2004) 44 British 
Journal of Criminology 889. 
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In following the analytical approach adopted in the previous section, the discussion will now 
examine law enforcement officer use of the counterterrorism powers to stop and search by 
reference to those requiring and not requiring reasonable suspicion. 
 
   (B) Stop and Search Requiring Reasonable Suspicion 
The information published by the Home Office on law enforcement officer use of section 
43 of the TA 2000 for England and Wales is obscured by combining the statistics on the 
exercise of other stop and search powers requiring reasonable suspicion.  As a result, it is 
not possible to solely examine the use made by law enforcement officers of section 43 of 
the TA 2000 in England and Wales.  It is noted that every police force in England and Wales 
collects and records information of its use of section 43 of the TA 2000 but this information 
is not shared publically. The failure to publish statistics of law enforcement officer use of 
section 43 of the TA 2000 has been criticised previously by the independent reviewer of 
terrorism legislation but the situation has continued.47  Nevertheless, there is information 
published on the use of section 43 of the TA 2000 in respect of the London Metropolitan 
Police Service (MPS).  Therefore, the discussion will concentrate on this published 








47 D. Anderson, The Terrorism Acts in 2015 Report of the Independent Reviewer on the Operation of the 
Terrorism Act 2000 and Part 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006 (Home Office, 2015), para 6.2 
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Table 5.1 Stop and Search Statistics Requiring Reasonable Suspicion under Section 43 of the 
Terrorism Act for the London Metropolitan Police Service 48 
 
Table 5.1 reveals that over the course of the last 
decade there has been a general theme where 
section 43 of the TA 2000 has been in decline.  In 
2009/2010, there was a 23% reduction from a high 
of 1,601 stop and searches in 2008/2009.  Further, 
in the years 2011-2012 and 2012-2013 there were 
continual reductions in the use of the power 
equating to an annual reduction of 29%.  Most 
recently in 2017/2018, there has been a significant 
increase in the use of the power rising to 768 stop and searches which constitutes a rise of 
70% from the previous year of 453 stop and searches.  Table 5.2 (below) also provides a 
greater insight into who has been the subject of these stop and searches.  Specifically, Table 
5.2 reveals that raw data by reference to the ethnicity breakdown of those stopped and 
searched by the MPS. This can be considered more significant from a profiling perspective 








48 Please note that these statistics refer to section 43 of the TA 2000 which are solely reported in respect of 
the London Metropolitan Police Service.  This information has been collated from: Home Office, Operation 
of Police Powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and Subsequent Legislation: Arrests, Outcomes and Stops & 
Searches, financial year ending March 2018 (Home Office, 2018), 20-21. 
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Table 5.2 Ethnicity Breakdown of the use of Stop and Search Requiring Reasonable 




Figure 5.1 Ethnicity Breakdown of Stop and Search under Section 43 of the Terrorism Act 
2000 for the London Metropolitan Police Service50 
 
In order to understand make sense of 
this data, Figure 5.1 reveals that in 
respect of the year 2015 those 
individuals recorded as being ‘Black’ 
were 2.0 times more likely to be 
stopped and searched in contrast to 
those recorded as being ‘White’. 
Figure 5.1 also reveals that those recorded as being Asian were 2.8 times and Chinese or 
‘Other’ were 3.9 times more likely to be stopped and searched than those recorded as being 
																																																								
49 These statistics relate specifically to section 43 of the TA 2000 which are solely reported in respect of the 
London Metropolitan Police Service.  This information has been collated from: Home Office, Operation of 
Police Powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and Subsequent Legislation: Arrests, Outcomes and Stops & 
Searches, financial year ending March 2018 (Home Office, 2018), 20-21. 
50 This Figure is based on the year ending 2015 with evidence published in: Home Office, Operation of 
Police Powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and Subsequent Legislation: Arrests, Outcomes and Stops & 
Searches, financial year ending March 2018 (Home Office, 2015).  The calculation of the disproportionality 
ratio is conducted using the same method explained in the previous section.  It is published at: 
https://www.faith-matters.org/2016/05/18/numbers-counter-terrorism-powers-disproportionately-affect-
ethnic-religious-minorities-britain/ (accessed 01st June 2018). 
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‘White’.  This reveals quite a significant disproportionality ratio between those individuals 
recorded as being ‘White’ versus those recorded as other ethnic minorities.  We will return 
to consider the potential significance of these disparities of these stop and searches below. 
 
 (C) Stop and Search Not Requiring Reasonable Suspicion 
In conducting the examination of the use of section 47A of the TA 2000, the focus here on 
firstly examining the fluctuations in the use of suspicionless stop and search power before 
secondly examining the disparities between those stopped and searched, and those who tend 
not to be stopped and searched.  This approach involves applying a disproportionality test 
ratio, which engages in a simple comparison between the likelihood of racial minorities 
being subjected to stop and search powers versus the likelihood of racial majorities being 
stopped and searched.51  This comparison is conducted on the basis of identifying any 
disparities between ethnic and racial minority population against the majority population as 
determined by national census.  The disparity between ethnicities in terms of those being 
subjected to stop and search provides an insight into who may have been the primary focus 
of law enforcement officers decision in terms of identifying and selecting ‘suspects’ in 









51 B. Harcourt, ‘Rethinking Racial Profiling: A Critique of the Economics, Civil Liberties, and Constitutional 
Literature, and of Criminal Profiling More Generally’ (2004) 71(4) The University of Chicago Law Review 
1329, 1330. 
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Table 5.3 Stop and Search Statistics Not Requiring Reasonable Suspicion under section 
47A and previously section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 for England and Wales 52 
 
 
Table 5.3 reveals that there were 10,200 stop 
and searches under section 44 of the TA 2000 
which rose to all time high in 2008-2009 to 
210,013 before continuing to fall to zero in 
2014-2015.   Table 5.3 also reveals that in the 
years after the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks in the US and in particular the years 
after the 2005 London Bombings, the use of 
stop and search grew significantly. 
 
The high usage of suspicionless stop and 
search powers can be considered as being 
particularly controversial.  For example, the 
former ‘Independent Review of Terrorism 
Legislation’ from 2001 to 2011, Lord Carlile, 
was often vocal about the growth rate of stop and search conducted under section the now 
obsolete section 44 of the TA 2000.53  In 2009 Lord Carlile commented “[i]f there is a single 
issue that can be identified as giving rise to most assertions of excessive and 
disproportionate police action, it is the use of section 44” of the TA 2000.54  In 2009, Lord 
																																																								
52 The figures quoted in this table relate to the published information on the use of section 44 of the TA 2000 
and subsequently section 47A of the TA 2000.  This table is taken in part from A. Sanders, R. Young and M. 
Burton, Criminal Justice (Oxford University Press, 2010), 76.  It has been updated by reference to information 
published in: Home Office, Operation of Police Powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and Subsequent 
Legislation: Arrests, Outcomes and Stops & Searches, financial year ending March 2018 (Home Office, 2018), 
5. 
53 Lord Carlile, Report on the Operation in 2006 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (HMSO, 2007), paras 113-114. 
54 Lord Carlile, Report on the Operation in 2008 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (HMSO, 2009), 42. 
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Carlile was specifically concerned that suspicionless stop and search powers were being 
used in a manner outside of their statutory intention.  For example, Lord Carlile commented 
that  
“[t]he alarming numbers of usages of the power (between 8,000 and 10,000 
stops per month as we enter 2009) represent bad news, and I hope for better 
in a year’s time.  The figures, and a little analysis of them, show that section 
44 is being used as an instrument to aid non-terrorism policing on some 
occasions, and this is unacceptable”.55 
 
The United Nations Human Rights Committee	also added its concerns about the use of the 
powers to stop and search by calling for its scope to be urgently reviewed 56     
 
Additionally, non-governmental organisations such as Justice57 and Watch58 also noted their 
concerns of the use of terrorism stop and search powers by law enforcement officers. The 
“Joint Committee on Human Rights” (JCHR) also expressed grave concerns about the 
statistical evidence demonstrating the use of terrorism stop and search powers by law 
enforcement officers.59  The JCHR ultimately concluded “counterterrorism powers should 
not be used against peaceful protestors”. 60  Finally, the ‘Metropolitan Police Authority’ also 
expressed concerns with the use of stop and search powers.61 
 
A further concern beyond the use of the suspicionless stop and search power relates to whom 
this power was used to target.  This concern relates to the similar issue with reasonable 
																																																								
55 ibid, para 147. 
56 UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UN, 2008), para 28. 
57 Justice, Stop and Search Under the Terrorism Act 2000 (Justice, 2012). 
58 Human Rights Watch, Without Suspicion (Human Rights Watch, 2010), 41-47. 
59 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Demonstrating Respect for Rights? A Human Rights Approach to 
Policing Protest (HMSO, 2009), 88-99. 
60 ibid. 
61 Metropolitan Police Authority, Counterterrorism: The London Debate (MPA, 2007), 51-52.  
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suspicion stop and search powers where there is a continual subjection of particular ethnic 
minorities to stop and search without any apparent justification.   
 
Figure 5.2 Ethnicity Breakdown of Stop and Search under Section 44 of the 
Terrorism Act 2000 in England and Wales.62 
 
Figure 5.2 reveals that 
between 2002 and 2011 
there was a significant 
disparity between those 
stop and searched who 
are recorded as being 
White and those being 
recorded as being Black 
or Asian.  The extent of 
the disparity is 
highlighted in Table 5.4 
(below) focuses on the ethnicity breakdown of 2008/2009 and 2009/2010 as the basis to 
highlight the disparity between minority ethnicities versus the majority ethnicity during a 
peak period in the usage of stop and search under section 44 of the TA 2000.  Additionally, 
the Ministry of Justice from 2007/2008 provided a more detailed breakdown of the recorded 




62 This figure is taken from: T. Quinlan and Z. Derfoufi, ‘Counter-Terrorism Policing’ in R. Desol and M. 
Shiner, Stop and Search: The Anatomy of a Police Power (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 134. 
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Table 5.4 Stop and Search Not Requiring Reasonable Suspicion under Section 44 of 
the Terrorism Act 2000 in England and Wales 63 
 
 
Table 5.4 highlights that at the peak of the use of stop and search in 2008/2009 those 
recorded as being White were stopped and searched at a rate of 2.6 per 1,000 head of 
population, whereas it was 7.8 for Asians and 10.3 for those recorded as being Black.  This 
meant that those recorded as being Asian were stopped and searched 3.0 times more than 
their White counterparts.  Similarly, those recorded as being Black were 3.9 times more 
likely to be stopped and searched than their White counterparts.  Of particular interest in 
																																																								
63 This table is replicated from Quinlan and Derfoufi (n62), 136.  Please note that this follows the same 
approach as previously quoted material.  The disproportionate ratio is calculated by dividing the minority 
ethnicity by the majority White ethnicity so as to work out how many more times the minority ethnicity is 
stopped and searched in comparison to the White ethnicity.  The figures used are those published by the 
Minister of Justice in 2010 and the official census figures used to determine majority ethnicity is the 2011 
national census. 
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Table 5.4 is the breakdown within each ethnicity of who was stopped and searched.  
Remember, the focus here is to demonstrate the likelihood of an absence of a systematic 
process in comparable terms with those formal manifestations of profiling in chapter three.   
 
Table 5.4 reveals that “there is a general Asian effect”, as classified by Quinlan and Derfoufi, 
on the basis that those classified as being Asian are significantly “more likely to be stopped 
and searched than their White counterparts”.64  However, the higher rates of those recorded 
as being Bangladeshi in contrast to Indian or Pakistani may be explained in part due to where 
these populations live.  For instance, Heath and Martin identify that Bangladeshi ethnicities 
tend to live in London whilst other Asian ethnicities such as Pakistani tend to live outside 
of London.65  This is similar to those recorded as being Black where those recorded as being 
Black Caribbean or Black Other as being stopped and searched to a higher degree than those 
recorded as being Black African.   On the basis of these statistics, it may be argued they 
reveal a strong likelihood that the decision to stop and search does not occur in a process 
comparable to those formal manifestations of formal profiling.   
 
Other suspicionless stop and search powers examined in the previous section were those 
powers contained in Schedule 7 of the TA 2000.  Although, the use of Schedule 7 powers 
has not been given the same level of focus in the media, the use of these powers shows a 
similar trend to the use of section 44 of the TA 2000.  Table 5.5 (below) reveals a similar 
trend in respect of other suspicionless stop and search powers where there is a general 
decline in the use of these powers by law enforcement officers.  Specifically, Table 5.5 
reveals that there was a high of 85,557 stop and searches in 2009/2010 to a gradual decline 
																																																								
64 Quinlan and Derfoufi (n62), 138-139. 
65 A. Heath and J. Martin, ‘Can Religious Affiliation Explain ‘Ethnic’ Inequalities in the Labour Market’ 
(2013) 36(6) Ethnic and Racial Studies 1005. 
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to 31,769 in 2014/2015.  However, in the years of high usage of stop and search such as 
2009/2010.  















Total 2009/10 82,870 2,687 85,557 486 
2010/11 63,396 2,288 65,684 913 
2011/12 61,662 2,240 63,902 680 
2012/13 53,992 2,265 56,257 667 
2013/14 42,231 1,887 44,118 517 
2014/15 29,871 1,898 31,769 1311 
2015/16 21,996 
 
1,723 23,719 1,649 
2016/17 16,022 1,479 17,501 1,522 
 
Lord Carlile also criticised the use of these powers.  For instance, Lord Carlile in 2010 
concluded, “the number of random or intuitive stop and searches could be reduced 
considerably” without impacting the purpose of the power.67    Further other reviewers of 
terrorism laws, such as Anderson also identified concerns about the exercise of this power 
to stop and search by specific questioning whether the wide construction of the power could 
be considered “necessary and subject to sufficient safeguards.”68 
 
The ethnicity breakdown of these powers was not publically available until 2011 and reveals 
a similar trend to the other stop and search powers already examined in this chapter.  
																																																								
66 This table is from: Z. Derfoufi, The Impact of Elected Police and Crime Commissioners in England and 
Wales on Police-Black and Ethnic Minority Community Relations, with Specific Reference to Stop and 
Search (University of Warwick, 2016), 147.  The table has been updated by reference to: 
67 Lord Carlile, Report on the Operation in 2009 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and Part 1 of the Terrorism Act 
2006 (Home Office, 2010), para 192. 
68 D. Anderson, Report on the Operation in 2010 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and Part 1 of the Terrorism Act 
2006 (Home Office, 2011), para 7. 
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However, the disproportionality ratio cannot be utilised here given that there is no collected 
data on the total number of different ethnicities passing through ports and airports to allow 
a figure to be identified on the 1,000 per head of population. 
 
Nevertheless, the figures do reveal a similar trend where consistently growing use of the 
power on Black and Asian ethnicities.  This concern was highlighted by Anderson in 2013 
where he concluded, “it is overwhelmingly likely” the application of these powers was being 
utilised against particular ethnicities, such as Asian ethnicities, which is disproportionately 
higher than in contrast to individuals of White ethnicity.  For instance, Table 5.6 (below) 
shows that in 2009/2010 7% of all examinations were of Black ethnicity which grew to 9% 
by 2014/2015.  Additionally, Table 5.6 highlights that those of Black ethnicity were detained 
rising to 13% in 2014-/2015.  Similarly, those of Asian ethnicity comprised 25% of all stop 
and searches in 2009/2010 which rose to 27% in 2014/2015.  Further, those of Asian 
ethnicity comprised 44% of those detained in 2009/2010, which also maintained its level at 
39% in 2014/2015.  
 










Other 2009/10 44 7 25 2 20 
2010/11 41 9 30 3 17 
2011/12 43 9 28 3 18 
2012/13 42 10 25 4 19 
2013/14 45 9 22 5 18 
2014/15 36 9 27 7 22 
2015/16 25 7 30 4 24 
2016/17 29 8 28 4 20 
 
																																																								
69  This table is taken from: Derfoufi (n66). 
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(C) Evaluation of the Statistics  
In light of the discussion in the previous section, it is now pertinent to evaluate the likelihood 
that stop and search in some instances may be considered as being tantamount as being an 
example of informal profiling. 
 
The argument that some uses of the power to stop and search can be classified as being an 
example of informal profiling rests on two central planks.   
 
Firstly, stop and search is not recognised either in the construction or application of the 
power as being a form of profiling.  The discussion in this thesis argues that given stop and 
search is not recognised as a profiling tool but yet the whole basis of the power is about 
making selections about individual suspects by law enforcement officers is a key indicator 
that some uses of the power to stop and search is very likely about profiling. 
 
Secondly, on the basis of the discussion in the previous section, it seems very unlikely that 
there is any formalised process in comparable terms with those processes of the 
manifestations of formal profiling examined in chapter three.  This is based on the fact that 
significantly higher levels of minority ethnicities were continually subjected to stop and 
search without any discernable justification in contrast to the White majority ethnicity.  This 
would stand in complete contrast to the iterative processes inherently part of manifestations 
of formal profiling examined in chapter three where profiling is meant to be perfected over 
time.  The evidence on the high levels of disparity questions the reason as to why individuals 
who are recorded as being Black or Asian are significantly more likely to be stopped and 
searched in contrast to individuals recorded as being White.  From the perspective of 
profiling, the obvious starting point is to focus on the decision-making process that 
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individual law enforcement officers go through whilst making their decision to exercise the 
power to stop and search.   
 
There are at least two arguments that are frequently drawn upon to explain the 
disproportionality ratio evident in the use of stop and search that seeks to avoid evidencing 
a deficient decision-making process on the part of law enforcement officers.70 
 
There is the controversial argument that individuals from Black ethnicities are more likely 
to be engaged in very types of crimes subject to law enforcement officer attention.71  This 
argument may be supported by the fact that arrest rates tend to demonstrate a higher 
proportion of Black ethnicities in contrast to White ethnicities.72  However, this is a hotly 
contested issue where some, such as Smith, contending that higher arrest rates amongst 
Black ethnicities is simply due to a greater focus on Black communities by law enforcement 
officers in contrast to White communities.73  Further, in research conducted by Bowling and 
Phillips74 and May et al75 has consistently found that higher offending rates amongst Black 
communities is very likely due to potential bias in law enforcement officer decision-making. 
Other studies, such as Thornberry and Krohn, suggest that a better way to analyse 
disproportionality in law enforcement was to rely on research self-studies as they were more 
likely to produce an accurate understanding of higher levels of racial disparity in the 
																																																								
70 M. Shiner and R. Desol, ‘The Politics of the Powers’ in R Delsol and M. Shiner, Stop and Search: The 
Anatomy of a Police Power (Springer Publishing, 2015), 52. 
71 ibid. 
72 R. Reiner, The Politics of the Police (Wheatsheaf, 1985), 33-34. 
73 D. Smith, ‘Ethnic Origins, Crime, Criminal Justice in England and Wales (1997) 21 Ethnicity, Crime and 
Immigration: Comparative and Cross-National Perspectives 101, 105-109. 
74 Bowling and Phillips (n5), 940-941. 
75 T. May, T. Gyateng and M. Hough, Differential Treatment in the Youth Justice System  (Equality and Human 
Rights Commission, 2010), 21-29. 
	 238	
application of law than official arrest rates.76  In a sequence of studies complied by Graham 
and Bowling,77 Flood-Page et al78 and Sharp and Budd79 found that individuals from Black 
ethnicities were either less likely than or comparably similar to White ethnicities to engage 
in criminality.  As a result, it may be argued that any suggestion that individuals from Black 
ethnicities are more likely to be predisposed to committing crime to justify individual law 
enforcement officers selecting them for stop and search appear unfounded. 
 
A further argument advanced to defend the higher disproportionate stopping and searching 
of Black ethnicities is due to the available population argument.  This argument contends 
that the higher levels of stop and search of Black ethnicities can be explained by reference 
to the fact there is likely to be greater levels of Black ethnicities available in areas where 
stop and search is more likely to be carried out by law enforcement officer.  According to 
Shiner and Delsol there is little the evidence to challenge this argument.80  For example, in 
studies conducted by MVA and Miller81 and Waddington et al82 it was found that in a 
selection of areas where stop and search was frequently deployed, there was a higher 
proportion of Black ethnicities available in contrast to White ethnicities.  However, both of 
these studies can be challenged.  For instance, Sanders and Young argue that MVA and 
Miller’s study may be distorted given the fact that it was carried out just after the Lawrence 
Inquiry had published their findings when the use of stop and search was relatively low.83  
																																																								
76 T. Thornberry and M. Krohn, ‘The Self-Report Method for Measuring Delinquency and Crime’ in D. 
Duggee, R. Crutchfield, S. Mastrofski, L. Mazerolle, D. McDowall and B. Ostrom (eds) Innovations in 
Measurement and Analysis (National Institute of Justice, 2000), 33-36. 
77 J. Graham and B. Bowling, Young People and Crime (Home Office, 1995). 
78 C. Flood-Page, S. Campbell, V. Harrington and J. Miller, Youth Crime: Findings from the 1998/1999 Youth 
Lifestyles Survey  (Home Office, 2000). 
79 C. Sharpe and T. Budd, Minority Ethnic Groups and Crime: Findings from the Offending, Crime and Justice 
Survey 2003 (Home Office, 2005). 
80 Shiner and Delsol (n70), 53. 
81 MVA and J. Miller, Profiling Populations Available for Stops and Searches (Home Office, 2000). 
82 P. Waddington, K. Stenson and D. Don, ‘In Proportion: Race and Police Stop and Search’ (2004) 44(6) 
British Journal of Criminology 889, 891-893 
83 Sanders (n8), 84. 
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Nevertheless, it still does not provide a solid explanation as to why so many more Black and 
Asian ethnicities are stopped and searched in comparison to White ethnicities.84 
 
As a result, the question comes back as to why law enforcement officers are engaged in 
stopping and searching Black and Asian ethnicities at a significantly higher rate in 
comparison to White ethnicities.  In other studies conducted on examining police officer 
experiences of stop and search, such as HMIC85 and Shiner,86 it was found that ‘race’ is a 
prominent feature in the decision-making process of some individual law enforcement 
officers.  This may suggest that in some instances the power to stop and search is clouded 
by visible characteristics over anything connected to the likelihood of the suspect being 
engaged in crime or terrorism.  Although there is some attempt in stop and search powers to 
control the influence of race and ethnicity, it is contended that these attempts fall far short 
of the standards expected in manifestations of formal profiling examined in chapter three. 
 
The purpose of this discussion is not make the argument that every use of the stop and search 
power can be considered a form of informal profiling, rather the argument is that given the 
continual subjection of particular ethnicities to stop and search without any discernable 
justification, it seems to a high degree of probability that there is either at worst no process 
or at best a minimal/limited process at play when law enforcement officers are deciding to 




84 Shiner and Delsol (n70), 55. 
85  Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC), Winning the Race (Revisited): Policing Plural 
Communities (Home Office, 1999). 
86  M. Shiner, ‘Post-Lawrence Policing in England and Wales: Guilt, Innocence and the Defence of 
Organisational Ego’ (2010) 50(5) British Journal of Criminology 935, 940-941. 
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(ii) People’s Experiences of Stop and Search in England and Wales 
Beyond the construction and application of the power to stop and search, there have been at 
least four studies that have focused on law enforcement officer usage of these powers.  Each 
of these studies will be discussed below to further demonstrate that the construction and use 
of stop and search in England and Wales has long had concerns about the lack of a process 
formalising the construction of the power in addition to law enforcement use of the power. 
 
Firstly, the Open Society Institute (OSI) have found branded the “use of stop and search 
powers as a form of ethnic profiling” where the consistent disproportionate use of the power 
to stop and search against those individuals recorded as being Black and Asian ethnicities 
in contrast to those recorded as being White.87   The continual disproportionate use of the 
power to stop and search over a sustained period of time led the OSI to conclude that the 
“stop-and-search practices have targeted persons perceived to be Muslim” without any 
discernable justification.88 
 
Secondly, according to Miller that attempts to reform the stop and search power will do 
little, if anything, to deal with the disproportionate targeting of ethnicity minority 
communities thought to be engaged in terrorism or preparatory activities.89  This suggests 
that the reforms related to the construction of the power to stop and search may do little to 
alleviate the focus of suspicion on particular ethnicities.  Although in recent years there has 
been zero uses of the counterterrorism power to stop and search, it seems plausible to suggest 
that when this power is used more frequently in the future there will likely continue to be a 
																																																								
87 Open Society Institute, Ethnic Profiling in the European Union: Pervasive, Ineffective and Discriminatory 
(OSI, 2009), 116-119. 
88 ibid, 60. 
89 J. Miller, ‘Stop and Search in England: A Reformed Tactic or Business as Usual’ (2010) 50(5) British 
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disproportionate focus on particular ethnicities which may in part be attributable to a 
deficient process regulating the use of the power in practice. 
 
Thirdly, according to Parmer the extent of the disparity in the use of the counterterrorism 
stop and search in areas such as London appear devoid of a policing function other than to 
allow for the targeting of particular ethnicities perceived as being involved in terrorism.90 
 
Fourthly, Yesufu has found that the continued use of the power to stop and search is simply 
discriminatory based on the systematic targeting of particular ethnicities such as Asian and 
Black ethnicities.91 
 
Beyond these studies, there have other additional older studies related to police uses of their 
discretionary powers under older counterterrorism laws such as the Prevention of Terrorism 
Acts was a cause for concern for the Irish communities living in Britain during the 1980s.  
For instance, Hillyard found considerable evidence that the police were effectively engaged 
in using their powers as the basis to select members of the Irish community simply because 
the threat of terrorism emanated from the Irish community due to the political violence 
coming from Northern Ireland at the time.92   
 
More recent studies undertaken by Hickman et al and previously Pantazis and Pemberto93 
suggest that there are some parallels between the experiences of the Irish communities with 
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the current experiences of the Muslim communities being the subject of focus of 
discretionary police powers because of their ethnicity.94  This had led academics, such as 
Breen-Smyth,95 to conclude that the use of police powers in England and Wales focus on 
particular ethnicities perceived as being a risk to terrorism.  It may be argued that the 
continual effect of focusing particular ethnicities creates a strong likelihood that police 
powers in some instances may be deployed in a manner that is at worst lacking any process 
to construct/apply profiles or at best a deficient process to ensure sufficient controls is placed 
on the types of data being used by law enforcement officers.  This falls far short of the 
processes evident in manifestations of formal terrorist profiling examined in chapter three. 
 
(iii) Stop and Search Powers as an Example of Informal Terrorist Profiling 
On the basis of the discussion throughout the previous sections, the argument advanced in 
this chapter is that some uses of the power to stop and search power may be considered as 
being an example of informal terrorist profiling for at least two reasons. 
 
Firstly, the evidence considered above on law enforcement officer use of stop and search 
powers would appear to suggest that the power is being deployed as a basis to identify 
individuals who are perceived as being a suspect for enhanced questioning/screening in an 
ad hoc manner based on low visibility discretion exercised by individual law enforcement 
officers.  It is the use of stop and search as the basis to identify individuals perceived as 
being suspects for enhanced levels of investigation/screening that makes this use of the 
power tantamount to a profiling method/approach/technique.  This is demonstrated 
consistently to a high degree of probability stemming from the construction of the power to 
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stop and search to the use of this power in practice to target particular ethnicities that are 
thus far unexplained by law enforcement agencies.  The studies on the people’s experiences 
of stop and search go further to reinforce the very strong likelihood that individuals from 
Asian and Black ethnicities appear to be the focal point of these powers in practice which 
would indicate or at least be the hallmarks of a profiling process likely to be without a 
systematic process comparable with those manifestations of formal terrorist profiling. 
 
Secondly,	there	is	no formal acknowledgement made by the state that some sort of profiling 
is being/may be being used as part of the ordinary range of police tools, mechanisms and 
powers as a profiling method/approach/technique in the detection, deterrence or prevention 
of crime and/or terrorism.  This is in direct contrast to the manifestations of formal terrorist 
profiling in chapter three.  For instance, the discussion in chapter three considered formal 
terrorist profiling manifestations, such as knowledge discovery processes and data mining.  
It was clear from this discussion that these formal terrorist profiling manifestations 
contained an official acknowledgement of their use as a profiling 
method/approach/technique as law enforcement officers used them to assist in the 
identification of individuals for enhanced questioning.   
 
5.3 Other Evidence Indicating Informal Terrorist Profiling 
Beyond the power to stop and search in England and Wales, there are other examples from 
the use of police powers, such as some uses of police power to arrest and detain suspects 
and powers to engage in identity checking can be used as a basis to identify the existence of 
other manifestations of informal profiling. This argument, which is expanded on below, is 
based on qualitative studies conducted in various countries such as Germany, France and 
Italy which identify a strong likelihood that some exercises of police powers is tantamount 
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to a profiling process that is not formally acknowledged by authorities as a profiling process 
and further there does not appear to be a systematic process to construct/apply profiles in 
comparable terms with those formal manifestations of terrorist profiling.  
 
There are news reports and academic qualitative studies that have focused on analysing 
people’s experience of police powers in numerous countries which suggest law enforcement 
officers may in some instances be relying on discretionary police powers as the basis to 
select individuals for enhanced screening/questioning in what appears to be outside of an 
officially acknowledged scheme of profiling and in the absence of a systematic process in 
comparable terms with those manifestations of formal profiling examined in chapters three.  
 
These qualitative studies suggest that there are at least three core uses of police powers to 
profile individuals thought or perceived to be engaged in terrorism or preparatory activities.  
These include the use of mass identity checks, the use of targeted raids by law enforcement 
officers and the use of police arrest and imprisonment powers.   It is contended that some 
uses of these police powers, as considered in the examples below, are capable of being 
classified as being a manifestation of informal profiling.   
 
This contention rests on the argument that these uses of police powers are a recognisable act 
of profiling because in each of the examples below law enforcement officers appear to use 
their powers to identify or assist in identifying individuals for enhanced levels of screening 
or questioning who they perceive as being involved in terrorism or preparatory activities.  It 
is also contended that in each of the examples considered below accurately represent an 
informal manifestation of profiling on the grounds that they are not officially acknowledged 
as being a profiling mechanism and they do not appear to have a systematic process in 
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comparable terms with those manifestations of formal terrorist profiling in chapter three and 
four.  It is also best to view this type of profiling as being a hybrid type of profiling that is 
capable of manifesting deductive and inductive elements.  Specifically, these uses of police 
powers are capable of constituting a manifestation of deductive profiling approach if law 
enforcement officers use these powers on the basis of past investigatory experience of 
specific terrorist activities to target specific individuals but equally, they may constitute 
elements inductive profiling if law enforcement officers use past investigatory experience 
and or intelligence as the basis to predict future likely characteristics of terrorists. 
 
(A) The Practice of Mass Identity Checks by Law Enforcement Officers 
A mass identity check is where law enforcement officers select individuals in ‘soft’ locations 
such as churches, train stations, shops or restaurants and compel individuals to provide their 
identity documentation so that individual officers can review the lawfulness of that 
individual’s identity documentation. 96   The purpose of these mass identity checks are 
somewhat unclear, as they do not appear to be recognised officially as a counterterrorism 
strategy.97  On the basis upon which law enforcement officers have deployed their powers 
to engage in mass identity checks, it would seem plausible to suggest that they may be using 
mass identity checks to assist in identifying individuals whom they perceive as being 
involved in terrorism or preparatory activities.  This rests on the argument that in the 
aftermath of the US terrorist attacks on the 11th September 2001 there is a growing array of 
evidence in numerous countries, which suggests that law enforcement officers are relying 
on mass identity checks as a means to manage the threat of terrorism.   
 
																																																								
96 Rosalind Williams Lecraft v Spain Comm No. 1493/2006, 30 July 2009, para 7.2. 
97 Open Society Institute (n87), 60. 
	 246	
The argument advanced in this chapter is that mass identity checks appear to be deployed 
by law enforcement officers as part of a regularised counterterrorism strategy to target those 
individuals perceived as being involved, or at risk of being involved, in terrorism so that law 
enforcement officers can enhanced levels of screening and questioning.  It is contended that 
some exercises/uses of these police powers is best considered as being a manifestation of 
informal terrorist profiling.  This contention rests on the argument that there is no official 
acknowledgement that law enforcement officers use their police powers to engage in mass 
identity checks and in contrast to the manifestations of formal terrorist profiling in chapter 
three there appears to be an absence of a systematic process to construct/apply profiles. 
 
In the immediate aftermath of the US terrorist attacks, there were widespread reports that 
German police were effectively targeting their Muslim population in direct response to the 
fact that a group commonly referred to as the ‘Hamburg Cell’ were living in Germany in the 
months prior to the US attacks who were directly involved in the planning of the US terrorist 
attacks.  For instance, according to the Open Society Institute at least 30 mosques have been 
subjected to continued identity checks that have reported concerns about police targeting.98  
The manner in which the police have conducted these checks have commonly been reported 
as being hostile where police officers are frequently dressed in riot uniforms and commonly 
surround the mosques in its entirety.   
 
It was also commonly reported that police would take those individuals without proper 
identification to the police station for enhanced interrogation that could last up to several 
hours.  This targeting approach also received a surge in the aftermath of the London 2005 
terrorist attacks where the OSI reported that “hundreds of police officers carr[ying] out 
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identity checks in front of mosques in the cities of Aalen, Balingen, Biberach, Esslingen, 
Freiburg, Friedrichshafen, Heilbronn, Karlsruhe, Lörrach, Ludwigsburg, Mannheim, 
Pforzheim, Ravensburg, Reutlingen, Sigmaringen, Stuttgart, Tübingen, Ulm and 
Waiblingen”.99  Furthermore, significant identity checks were extended beyond Mosques to 
the nearby streets in August 2005, which resulted in streets leading up and surrounding 
mosques being closed to allow 1,260 identities being checked.  According to the German 
Ministry of the Interior, the officially stated purpose of these checks was to: 
“obtain further information about Islamic extremists and terrorists in order 
to react quickly to any Islamist threat and to destroy terrorist structures. ... 
Police need to obtain comprehensive information about Islamists. ... It must 
be made clear to the extremists that we will deal most forcibly with any 
religiously motivated claims to absolute power, intolerance and disregard for 
human rights.”100 
 
However, other evidence collected by interviews conducted by the OSI with law 
enforcement officers on the ground found that they did  
“not really expect to find people who are terrorists or supporters. To reach 
this goal other methods are used. Preventive identity controls are instead 
used on top of other methods. The main goal of these controls is to find people 
who are living in Germany illegally or [engaged in] other related crime. We 
also want to show that the police are there, that we are doing something about 
terrorism; this increases pressure on persons involved in terrorist 
activities.”101 
 
If this law enforcement officer’s explanation of this type of conduct is correct, then this may 
not be considered profiling but more likely to be simply an attempt to send a signal to 
communities that they are being watched.  Nevertheless, it seems plausible to suggest at 
minimum this type of police practice is a crude filter that may in some instances be close to 
a form of profiling. 
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More recent activities by the German police was reported on Reuters News that on New 
Years Eve on the 31st December 2016 police in Cologne undertook a significant mass 
identity check of what appeared to be individuals of North African appearance in light of 
perceived security concerns.102   
 
Some evidence collected in Italy would suggest that law enforcement officers are frequently 
using their powers to engage in identity checks of individuals whom law enforcement 
officers perceive as being a risk of terrorism or preparatory activities.  For instance, it was 
reported that in 2005 police were frequently engaged in anti-terrorism sweeps of high areas 
of Muslim populations.103  These checks have been reported in escalation in Northern and 
Southern territories in Italy since the 9/11 US terrorists attack.104 
 
A similar theme is evident in France where there has been evidence collected on police usage 
of their powers which suggest that they may be frequently engaging in mass identity checks 
of Muslim populated areas as a basis for enhanced levels of screening and questioning.  For 
instance, the OSI has found that in interviews held with Muslims there were reported 
instances of the police turning up to Mosques with the apparent sole objective to engage in 
mass identity checks of those in attendance. 105   In other studies conducted by the 
international Federation for Human rights, there have been similar results found where 
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police simply turn up at mosques as the basis to check the identity of those in attendance 
with often very little, if any, arrests being made.106 
 
Consequently, it may be argued that in each of these countries, it would seem plausible to 
suggest that some law enforcement officers in some locations may well be engaged in using 
their police powers as the basis to identify individuals for enhanced screening or questioning 
without any justification.  These mass identity checks undertaken by the law enforcement 
officers seem to operate outside any official acknowledgement that these powers may be 
utilised as a profiling mechanism and they appear quite randomised without a systematic 
process for constructing/applying profiles in comparable terms with those manifestations of 
formal terrorist profiling examined in chapter three.  Or alternatively, this practice may be 
an abuse of police powers that represent a flagrant act of harassment and collective 
punishment on some communities.  
 
(B) The Practice of Targeted Raiding by Law Enforcement Officers 
There is also evidence to support the argument that law enforcement officers in numerous 
countries appear to be using their discretionary powers as the basis to select individuals for 
enhanced levels of screening or questioning by engaging in the practice of targeted raids.  
Whilst raids undertaken by the police may be undertaken on the basis of available 
intelligence that is ultimately aimed at apprehending a suspect, in the context of 
counterterrorism policing strategy, it would seem that in the aftermath of US terrorist attacks 
that target raids are in part being focused on Muslim communities.  In some instances, it 
would seem possible that law enforcement officers may be using this tactic as a basis to 
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assist in the identification of those likely to terrorists or engaged in preparatory activities.  
Although, this use police powers may simply be abuse of police powers, it is at least possible 
to question the potential that some law enforcement officers may be using this power in a 
very crude manner to identify those who they perceive as being at risk of being a terrorist.  
For example, according to the International Federation for Human Rights   
“… since September 11th, thousands of Muslims [in Germany] have been 
subjected to screening of their personal data, house searches, interrogations 
and arrests solely because their profiles have marched certain criteria, 
foremost of which is an affiliation with Islam.”107   
 
For instance, the OSI have found that Muslim places of worship, business and homes are 
commonplace as part of a ‘tough’ stance on counterterrorism.108  The value of these targeted 
raids are varied.  For example, the BBC reported in 2007 on a targeted raid in Italy which 
suggested that “[p]olice in central Italy say they have uncovered a bomb school for Islamist 
militants after raiding a mosque in Perugia and making three arrests.”109  Similarly, CNN 
reported on a police raid in London by stating  
“British anti-terror police found a mini-arsenal of weapons when they raided 
a London mosque linked to a number of key terrorist suspects.”110  In the 
context of Germany, there have been some reported successes such as 
Patterson who identified that “an operation involving more than 800 officers, 
police had raided 50 addresses across Germany and confiscated faked 
passports, computer data and militant Islamic propaganda”.111 
 
Although these reports have identified positive outcomes as a result of law enforcement 
officer use of their powers to engage in targeted raiding, there are numerous other reports 
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that demonstrate the unofficial nature of the use of targeted raids by law enforcement 
officers in some instances.  For example, Smolar who was a reporter with Le Monde in 
France identified that law enforcement officers appear to engage in raiding businesses and 
mosques without any discernable justification.112    
 
Smolar suggested that in 2005 upwards of 47 mosques were searched along with 473 
businesses and 85 cafes which resulted in the police issuing 276 penalties unrelated to 
terrorism.113  Individual interviews conducted by the OSI with those subjected to these 
targeted raids commonly suggest that  
“[i]n practice, the [police] arrive with numerous vehicles. They come at peak 
business hours.  Some officials have uniforms; others wear ordinary clothes. 
They enter the business—health, customs, fraud, police ... They don’t show 
their badges, they don’t identify themselves. If any officials show their badges 
it is the health and hygiene inspectors.”114   
 
A cafe manager interviewed by OSI recounted their experience of being subjected to a 
targeted raid: 
“[t]he manager called me when the officials arrived and I came immediately. 
There were six or eight cars and at least 10 officials. It was around 8:00 p.m., 
a busy time. I observed the manner that they behaved and I asked them 
questions. I saw that there were two officials from the intelligence services. I 
could identify them as they did not respond when I asked where they worked. 
The telephone rang; the employee wanted to answer the phone. One of the 
intelligence officials said, “No, turn off your phone and close down the 
shop.” I watched him [as] he went to the back of the restaurant. I asked what 
he was doing there. “Shut up,” he responded ... The other intelligence official 
said, “Now, you keep quiet or we’ll shut down your business permanently.” 
I was torn between [wanting to protest] the illegal nature of their words and 
[my desire not to endanger] my friend. I said nothing further. The police 
asked everyone inside the restaurant to produce their identity documents. 
Those who didn’t have their documents with them were handcuffed and taken 
to the police station.”115 
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In other countries, such as Italy, there have been similar concerns expressed by those 
subjected to individual targeted raids by law enforcement officers.  For instance, the OSI 
found that after either a terrorist attack or information on how an attack was foiled police in 
Italy frequently heightened their practices of targeted raids on mosques, businesses owned 
by Muslims and individual houses in known Muslims areas.116  The OSI found that it was 
more common that these targeted raids appeared in direct responses to perceived risks of 
terrorism or preparatory activities of Muslims without any specific or discernable concern 
were being targeted.117    
 
Other similar concerns have been identified in Germany where mosques appear to be the 
direct target of police raids.  For instance, Bernstein from the New York Times in an 
interview with a Muslim subjected to a targeted raid concluded that: 
 
“[p]robably at the moment, every Muslim is under suspicion. It is the right 
of the police to search but not to overdo it in such an aggressive way. 
Somebody hears something from a child and then the police arrive with 200 
men. There were other ways of finding out if some- thing like that was shown 
or not.”118 
 
In light of this evidence, it may be argued that in certain instances the law enforcement 
officers appear to be using their police powers to engage in selecting individuals for 
enhanced levels of questioning/screening through targeted raids without any justification.  
Although, some of the discussion did point to some successes, it is contended that other 
evidence showing the potential misuse of police powers in certain circumstances creates a 
high degree of probability that these powers may in some instances be deployed in a manner 
that is not acknowledged as a profiling process and does not exhibit a systematic process in 
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comparable terms with those manifestations of formal profiling already examined in chapter 
three. 
 
(C) Law Enforcement Use of Powers of Arrest and Imprisonment 
The power of arrest and imprisonment afforded to law enforcement officers can be 
considered quite an important police power which allows officers to arrest and imprison 
those deemed to be at risk of, or engagement in, the commission of criminality or in the 
context of terrorism, the risk of preparing or committing acts of terrorism.  However, a 
problem or concern with the power to arrest and imprisonment suspects is the discretionary 
nature of the power that can be used to target particular individuals or groups of individuals 
who may be perceived as being a risk of criminality or terrorism.   In the context of terrorism, 
it is common that the power to arrest and imprison are quite broadly constructed, which 
frequently allow ‘suspects’ to be detained without little or any evidence of the individual’s 
involvement in terrorism.119 
 
In the aftermath of US terrorist attacks there has been some evidence to suggest that law 
enforcement officers in numerous jurisdictions may be deploying the power to arrest and 
imprison to target individuals and/or groups who are perceived as being at risk of 
involvement in terrorism or preparatory activities.   
 
For example, there has been reports in France which suggest that law enforcement officers 
are in certain circumstances are using the power of arrest and imprisonment as the basis to 
detain those of Muslim appearance.  An OSI’s interview with one of the French 
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counterterrorism police reveals the thinking process that police officers go through in 
deciding when to exercise their powers of arrest:  
“[t]he first [consideration] is the babysitter, the next is the baker, the next is 
a Muslim man —simply an ordinary religious Muslim—and the next is a 
Muslim who was in Afghanistan. The babysitter and baker will be easily 
eliminated and the Muslim that has also been to Afghanistan will be included. 
It is with respect to the other Muslim that things become problematic, and 
where a possibility of discrimination arises. The investigative judge will need 
to make a decision.”120 
 
Furthermore, the counterterrorism officer suggested that suspicion may be formed about an 
individual when: 
“[t]he personal history and skills necessary to carry out a terrorist act [or] 
certain behaviours that differentiate a person from the rest. For example, the 
fact of going to the mosque every day at 5:00 p.m. This is not so common, so 
this behaviour can differentiate a person; even within this community, 
everyone does not go to the mosque every day, not European Muslims. ... 
Operational logic prevents us from keeping everyone under surveillance.... 
We look who the person knows... If they know 15 people who are good 
Muslims, we don’t care. But if someone’s sister and brother are “Tabligh”, 
that is more interesting...We basically watch for criteria that differentiate a 
person, and these criteria include a person’s skills, behaviour (such as trips 
to certain countries or going to the mosque every day), and judicial 
history.”121 
 
The most concerning aspect of the French apparent use of the police power to arrest and 
imprison is the accounts of those subjected to these powers.  For instance, one account by 
an individual subjected to arrest accounted that:  
“[t]hey took me to the station. On the way, when we were on the highway at 
a turn, they said, “You know Zorro, we can wipe you out here. We have all 
the rights, so if you cause us problems we’ll take you down and throw you 
away. We have unlimited powers.” When we got to the police station, they 
put me in the interrogation room. They took my photo and my fingerprints. 
They called me “Zorro.” They said, “Zorro, your friends sold you, they told 
us everything.” They asked me what I did. They brought me my old passports. 
They said I had been to New York. They spoke rudely. They asked questions 
about my life, my earnings, my rent. They said that I had been under 
surveillance for some time. They let me go around 6.00 p.m. the same evening. 
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In fact, they had my cousin under surveillance. He had taken a trip to 
Ukraine. They had monitored him upon his return....I rarely see my cousin, 
but they have to find a network and a link, so they create a relationship from 
diverse elements that in fact are not related. There had been an armed 
robbery on high security vehicles. They said that this money had gone to buy 
arms in the Ukraine and bring them back to Paris to carry out attacks. They 
had no concrete elements to support this hypothesis. I think the reality is that 
after 9/11 they wanted to show that they were doing something; they have to 
carry out some arrests.”122 
 
It would seem that law enforcement officers have little reason to select this individual for 
arrest and detection which may be question law enforcement tactics. 
 
There are also reports from other countries which reveal similar patters of reported abuses 
of the power of arrest and imprisonment.  For instance, in Italy the OSI found that in 2006 
upwards of 200 individuals were subjected to arrest and imprisonment but ultimately two of 
these arrests actually led to prosecution and conviction.123   Additionally, in the context of 
the UK there have been reports of excessive uses of arrest and imprisonment powers on 
Muslim communities since the US terrorist attacks on the 11th September 2001.  According 
to Jaggi from 2001 up until 2004 there had been arrests of around 600 individuals on the 
basis of suspected terrorism offences with only 100 charges leading to only 15 successful 
prosecutions.124   
 
These studies form the basis to argue this the power of arrest may in some instances be 
considered as deployed in a manner not recognised as a form of profiling and does not 
exhibit a systematic process in comparable terms with those formal manifestations of 
profiling already examined in chapter three. 
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5.4 The Usefulness of Informal Terrorist Profiling 
The discussion in the previous section considered some of the evidence related to supporting 
the contention that some uses of police powers are capable of amounting to examples of 
informal terrorist profiling.  In keeping with the theme established in chapters and three and 
four, it is now appropriate to progress to consider, how if at all, these examples of informal 
profiling may be considered as being useful in prevention, detection and deterrence of 
terrorism and its preparatory activities. 
 
As it can be recalled from the introductory chapter, the effectiveness of terrorist profiling 
may be assessed/measured by reference to three separate indicators of effectiveness. 
 
(a) The Input Effectiveness  
The input effectiveness involves conducting a utilitarian assessment of the methods used in 
the construction and/or application of terrorist profiles so as to assess whether the methods 
are capable of identifying likely terrorist characteristics that can be used in the construction 
of terrorist profiles.  In each of the examples of informal terrorist profiling considered in this 
chapter, it is difficult to identify whether any methods/approaches were relied upon by the 
individual law enforcement officers when they decide to exercise their discretionary police 
powers.  As noted in the introduction above, each of these examples of informal terrorist 
profiling may represent examples of inductive or deductive profiling depending on the 
context in which the individual law enforcement officer decided to use their police power.  
As these uses of police powers are not recognised as being a form of profiling, it is not clear 
that there are any methods used to construct a profile.  From a methodological perspective 
it is argued that the apparent absence of a discernable profiling method/approach calls into 
question the usefulness or indeed effectiveness of this type of profiling.  As it was noted in 
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chapter two, there were a number of weaknesses evident in deductive and inductive profiling 
methods.  As it is not possible to firmly classify informal terrorist profiling as being a 
deductive or inductive profiling method/approach, it is necessary to consider the limitations 
of both profiling approaches. 
 
Deductive profiling methods/approaches required a significant array of pre-existing 
knowledge/data to allow themes and patters to be spotted. The identification of these themes 
and patters allowed for a high degree of typologies and hypothesis as the basis to construct 
a profile.  If informal terrorist profiling is to be deployed as a means to prevent, detect or 
deter acts of terrorism or its preparatory activities in a meaningful way, then individual 
officers on the grounds exercising their discretionary police powers as a profiling 
method/approach needs to draw upon this array of pre-existing evidence to construct 
typologies and hypothesis.  If there is an absence of a methodological approach, then there 
is little or no means to manage the risks associated with these limitations of deductive 
profiling.  This may prove fatal to the meaningfulness or potential meaningfulness of 
informal terrorist profiling. 
 
A limitation of Inductive profiling methods/approaches identified in chapter two was a high 
reliance on statistical models as the basis to predict future likely characteristics.  If individual 
law enforcement officers are effectively using their discretionary police powers in an ad hoc 
informal profiling manner, then there will be no statistical model upon which to predict or 
guide law enforcement officers on how they should be exercising their discretion to select 
individuals for enhanced questioning/screening. 
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Consequently, the high degree of probability surrounding the likely absence of any 
method/approach to construct profiles would call into question the usefulness or 
effectiveness of this type of profiling. 
 
(b) The Output Effectiveness  
The output assessment of the effectiveness of the application of terrorist profiles involves 
considering the direct and indirect evidence available to demonstrate whether law 
enforcement officers were able to identify individuals likely to be engaged in terrorism or 
preparatory activities. 
 
It is acknowledged that the output effectiveness is difficult, if not impossible, to identify in 
respect of the qualitative examples of informal terrorist profiling considered above.  This is 
largely due to the lack of any discernable or creditable evidence that these uses of police 
powers are capable of identifying those likely to be engaged in terrorism or its preparatory 
activities.  As a result, the discussion will focus here on the quantitative evidence available 
on law enforcement officer use of stop and search powers in England and Wales. 
 
In the context of measuring the output effectiveness of law enforcement officer use of stop 
and search powers, the most obvious benchmark to focus on is the arrest rate that follows 
the exercise of the power to stop and search.  The problem with identifying the output 
effectiveness of stop and search powers is that there is a very low arrest rate associated with 
police uses of stop and search powers.  For example, the most recent statistics on the use of 
section 47A of the TA 2000 reveals that out of 126 stopped and searched there were only 4 
arrests, which represents a 3% success rate.125  Under the previous law, section 44 of the TA 
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2000, the arrest rate was also low with 0.7% of all section 44 stop and searches resulting in 
an arrest in 2010/2011.126   Although, the discussion in the earlier part of this chapter 
acknowledges that focusing on the arrest rate may be artificial as an arrest is not the principle 
aim of the use of stop and search.  Nevertheless, it is argued that such a low level of arrest 
following the decision to exercise a stop and search calls into question whether the exercise 
of this power as a profiling method/approach is capable of assisting law enforcement officers 
identify those likely to be engaged in terrorism or its preparatory activities. 
 
(c) The Impact of Informal Terrorist Profiling 
It can also be recalled from the introduction chapter that a further measure of effectiveness 
is to analyse the impact of formal terrorist profiling so as to determine whether the effect 
and cost of terrorist profiling can be considered as outweighing any input and output 
effectiveness. 
 
   (i) Stop and Search in England and Wales 
The discussion examining the stop and search powers in England and Wales highlighted the 
extent of the disproportionality ratio in the application of stop and search powers between 
ethnic minorities versus the majority White ethnicity in England and Wales.   The 
application of stop and search powers have long concerned civil liberties groups in England 
and Wales, given the extent of the disproportionality in stop and search between those 
individuals recorded as being Black or Asian and White ethnicities.127 There are also various 
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academic studies that have sought to discern the impact of the excessive application of stop 
and search powers on ethnic minority communities.128    
 
According to Pantazis and Pemberton there are at least three core discernable impacts of the 
disproportionate application of stop and search on ethnic minority communities in England 
and Wales that questions the cost associated with the use of the stop and search power.129 
 
Firstly, the frequent application of stop and search powers on particular ethnicities, such as 
the Black and Asian communities, has the net effect of reducing public confidence in the 
police by individuals from these communities.130  This means that the high levels of official 
suspicion felt by some members in Muslim communities often contribute to these 
communities having limited or no confidence in the police.131 Spalek et al also found that 
there is a common “sense of grievance amongst Muslims” attributable to the use of stop and 
search powers.132   
 
This sense of grievance was also exposed by other research conducted by Choudhury and 
Fenwick who found that there was considerable resentment building in Muslim communities 
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England.133  The concern exposed by this research found that at ports and airports there was 
a feeling amongst some Muslims that they are effectively being singled.  For example, in 
some of their participant surveys expressed the following experiences of stop and search at 
airports: 
 
“I went to Turkey recently with my uncle, and he always gets stopped. Every 
single time he comes to the UK he gets stopped. The business that he is in is 
import and export.’ (Muslim, female, Leicester) 
 
The first thing you always ask your friend when they come from travelling is, 
did they stop you... it’s not how was the holiday, it’s did you get stopped and 
what did they ask you. That is the first question people ask each other now.’ 
(Muslim, male, Glasgow)”134 
 
Further, an airport law enforcement officer who was interviewed as part of this research was 
able to identify resentment by Muslims travelling through British airports. For example one 
officer reported: 
Stopping at the airport that has caused a lot of resentment, not only the young 
people but older people, families coming back from India and Pakistan or 
flights from Dubai, they are singling out either the parent, the father or a 
brother, and it means the rest of the family is kept waiting for five hours. You 
are not just alienating that individual, you’ve got a family and the family go 
into the community; they then tell their community and before you know it 
you’ve got the community saying what’s happened to you.’ (Local police 
officer)135 
 
Other research conducted by Blick et al found that the consequence of the erosion of 
confidence in the police means the continual police suspicion on Muslim communities can  
“…drip feed into vulnerable communities and gradually erodes confidence 
and trust ... the impact of this will be that just at the time we need the 
confidence and trust of these communities, they may retreat within 
themselves.”136   
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This allows Pantazis and Pemberton to conclude that a lack of confidence in the police will 
inevitably disrupt the “flow of information” between communities and the police.137  This 
lack of information flow is further identified by Lambert who argues that police in England 
and Wales depend on intelligence from Muslim communities to understand the tactics and 
threats from Islamist terrorist groups operating in England.138  As a result, it can be argued 
that some uses of stop and search powers has the innate potential to alienate the communities 
that police actually need co-operation from for intelligence purposes.   
 
Secondly, Pantazis and Pemberton also argue that the continual subjection of Muslim 
communities to a disproportionate level of stop and search powers carries a high risk of 
furthering radicalisation within ethnic minority communities. 139   A dominant theme 
identified by Githens-Maze140 and Neumann and Kleinmann141 in counterterrorism policy 
is for governments to place a significant focus on developing policies so as to engage with 
the risk of radicalisation.  This theme is evident in England and Wales since the formal 
adoption of the CONTEST counterterrorism strategy which aims to ‘Prevent’ terrorism acts 
from occurring, ‘Pursue’ those responsible for terrorism, ‘Protect’ against the threat of 
terrorism and the ‘Prepare’ the country for imminent acts of terrorism.142  The ‘Prevent’ 
strand within CONTEST is particularly focused on countering radicalisation by creating 
opportunities for the state to engage with those most likely to be radicalised into committing 
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acts of terrorism.143  The concern raised by Pantazis and Pemberton is that the continual 
subjection of particular communities to official suspicion of terrorism or preparatory 
activities by disproportionately and unjustifiably stopping and searching them carries a high 
risk that the very aim underpinning counterterrorism strategies like ‘Prevent’ may well be 
undermined.144 
 
This is supported by reference to Hillyard’s study on the use of suspicion adopted in respect 
of the Irish conflict during the 1980s which was used by the Irish Republic Army to assist 
with their recruitment of volunteers.145  Lambert draws the parallel between the police use 
of stop and search in contemporary counterterrorism policing and the policing strategies 
adopted during the Irish troubles as the basis to argue Islamist terrorist groups can use this 
official suspicion to radicalise volunteers to support Islamic fundamentalism.146  Abbas 
suggests that the official suspicion on Muslims in England and Wales creates and 
perpetuates a sense of “dislocation and alienation” that can be used by Islamist groups to 
galvanise support.147   
 
It is contended by McGhee that these feelings of disconnection between Muslim 
communities and mainstream ethnicities in England and Wales creates the atmosphere of 
“them” and “us” that can be harvested by Islamists groups to generate a sense of solidarity 
between Muslims against the common enemy of the police.148 Choudhury and Fenwick 
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found in some instances not many within Muslim communities had any knowledge of 
‘Prevent’ where one of their participants stated that “the ordinary Muslim man on the street 
would not have a clue what Prevent is.’ (Director, Muslim women’s organisation)”.149  As 
a result, it seems arguable that if Government counterterrorism policy is genuinely becoming 
focused on preventing radicalisation, they would need to ensure sufficient controls on the 
exercise of police powers which may be eroding the very rationale of such counterterrorism 
policies. 
 
Thirdly, Pantazis and Pemberton also argue that the impact of the continual use of stop and 
search against Black and Asian communities stirs dissent in community relations.150  It is 
contended by Poynting and Maso that the impact of the application of stop and search on 
Black and Asian ethnic minority communities essentially gives the majority White ethnicity 
the “permission to hate” them.151   This creates a lack of cohesion in society between 
different ethnicities where those subjected to suspicion feel aggrieved while those not 
subjected to suspicion begin to distrust and perhaps hate those subject to suspicion based on 
a perception of guilt. 
 
(d) Summary 
In light of the discussion on the input and output effectiveness of informal terrorist profiling, 
it can be argued that it is difficult to argue that this form of profiling can be considered useful 
or effective in assisting law enforcement officers identify those likely to be engaged in acts 
of terrorism or preparatory activities.  It is argued that the apparent lack of a methodological 
approach in the construction of informal profiles and a further systematic process capable 
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of reviewing the application of these profiles calls into question their assistive value as a 
profiling tool. 
 
Furthermore, in light of this qualitative studies on the impact of the exercise of stop and 
search powers, it is arguable that the disproportionate application of these powers on Muslim 
communities carries a very high risk of alienating these communities from the state which 
identifies a high cost that undermines the legitimacy of the state to govern.  As a result, it is 
contended that even if these manifestations of informal terrorist profiling were capable of 
been classified as being input and output effective, the impact or likely impact of them is so 
significant that it is capable of compromising the state’s ability to manage the threat of 
terrorism through counterterrorism policies. 
 
   (ii) Other Qualitative Studies on the Exercise of Police Powers 
In addition to stop and search, other qualitative studies were examined on the use of police 
powers including the power to engage in identity checking and the raiding of premises in 
other European countries such as France and Germany.  The Open Society Institute (OSI) 
examined the impact of the evidence on the use of these powers. 152  This examination found 
that the apparent subjection of ethnicity minorities to police suspicion served to “associate 
Muslims, foreigners, illegal immigrants, extremism, and terrorism” together. 153   In 
subsequent research, the OSI also found that the subjection of police powers on Muslim 
communities had the effect of alienating ethnic minority communities within society.154  
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Other research undertaken by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) 
has found that ethnic minorities had a significant distrust of the police.155 
 
These studies combine to demonstrate that some uses of police powers to engage in acts of 
profiling that may be capable of being classified as manifestations of informal terrorist 




The primary aim of the discussion in this chapter was to progress the evaluation of terrorist 
profiling by identifying, explaining and evaluating evidence of informal terrorist profiling. 
 
The examination of statutory powers advancing the power to stop and search found that it 
failed to provide a systematic process, in comparable terms with the manifestations of formal 
terrorism profiling examined in chapter three, capable of controlling the data and processing 
of data when law enforcement officers decide to exercise a stop and search. A specific 
concern in this discussion was the advancement of the power to stop and search without the 
requirement of reasonable suspicion given that the Code of Practice only provided very 
limited guidance on how this power should be exercised.  It is this suspicionless stop and 
search power that resembles very little identifiable controls which stands in stark contrast to 
manifestations for formal terrorist profiling examined in chapter three. 
 
																																																								
155 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Data in Focus Report: Police Stops and Minorities 
(FRA, 2010), 6-7. 
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Further, the examination of the application of the stop and search power found that there is 
quantitative evidence on the use of the police power to stop and search which shows to a 
high degree of probability that law enforcement officers are likely to be using these powers 
in some instances as the basis to engage in profiling.  This is also supported by reference to 
qualitative studies conducted on people’s experiences of stop and search powers in England 
and Wales.  Some of the uses of the stop and search power may be classified as being 
informal as law enforcement appear to be using these powers to identify and select 
individuals for enhanced levels of questioning and/or enhanced screening outside of an 
officially recognised and systematic process. 
 
The discussion in the third section progressed further by considering other evidence of the 
use of police powers including the power to engage in identity checking, targeted raids and 
the use of arrest powers.  This discussion found that there are a number of qualitative studies 
on police uses of their discretionary powers to suggest that law enforcement officers may be 
using their discretionary police powers to effectively engage in acts tantamount to profiling 
that may classifiable as being informal. 
 
The final part of the chapter above considered the effectiveness of these uses of discretionary 
police powers as the basis to consider would they be likely to assist law enforcement officers 
identify those engaged in terrorism or its preparatory activities.  This discussion found at 
least three grave concerns related to the input and output assessment on the likely 
effectiveness of informal terrorist profiling. 
 
Firstly, the mere fact that these uses of powers are not acknowledged as a profiling process 
creates the difficulty in opening the process used to construct and apply profiles to review.  
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The discussion in chapter two found that the reviewability of individual law enforcement 
officer applications of profiles is essential to ensure that profiling perfects its application as 
iterative process. 
 
Secondly, the apparent absence of any formalised process to construct or apply profiles 
suggests the uses of these police powers as a profiling process cannot minimise the 
limitations and weaknesses of deductive and inductive profiling processes. 
 
Thirdly, the apparent focus on the application of these police powers on specific ethnicities 
raises serious concerns related to the impact of each application of these powers.  The 
discussion on impact identified a number of qualitative studies, which seem to suggest that 
Muslim communities are becoming increasingly disenfranchised from the state.  This 
discussion called into question that even if these manifestations of informal terrorist 
profiling could be considered remotely useful to law enforcement officers in the 
identification of likely terrorists, the cost of this type of profiling lowers the state below that 
of the terrorists by compromising fundamental human rights of ethnic minorities.  It may 
even be argued that the use of this manifestation of profiling may be counterproductive in 
counterterrorism as a whole. 
 
In light of the discussion thus far, we shall now proceed to examine the lawfulness issue 
related to the inclusion of sensitive characteristics in profiling. 
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CHAPTER 6: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE 
INCLUSION OF SENSITIVE CHARACTERISTICS IN TERRORIST PROFILING 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The assessment and examination of terrorist profiling throughout the previous chapters 
concentrated on analysing the usefulness of terrorist profiling by separately analysing the 
‘construction’ and ‘application’ of terrorist profiles.  A core argument advanced in this thesis 
is that the assessment of the usefulness of terrorist profiling requires engagement with a 
complex array of human rights issues that arise from the theory and practice of terrorist 
profiling.  This argument is advanced on the basis that any determination on the usefulness 
of terrorist profiling should take into account the broader human rights concerns that may 
stem from the use of terrorist profiling. 
Therefore, the assessment on the usefulness of terrorist profiling in the previous chapters 
has left an unresolved issue relating to the justification for including sensitive characteristics 
in the construction and/or application of profiles.  Terrorist profiling by its nature involves 
including relevant characteristics to narrow and filter the search for potential terrorists.  It 
can be recalled from the chapter one that sensitive characteristics are interpreted broadly in 
this thesis to include race, ethnicity, age, gender, country of origin etc.   
 
The inherent danger posed by the inclusion of sensitive characteristics in the terrorist 
profiling process is that law enforcement officers may over rely on sensitive characteristics 
in the construction and/or application of terrorist profiles.  This may result in particular 
individuals or groups of individuals becoming subjected to enhanced levels of scrutiny and 
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suspicion without any justification other than individuals exhibiting some of the sensitive 
characteristics.  The potential for over reliance on sensitive characteristics creates an 
inevitable tension in the terrorist profiling process in determining the point at which the 
inclusion of sensitive characteristics can be considered an important part of the profiling 
process versus the point at their inclusion can become unjustifiable, unlawful and even 
harmful. 
The primary aim of this chapter is to address two key questions so as to examine the human 
rights concerns that might impact the utility of terrorist profiling.  Firstly, whether it can 
ever be justified to include sensitive characteristics in terrorist profiling and secondly, if so, 
in what circumstances can sensitive characteristics be justified in the construction and 
application of terrorist profiles.  The argument advanced in this chapter is that there is no 
singular answer to either of these questions.  However, in order to address these two 
questions, it is possible to draw upon at least three philosophical approaches as identified by 
Hunt.1  This includes conducting a utilitarian assessment, a human rights assessment and a 
more ‘balanced’ assessment of the justification of including sensitive characteristics in 
terrorist profiling.2   As the primary focus of the assessment of the usefulness of terrorist 
profiling is undertaken from the perspective of law enforcement officers operating in the 
field, human rights standards and norms are only considered insofar as they are relevant to 
addressing the usefulness of terrorist profiling arising from the discussion in the previous 
chapters. 
 
The discussion in the first part begins by analysing the previous attempts at examining the 
justification of including sensitive characteristics in the profiling process.  It is argued that 
                                                             
1 A. Hunt, ‘Counter-Terrorism Law’ [2017] Birmingham Law School, Occasional Paper Series 1, 7. 
2 ibid, 7-12. 
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this represents an important first step in assessing the justification of including sensitive 
characteristics as it provides a basis to explore and avoid the weaknesses of previous 
academic exercises.  The discussion in the second part progresses to define profiling where 
sensitive characteristics are included.  It is argued that the justification for the inclusion of 
sensitive characteristics changes when considering different manifestations of terrorist 
profiling and as a result it is important to make a distinction between different manifestations 
of terrorist profiling by reference to the profiling spectrum set out in chapter one when 
assessing the justification question.  The discussion in the third part progresses to investigate 
the lawfulness of the justification for including sensitive characteristics from the perspective 
of law enforcement officers.  
 
6.2 Previous attempts at analysing the inclusion of sensitive characteristics in the profiling 
process 
It is argued that in order to conduct a legal assessment of the justification of including 
sensitive characteristics in the terrorist profiling process, it is necessary to begin by 
considering the problems with the current literature which analyses the inclusion of sensitive 
characteristics in terrorist profiling.  This approach provides a basis to consider how the 
justification of including sensitive characteristics in the profiling process may be examined 
in this thesis.  
 
There has been much debate in the literature concerning the inclusion of sensitive 
characteristics in terrorist profiling.  However, not all of the literature can be considered 
useful in our assessment of the justification of including sensitive characteristics as relevant 
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characteristics in the profiling process.  The previous assessment of including sensitive 
characteristics can be classified as being approached in three ways. 
 
Firstly, there are those including the American Civil Liberties Union,3 Cuellar,4 Harcourt,5 
Harris,6 Roach7 and Moecki8 who argue that the inclusion of some sensitive characteristics, 
such as race or ethnicity, in the construction and/or application of profiling will always pose 
an unjustifiable risk that particular individuals or groups of individuals resembling the 
sensitive characteristics will become subject to official scrutiny and suspicion by law 
enforcement officers.   As a result of this risk, they commonly argue that all forms of 
profiling involving the inclusion of sensitive characteristics such as race, ethnicity and 
country of origin should be prohibited regardless of any assistive value to law enforcement 
officers.   This view of the inclusion of sensitive characteristics in terrorist profiling can be 
classified as being a “human rights absolutists” approach.9 
 
A difficulty with this approach is that it tends to obscure the analysis and the assessment for 
the inclusion of sensitive characteristics, such as race/ethnicity, by concentrating on 
                                                             
3 American Civil Liberties Union, Sanctioned Bias: Racial Profiling (American Civil Liberties Union, 2004), 
3. 
4 M. Cuellar, ‘Choosing anti-terror targets by national origin and race’ (2003) 6(1) Harvard Latino Law 
Review 9, 11. 
5 B. Harcourt, ‘Rethinking racial profiling: A critique of the economics, civil liberties and constitutional 
literature and of criminal profiling more generally’ (2004) 71(4) The University of Chicago Law Review 
1275, 1345.  See also: B. Harcourt, ‘Muslim Profiles Post 9/11: Is Racial Profiling an Effective Counter-
terrorist Measure and Does It Violate the Right to be Free from Discrimination?’ in B. Goold and L. Lazarus, 
Security and Human Rights (Hart Publishing, 2007), 73-76.  
6 D. Harris, ‘Racial Profiling Revisited: “Just Common Sense” in the Fight Against Terror?’ (2002) 17 
Criminal Justice 36, 37. 
7 K. Roach, ‘Making progress on understanding and remedying racial profiling’ (2004) 41 Alberta Law 
Review 895. 
8 D. Moeckli, ‘Discriminatory Profiles: Law Enforcement After 9/11 and 7/7’ (2005) 5 European Human 
Rights Law Review 517. 
9 A. Ashworth, ‘Security, Terrorism and the Value of Human Rights’ in B. Goold and L. Lazarus (eds) 
Security and Human Rights (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2007), 205. 
 273 
manifestations of profiling where race/ethnicity are either the sole characteristic or part of 
wider range of characteristics used by law enforcement officers.   Frequently, these 
manifestations of profiling may be classified as being examples of low visibility 
manifestations of profiling where law enforcement officers exercise informal discretion in 
the selection of individuals for enhanced levels of scrutiny or investigation, such as those 
manifestations of informal terrorist profiling examined in chapter five. As a result, the 
analysis which characterises profiling as being unlawful commonly fail to analyse different 
manifestations of profiling where sensitive characteristics are included in combination with 
other non-sensitive characteristics.  An argument advanced in this chapter is that any 
assessment of sensitive characteristics in the construction and application of profiles must 
undertake an examination of different manifestations of profiling where sensitive 
characteristics are not necessarily the sole criteria so as to provide a full examination and 
determination of the justification question.   
 
Secondly, there are those such as Ramierz et al,10 Schuck11 and Turley12 who contend that 
including sensitive characteristics forms an important part of the profiling process so as to 
assist law enforcement officers narrow and filter their search for likely terrorists in the 
prevention and detection of acts of terrorism.  For example, the Chief Constable of the 
British Transport Police commented in response to the London Bombings in 2005 that  
“[w]e should not waste time searching old white ladies.  It is going to be 
disproportionate. It is going to be young men, not exclusively, but it may be 
disproportionate when it comes to ethnic groups.”13   
 
                                                             
10 D. Ramierez, J. Hoopes and T. Quinlan, ‘Defining racial profiling in a post-September 11th world’ (2003) 
40 American Criminal Law Review 1195, 1207-1207. 
11 P. Schuck, ‘Context is Everything with Racial Profiling’, LA Times, 27th January 2002. 
12 J. Turley, ‘Use Profiling Judiciously’ LA Times, 4th January 2002. 
13 V. Dodd, ‘Asian Men Targeted in Stop and Search’, The Guardian 17th August 2005. 
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This approach tends to accept, without question, the justification of including sensitive 
characteristics, even if sensitive characteristics form the sole criteria for selecting individuals 
for enhanced investigation by law enforcement officers. This view of the inclusion of 
sensitive characteristics in terrorist profiling can be classified as being closer towards a 
utilitarian approach that places significant importance on order or security above the value 
of human rights.14 
 
A difficulty with this approach is that it tends to overestimate the importance of sensitive 
characteristics in the profiling process without assessing whether it can be considered 
justified to include sensitive characteristics as part of the profiling process. The focus in the 
utilitarian approach is on the end goal of attaining security and it is argued that this fixation 
on the end goal clouds the assessment of the usefulness of terrorist profiling as a 
counterterrorism tool. Furthermore, it is contended that any argument categorically 
supporting the inclusion of sensitive characteristics in any circumstance may be considered 
as being tainted by the “emergency” posed by the threat of terrorism. This means that the 
“emergency” that frequently surrounds counterterrorism fails to allow a full analysis of the 
justification of including sensitive characteristics in terrorism profiling. As a result, it is 
contended that any argument advanced founded entirely on the basis of the threat of 
terrorism must be viewed with caution as it tends to fail to provide a full assessment of the 
justification for including sensitive characteristics in terrorist profiling. 
 
                                                             
14 F. Teson, ‘Liberty Security’ in R. Wilson (ed) Human Rights in the ‘War on Terror’ (Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 59-61. 
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Thirdly, there are those such as Armar,15 Banks,16 Derbyshire,17 Ellmann,18 Kinsley19 and 
Risee and Zeckhauser20 who offer a qualified acknowledgement of the potential assistive 
value for including sensitive characteristics in the construction and/or application of terrorist 
profiling but express some doubt on its widespread application.  In particular, they 
commonly argue that including sensitive characteristics, such as race and ethnicity, in the 
construction and application of profiles may only be justified where sensitive characteristics 
do not become the sole criterion in the selection of individuals for enhanced levels of 
investigation.  This view of the inclusion of sensitive characteristics in terrorist profiling 
may be classified as being more of a balanced approach.  However, this approach has been 
criticised by some, such as Ashworth, who notes that the very concept of ‘balance’ is only 
theoretical with little or any evidence in practice.21  The weakness of this approach is that it 
views the pursuit of security through counterterrorism law and human rights as being 
something of a trade off where human rights sometimes need to be sacrificed to achieve 
security.  The acceptance of any trade off between security and human rights is criticised by 
some, such as Luban22 and Thomas,23 as being a false dichotomy.  However, it is argued that 
to advance a steadfast “human rights absolutists” approach or a steadfast utilitarian approach 
fails to conduct a broad review and scrutiny of the arguments for the justification of 
including sensitive characteristics in the profiling process as they are polarised by being 
categorically against or in support of including sensitive characteristics.   
                                                             
15 V. Amrar, ‘Life After 9/11: The Golden Rule of Racial Profiling’, LA Times, 22nd September 2002.  
16 R. Banks, ‘Essay: Racial profiling and anti-terrorism efforts’ (2004) 89 Cornell Law Review 1201. 
17 J. Derbyshire, ‘A (Potentially) Useful Tool’ [2002] Responsive Community 67, 67-70. 
18 J. Ellmann, ‘Racial Profiling and Terrorism’ (2003) 19 New York Law School Journal of Human Rights 
305, 314-347. 
19 M. Kinsley, ‘Discrimination We’re Afraid to be Against’ [2002] Responsive Community 64, 64-66. 
20 M. Risse and R. Zeckhauser, ‘Racial Profiling’ (2004) 32(2) Philosophy and Public Affairs 131. 
21 Ashworth (n9),209-210. 
22 D. Luban, ‘Eight Fallacies About Liberty and Security’ in R. Wilson (ed) Human Rights in the ‘War in 
Terrorism’ (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 245-246. 
23 P. Thomas, ‘Emergency and Anti-Terrorist Powers 9/11: USA and UK’ (2003) 26 Fordham International 
Law Journal 1193, 1206 
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It is suggested that the third approach may present a way for us to examine the justification 
for including sensitive characteristics in the construction and/or application of profiles but 
acknowledging the weaknesses that surround this third way.  In particular, it is contended 
that the examination of the arguments for the justification of including sensitive 
characteristics in profiling must not become overshadowed by manifestations of profiling 
where sensitive characteristics become the sole criteria in selecting individuals for enhanced 
investigation and additionally it must not become tainted by the “emergency” posed by the 
threat of terrorism.   
 
Consequently, the discussion in this chapter draws an analytical distinction between 
different manifestations of terrorist profiling in assessing the justification question so as to 
avoid the limitations evident in previous assessments on the justification of including 
sensitive characteristics.  In particular, the discussion in chapter three and five drew a 
distinction between formal and informal manifestations of terrorist profiling.  It is argued 
that the distinction between these two manifestations of terrorist profiling represent an 
important means to assess the justification question.  It is argued that formal terrorist 
profiling represents manifestations of profiling where sensitive characteristics are not the 
sole criterion in the selection of individuals for enhanced levels of law enforcement scrutiny.  
Whereas informal manifestations of terrorist profiling represents manifestation of profiling 
where sensitive characteristics may be the sole criterion in the selection and identification 
of suspected terrorists by law enforcement officers. 
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6.3 The definition of profiling when sensitive characteristics are used in the profiling 
process 
After setting out the problems concerning previous attempts at analysing the inclusion of 
sensitive characteristics in the profiling process, it is argued that it is now important to 
continue our discussion by defining profiling where sensitive characteristics are used.  This 
is important as it recognises that the argument concerning the justification of including 
sensitive characteristics is related to the specific manifestation of terrorist profiling being 
examined.  Additionally, it is acknowledged that not all manifestations of terrorist profiling 
will inevitably involve the inclusion of sensitive characteristics.  
 
As we identified in chapter two, “profiling refers to the police practice of viewing certain 
characteristics as indicators of criminal behaviour”.24  From a theoretical perspective, 
profiling should assist law enforcement officers to separate  
“a subsection of the population from the larger whole on the basis of specific 
criteria that purportedly correlate to risk and subjecting the subgroup to 
special scrutiny for the purposes of preventing violence, crime or some other 
undesirable activity.”25  
However, a key issue in all forms of profiling is determining which characteristics, if any, 
are more or less indicative of criminality or terrorism.   
 
Where sensitive characteristics become the predominant characteristics over all other 
characteristics this has been characterised in the literature as being manifestations of “racial 
                                                             
24 H. Barovick, ‘Driving While Black’, Time, 15th June 1998, 35.  
25 S. Choudry, ‘Protecting Equality in the Face of Terror: Ethnic and Racial Profiling and s. 15 of the 
Charter’ in R. Daniels, P. Macklem and K. Roach (eds), The Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada’s Anti-
Terrorism Bill (University of Toronto Press, 2001), 369. 
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profiling”, “religious profiling” or “ethnic profiling”.26  If the inclusion of sensitive 
characteristics, such as race, religion, ethnicity, country of origin etc imply that individuals 
or groups of individuals are more likely to be engaged in criminality or terrorism without 
justification, then it may be argued that sensitive characteristics can never be justified as 
relevant characteristics in the construction and application of terrorist profiles.  Therefore, 
this chapter is not seeking to make the argument that the inclusion of sensitive characteristics 
will be justifiable in every manifestation of profiling but rather to consider the 
circumstances, if any, sensitive characteristics may be justifiable if included in profiles. 
 
As noted above, racial profiling is debated at length throughout the literature with many 
commentators setting forward differing definitions.27  The term “racial profiling” can be first 
traced to a description appearing in the New York Times of a police traffic stop in the US 
undertaken as part of “Operation Pipeline” by the “Drugs Enforcement Agency” (DEA) 
which was aimed at identifying individuals likely to be engaged in drug couriering in the 
US.28  Racial profiling emerged during the 1980s and 1990s as an issue of national concern 
in the US as a consequence of the “wars on crime and drugs”.29  This is significant as it 
demonstrates that the very term used to describe the inclusion of sensitive characteristics in 
profiling can be considered as being a pejorative term employed to criticise police practice 
in the mainstream media.    
                                                             
26 S. Han, ‘The Long Shadow of Racial Profiling’ (2012) 1 British Journal of American Legal Studies 77, 82-
86. 
27 See: S. Gross and D. Livingston, ‘Racial Profiling Under Attack’ (2002) 102 Columbia Law Review 1413, 
1415, D. Harris, ‘Flying While Arab: Lessons from the Racial Profiling Controversy’ (2002) 6 Civil Rights 
Journal 8, 8 and D. Ramirez, J. Hoopes and T. Quinlan, ‘Defining Racial Profiling in a Post September 11th 
World’ (2003) 40 American Criminal Law Review 1195, 1205. 
28 D. Harris, ‘Racial Profiling Redux’ (2003) 22 Saint Louis University Public Law Review 73, 77. 
29 D. Johnston, D. Brazier, K. Forrest, C. Ketelhut, D. Mason and M. Mitchell, ‘Attitudes Toward the Use of 
Racial/Ethnic Profiling to Prevent Crime and Terrorism’ (2011) 22(4) Criminal Justice Policy Review 422, 
423. 
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Consequently, Risse and Zeckhauser30 argue that the term “racial profiling” used to broadly 
analyse the inclusion of race and/or ethnicity in profiling is problematic as it is commonly 
conflated with three issues: firstly, “the use of race as an information-carrier for 
investigative purposes”, secondly, “police abuse” and thirdly, “the disproportionate use of 
race in profiling”.31   
 
This conflation has tended to shape and overshadow the debate on justification and it is 
compounded by many of the criticisms of the inclusion of sensitive characteristics drawing 
inspiration from evidence of police abuse of their powers where law enforcement practice 
appear to be over relying on sensitive characteristics.  This makes the assessment of the 
justification for including sensitive characteristics profoundly difficult.  It is contended that 
in any objective assessment of the circumstances where sensitive characteristics may be 
justifiably included as relevant characteristics, our interest is solely on the value of sensitive 
characteristics as being “an information-carrier for investigative purposes” with “police 
abuse” and “overreliance” being classifiable as being downstream issues affecting 
justification. 
 
A consequence of the criticism of the inclusion of sensitive characteristics is that the debate 
is polarised by being positioned either in favour or against the inclusion of sensitive 
characteristics.  As a result of this polarisation, it may be difficult to separate these three 
issues so as to evaluate the value of including sensitive characteristics “as an information-
carrier” capable of assisting law enforcement officers identify potential suspects.  
                                                             
30 Risse and Zeckhauser (n20), 135. 
31  M. Risse, ‘Racial Profiling: A Reply to Two Critics’ [2007] Criminal Justice Ethics 4, 4. 
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Specifically, “police abuse” and their “over-reliance” on sensitive characteristics may 
overshadow any potential analysis of the justification of sensitive characteristics.  However, 
while it may be difficult, it does not invalidate the assessment and evaluation of the 
circumstances where the inclusion of sensitive characteristics may be justifiable.  It is argued 
that we can begin to unravel this difficulty by defining profiling where sensitive 
characteristics have been included so we can identify the subject of analysis of this chapter, 
the justification of sensitive characteristics in terrorist profiling. 
 
The problem of conflation is apparent in many of the common definitions of racial profiling 
found in the literature.  For example, Ramierez et al32 define profiling as being  
“any police initiated action that relies on the race, ethnicity or national 
origin, rather than the behaviour of an individual or information that leads 
the police to a particular individual who has been identified as being, or 
having been engaged in criminal activity.”33   
 
A key problem with this definitional approach is that profiling, as understood by Ramierez 
et al, is defined by contrasting “race, ethnicity or national origin” with “the behaviour of an 
individual or [police] information that leads the police to a particular individual who has 
been identified as being, or having been engaged in criminal activity.”  This definition 
suggests that profiling will commonly rest on “race, ethnicity or national origin” instead of 
an assessment of an individual’s behaviour or a combination of both.  It fails to evaluate the 
circumstance where sensitive characteristics may only be one of a range of characteristics 
included in the construction and application of profiles.  Arguably, it assists those who seek 
                                                             
32 D. Ramierz, J. McDevitt and A. Farrell, A Resource Guide on Racial Profiling Data Collection Systems: 
Promising Practices and Lessons Learned (Northeast University, 2000), 4-6.  For other very similar 
formulations see: R. Banks, ‘Race-Based Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal Protection Doctrine and 
Discourse’ (2001) 48 UCLA Law Review 1077.  Gross and Livingston (n27), 1415. 
33 ibid. 
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to characterise any manifestation of profiling as being substantially reliant on sensitive 
characteristics without appreciating whether sensitive characteristics can be included as part 
of a range of other non-sensitive characteristics. 
 
Therefore, according to Risse and Zeckhauser this definitional approach suggests “profiling 
serves purposes other than apprehending criminals, imparting an aura of illegitimacy to 
profiling by definition.”34  Specifically, this definition of this type of racial profiling carries 
the risk that certain sensitive characteristics are indicative of terrorism as opposed to 
evaluating the inclusion of other non-sensitive characteristics such as an individual’s 
behaviour.  The definition is constructed in such a way that suggests sensitive characteristics 
must be included in the profiling process. Additionally, it is also arguable by adopting this 
dual approach to defining racial profiling it suggests that law enforcement officers will use 
either the sensitive characteristics such as race, ethnicity, country of origin, etc or “specific 
information on suspicious activity”.35  As a result, the definition fails to appreciate the 
circumstance where sensitive characteristics are included in combination with other non-
sensitive characteristics.  
 
Consequently, to avoid the previous problematic approaches towards defining profiling 
where sensitive characteristics are included, Risse and Zeckhauser propose an alternative 
definition.  They suggest that profiling where sensitive “characteristics such as race, 
ethnicity” are used can be defined as being “any police-initiated action that relies on race, 
ethnicity or national origin and not merely on the behaviour of an individual”.36  This 
                                                             
34 ibid. 
35 ibid. 
36 ibid, 137. 
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approach avoids the problems identified with the other definitional attempts by refraining 
from constructing a definition that suggests that profiling rests on the inclusion of sensitive 
characteristics.  This approach allows us to ask whether the inclusion of sensitive 
characteristic are justifiable and, if so, in what circumstances by being able to appreciate the 
value of sensitive characteristics “as an information carrier for investigative purposes.”   
 
The discussion thus far has concentrated on the academic debate on the definition of 
profiling when sensitive characteristics are used in the construction and/or application of 
terrorist profiles.  However, an interesting formal definition of racial profiling can be found 
in a defunct US statute “End Racial Profiling Act 2001” which states: 
"The practice of a law enforcement agent relying, to any degree, on race, 
ethnicity, or national origin in selecting which individuals to subject to 
routine investigatory activities, or in deciding upon the scope and substance 
of law enforcement activity following the initial routine investigatory activity, 
except that racial profiling does not include reliance on such criteria in 
combination with other identifying factors when the law enforcement agent 
is seeking to apprehend a specific suspect whose race, ethnicity, or national 
origin is part of the description of the suspect."37 
 
This definition may be considered as being capable of resolving the difficulties in the 
academic literature as to how profiling that includes sensitive characteristics should be 
defined. It is apparent from this statutory definition that there are at least two different ways 
to define racial profiling.   
 
Firstly, there is a narrow definition that assumes race, or as we refer to it as sensitive 
characteristics, are the only relevant factors to be used to construct profiles. In the literature 
                                                             
37 End Racial Profiling Act 2001, s. 989. 
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this is commonly referred to as “hard definitions of racial profiling”.38  This form of racial 
profiling can occur where law enforcement officers identify individuals for enhanced levels 
of scrutiny solely on the basis of sensitive characteristics.  It is contended that hard 
manifestations of racial profiling are inevitably likely to be classified as being unlawful and 
even harmful.  It is argued that manifestations of hard racial profiling are unlawful as they 
depart from the fundamental principle of the rule of law which advocates that “law 
enforcement determinations should be based on individual conduct, not on membership in 
an ethnic, racial, national or religious group.”39  Nevertheless, we will return to assess the 
lawfulness of this manifestation of racial profiling during the next section. 
 
Secondly, there is also an alternative way to define racial profiling where race/ethnicity, or 
as we refer to sensitive characteristics, are used in combination with other non-sensitive 
characteristics in the construction of profiles.  This is commonly referred to in the literature 
as being “soft definitions of racial profiling”.40  This form of racial profiling can occur 
whenever sensitive characteristics are “part of the calculus of suspicion which may include 
other factors such as … behaviour.” 41  
 
The distinction between hard and soft forms of racial profiling can be considered as being 
fundamental to this chapter as it provides a basis to develop a framework to assess the 
justification of including sensitive characteristics in the construction and application of 
terrorist profiles.  Therefore, we need to determine whether the division between hard and 
                                                             
38 I. Fiala, ‘Anything New? The Racial Profiling of Terrorists’ (2003) 16(1) Criminal Justice Studies 53, 54. 
39 Open Society Justice Initiative, Ethnic Profiling in the European Union: Pervasive, Ineffective and 
Discriminatory (Open Justice Institute, 2009), 19. 
40 Fiala (n38), 54. 
41 A. Jones, ‘The Corrective Use of Lawsuit Data in Policing: Reconstructing the Vocabulary of Racial 
Profiling’ (2013) 5 Widener Journal of Law, Economics and Race 1, 7. 
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soft forms of profiling represents a way to justify the inclusion of sensitive characteristics in 
terrorist profiling. It is argued that the justification for including sensitive characteristics in 
the construction and/or application of profiles can be explored by firstly considering whether 
their inclusion may be justified in the context of the philosophical founds of the right to non-
discrimination and secondly the content of the right to non-discrimination as a result of its 
development in international, regional and domestic law. 
 
6.4 The lawfulness of including sensitive characteristics in terrorist profiling 
As noted in the introductory section above, a key part of our assessment of the justification 
of including sensitive characteristics in the construction and/or application of profiles 
involves assessing the lawfulness of including sensitive characteristics.  The framework 
used in this section to analyse the lawfulness of the inclusion of sensitive characteristics in 
the construction and application of terrorist profiling is drawn from international, regional 
and domestic law which focuses substantially on the right to non-discrimination.  It is 
contended that the content of the right to non-discrimination as protected in numerous 
international, regional and domestic laws and legal frameworks provides a basis to explore 
whether the inclusion of sensitive characteristics can be considered justified from the 
perspective of law enforcement officers.   
 
It is important to point out that there are at least two considerations relevant to the 
determination of the justification of including sensitive characteristics in terrorist profiling.  
Firstly, it is necessary to consider whether any manifestation of terrorist profiling may be 
considered as being lawful.  The focus in this section will concentrate on analysing the 
potential lawfulness of including sensitive characteristics in manifestations of terrorist 
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profiling as the basis to determine the justification of including sensitive characteristics in 
terrorist profiling.  Secondly, even if some manifestations may be considered as being lawful 
it will be necessary to consider whether there are further reasons, which may suggest that it 
should be unlawful.  This second issue will be considered towards the end of the chapter. 
 
Although there is a substantial body of international and regional legal instruments and 
norms in addition to a substantial body of academic literature discussing international, 
regional and domestic law, it is argued that the purpose of this section is not to trace the 
origin and development of the right to non-discrimination but rather the aim is to extract the 
content and the scope of the right to non-discrimination that will be capable of assisting us 
in distinguishing between permissible and impermissible distinctions in treatment.  The 
discussion in the previous two sections allows us to draw different distinctions in the 
manifestations of terrorist profiling.  In particular, the discussion in the earlier part of the 
chapter draws upon formal and informal manifestations of terrorist profiling and secondly 
hard and soft manifestations of racial profiling which will be used in this section to explore 
whether these distinctions represent a means to consider the justification of including 
sensitive characteristics in the construction and/or application of terrorist profiles. 
 
The starting point in understanding the content and scope of the right to non-discrimination 
is to consider its foundation in the works of Aristotle who advanced a principle of equality.42  
The central plank of Aristotle’s equality principle was the belief that equals be treated 
equally and those unequal be treated unequally.  A key flaw with Aristotle’s equality 
principle was its failure to define the equals and to determine distinctions in conduct.  As 
                                                             
42 S. Fredman, Discrimination Law (Clarendon Press, 2011), 1-8. 
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Westen contends a principle of equality can only have meaning if it has values to define 
‘individuals’ and the ‘conduct’ capable of being alike so as to be able understand equality.43    
 
However, the contemporary development of the principle of equality originates in the works 
of Hobbes44 and Locke45 who suggest that those in ownership of property acquired the same 
“natural rights” so that they are “equal and independent”.46 In a similar vein, Kant suggests 
that due to our individual humanity we are all equal with equality stemming from our general 
humanity.47  Rawls48 and Dworkin49 have made more recent contributions to the concept of 
equality.  According to Rawls  
“[e]ach person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of 
equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.”50   
 
This contention suggests that equality is derived from the premise of “equal liberty” and any 
interference with this premise can only be justified if the advantage to be achieved through 
interference serves the interests of everyone in society.51  Additionally, according to 
Dworkin the foundation of society requires that all individuals have an innate right to be 
treated equally which requires governments to respect this right through the development 
and establishment of principles and laws.52  The connection between equality and the state 
                                                             
43 P. Westen, ‘The Empty Idea of Equality’ (1982) 95 Harvard Law Review 537, 547-548. 
44 T. Hobbes, Leviathan (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2011), 75-78. 
45 J. Locke, Two Treaties of Government (Book Jungle 2009).  
46 ibid, 88. 
47 I. Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice: Part 1 of the Metaphysical of Morals (Bobbs-Merrill, 
1965). 
48 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, 1999). 
49 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, 1977). 
50 Rawls (n48), 266. 
51 D. Moeckli, Human Rights and Non-Discrimination in the War on Terror (Oxford University Press, 2008), 
60. 
52 ibid, 61. 
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made by Dworkin suggests that the state can only derive its legitimacy through the 
development of principles and laws protecting equality.53 
 
This discussion reveals that there are a number of philosophical foundations supporting a 
right to equality and freedom from discrimination that extends beyond the concept of 
equality formulated in laws and legal standards.  It may be argued that manifestations of 
formal terrorist profiling and soft manifestations of racial profiling may be considered 
compatible with these philosophical debates on the scope of the principle of equality as no 
individual is selected for a distinction in treatment solely on the basis of any one criteria 
used in the construction and/or application of terrorist profiles.  However, informal terrorist 
profiling and hard manifestations of racial profiling may conflict or at least create 
considerable tension with these philosophical foundations of the principle of equality, as 
there is a risk that law enforcement officers select individuals for enhanced levels of scrutiny 
without any justification other than portraying a particular characteristic. 
 
Beyond the philosophical debate, international, regional and domestic courts have 
developed the content of the right to non-discrimination by distinguishing between conduct 
that is permissible and impermissible.  The starting point in our analysis and discussion can 
be to consider the definition of discrimination so as to begin to identify the boundary 
between permissible and impermissible conduct in the context of manifestations of soft 
racial profiling.  There are three key standards that we can draw on here for assistance in the 
defining the boundary of the right to non-discrimination. 




Firstly, Article 1(3) of the United Nations (UN) Charter states that all states aim  
“to achieve international co-operation in … promoting and encouraging 
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.”54   
 
The importance of protecting equality and non-discrimination is also expressly stated in the 
Preamble and Articles 13(1)(b), 55(c) and 76(c) requiring states to abide by “human rights 
and fundamental freedoms without distinction based on race, religion or language.”55   
 
Secondly, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) specifically protects 
equality and non-discrimination in Articles 1, 2(1) and 7.  Article 2(1) of the ICCPR obliges 
member states to  
“ensure that all individuals within its territory enjoy the rights recognised in 
the Covenant without discrimination of any kind including grounds of race, 
…. religion, national or social origin….”56   
Additionally, Article 26 of the ICCPR provides that  
“all people are entitled to the equal protection of the law free from 
discrimination, guaranteeing all people equal and effective protection 
against discrimination on any ground including race, …. religion, … national 
or social origin…”57  
 
Article 1 of CERD defines racial discrimination as being  
                                                             
54 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3930.html [accessed 20 August 2018], Article 1(3). 
55 B. Ganor and A. Conte, ‘Legal and Policy Issues in Establishing a Framework for Human Rights 
Compliance when Countering Terrorism’ [2005] International Policy Institute for Countering Terrorism 1, 
38. 
56 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, United 
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3aa0.html [accessed 21 August 2018], Article 2(1). 
57 ibid, Article 26. 
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“any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race … or 
national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or 
impairing the recognition, enjoyment, exercise on an equal footing of human 
rights ….”58   
Article 2 of CERD also obligates states to refrain from engaging in acts or practices that can 
result in racial discrimination.  Additionally, Article 5 expressly obligates states to “prohibit 
and eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms” and to guarantee citizens equal treatment 
before the law.  Additional measures are found in Article 3 of the “Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees” (Refugee Convention) which ensures that refugees are free from 
discrimination concerning “race, religion or country of origin”.59  Other international laws 
advocating the protection of equality and non-discrimination include the “International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”60 (ICESCR) and the “Convention on 
the Rights of the Child”61 (CRC). 
 
According to the UN Human Rights Committee discrimination in the context of the ICCPR 
can be defined as being  
“any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which is based on any 
ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status and which 
has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment 
or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms.”62  
                                                             
58 UN General Assembly, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, 21 December 1965, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 660, p. 195, available at: 
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59 UN General Assembly, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, United Nations, 
Treaty Series, vol. 189, p. 137, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3be01b964.html [accessed 21 
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60 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 
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62 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 18, Non-discrimination (Thirty-seventh session, 1989), 
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 
U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 26 (1994), para 6. 
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The construction of the right to equality and discrimination in international law is commonly 
characterised in the literature as either “subordinate [or] autonomous provisions.”63  The 
protection from discrimination in subordinate provisions means that individuals are only 
protected from discrimination so far as their enjoyment of the rights is concerned is set out 
in the international law.64  For example, Article 2(1) of the UDHR and Article 2(1) of the 
ICCPR protect against discrimination so far as to the content of these provisions is concerned 
but there is no general right against discrimination.  
 
Alternatively, autonomous provisions provide a general right against discrimination with 
examples being found in Article 26 of the ICCPR and Articles 2 and 5 CERD advancing a 
general protection from discrimination.  The content of the general protection from 
discrimination has been subject to discussion.  For example, according to the Human Rights 
Committee’s General Comment XVIII concerning non-discrimination, opined that a 
difference in treatment would not be considered as being discriminatory “if the criteria for 
such differentiation are reasonable and objective and the aim is to achieve a purpose which 
is legitimate under the Covenant.”65  Additionally, CERD in its General Recommendation 
XIV66 has opined that it will assess the legality of a measure against “the objectives and 
purposes of the Convention”.67 
 
                                                             
63 A. Bayefsky, ‘The Principle of Equality or Non-Discrimination in International Law’ (1990) 11 Human 
Rights Law Journal 1, 3-4. 
64 ibid.  
65 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 18, Non-discrimination (Thirty-seventh session, 1989), 
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 
U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 26 (1994). para 13. 
66 UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation XIV(42), on art. 1, 
para. 1 of the Convention, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 18, U.N. Doc. A/48/18 (1993).  
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Thirdly, these international standards are supported by two ‘soft law’ standards including 
the “UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials” (Code)68 and the “Programme of 
Action” adopted by the “UN World Conference against Racism 2000” (Programme).69  Both 
the Code and the Programme call on states to eliminate discrimination in law enforcement.70  
Other international soft law standards prohibiting discrimination include the “Declaration 
on the Human Rights of Individuals Who are Not Nationals of the Country in which They 
Live”71 and the “UN Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form 
of Detention or Imprisonment”.72  
 
In order to conduct an assessment of the justification for including sensitive characteristics 
in terrorist profiling we must consider the interpretation of these standards.  According to 
Moeckli it is possible to distil the content of the right to non-discrimination into at least five 
key considerations including,  (a) no need for discriminatory intent to be established, (b) the 
need for a comparator, (c) the pursuit of a legitimate aim, (d) the proportionality of the 
measure and (e) the standard of review applicable.73  It is argued that our assessment of the 
justification for including sensitive characteristics in the construction and/or application of 
terrorist profiles involves concentrating on assessing the legitimate aim, the proportionality 
and the standard of review.  It is contended that the other key considerations are not 
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necessarily relevant to assessing the justification question at issue in this chapter.  
Specifically, there is no contention that the inclusion of sensitive characteristics is 
necessarily evidence of a discriminatory intent and it is presumed there is a comparator in 
individual cases. 
(a) Legitimate Aim 
If it can be accepted that the inclusion of sensitive characteristics in the construction and/or 
application of terrorist profiles results in individuals in analogous situations being treated 
differently, then the focus of analysis shifts to objectively assessing whether the difference 
in treatment can be regarded as being in pursuit of a legitimate aim.  In light of some 
academic literature,74 it may be argued that the legitimate aim test has become a redundant 
test, especially in the context of terrorism.  In particular, the nature of the threat of terrorism 
to a state’s national security is likely to easily meet this requirement.75   
 
As a result, it is contended that so long as sensitive characteristics are included to assist in 
managing the threat of terrorism, it is highly likely to be considered in pursuit of a legitimate 
aim. 
(b) The proportionality of the measure 
The assessment of the proportionality of measure, or in our case the inclusion of sensitive 
characteristics in profiles, requires that there must be proportionality between the distinction 
in treatment and the legitimate aim being realised.  The existence of proportionality has been 
                                                             
74Such as: O. Arnadottir, Equality and Non-Discrimination under the European Convention on Human 
Rights (Martinus Nijhoff, 2012), 49-51 and K. Partsch, ‘Discrimination’ in R. Macdonald, F. Matscher and 
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evident in the ECHR in the Belgium Linguistics Case,76 the UK courts in interpreting the 
HRA 199877 and in the jurisprudence of the German Constitutional Court.78  The assessment 
of proportionality commonly involves a three-stage test.   
 
The first consideration involves assessing the suitability of the measure so as to determine 
whether the measure is suitable to achieve the aim of the policy.79 Secondly, the measure 
must be least restrictive measure available to achieve the stated policy so as to be considered 
necessary.80  Thirdly, there is a balancing exercise to be undertaken so as to assess the rights 
and interests of the disadvantaged individual against the broader societal interests in the 
pursuit of the aim so as to be considered proportionate.81  During the third stage, a court may 
be influenced by whether there is a sufficient basis within the measure adopted to protect 
against its abuse or potential.82  This simply means that if the adopted measure is capable of 
protecting against its abuse or potential abuse, then it may be considered as being more 
acceptable from a human rights perspective. 
 
In examining the first assessment, ‘suitability’, Panaccio identifies that there are two 
common ways human rights courts approach this part of this test.83  Firstly, there is a “less 
taxing” assessment where the court checks whether the measure under scrutiny is “causally 
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able to achieve the stated aim”.84  Secondly, there is a “more demanding form” where the 
courts will determine whether the measure at issue is “irrational/unreasonable because it 
generates a disproportionate degree of [harmful] effects”.85 
 
In applying these standards to the assessment of the justification for the inclusion of sensitive 
characteristics, it is necessary to reconsider the analytical distinction drawn between formal 
and informal manifestations and hard and soft manifestations of racial profiling.  
 
In light of the discussion in chapter five on manifestations of informal terrorist profiling, it 
seems highly probable that the inclusion of sensitive characteristics cannot be considered as 
being suitable.  This is due to the fact that the discussion in chapter five demonstrated to a 
high degree of probability these manifestations of terrorist profiling were very unlikely to 
be “causally able to achieve the stated aim” of assisting law enforcement officers with the 
identification, detection and prosecution of terrorists or potential terrorists.  Furthermore, 
the “more demanding” test would also be unlikely to be satisfied given the discussion in 
chapter five on the likely harmful effects arising from the use of this form of profiling.   
 
It would also seem probable that those manifestations of terrorist profiling that move 
towards the informal side of the profiling spectrum, such as those discussed in chapter four 
would not satisfy either of these tests for the very same reasons as those manifestations of 
informal terrorist profiling. 
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In the context of formal manifestations of terrorist profiling and soft manifestations of racial 
profiling, it may be argued from a theoretical perspective that the suitability is something 
that may be asserted.  Specifically, this type of profiling (if properly conducted) may at least 
be considered as being “causally able” to assist law enforcement officers identify those 
individuals likely to be engaged in terrorism and/or preparatory activities in light of the input 
and output assessment in chapter three.   However, if the court applied the “more 
demanding” test then it may be argued that formal manifestations could only be capable of 
satisfying this test if the harmful effects arising from the use of formal terrorist profiling 
could be addressed.   
 
In considering the second part of the test, the least restrictive measure available, it may be 
argued that terrorist profiling forms part of much broader range of counter-terrorism 
initiatives that range in a variety of intrusiveness.  Sweet and Mathews identifies that this 
part of the test common asks whether “there is any alternative measure that is less restrictive 
of rights while being equally effective in attaining the stated” aim or goal of the measure in 
question.86  The inclusion of sensitive characteristics in informal manifestations of terrorist 
profiling (such as those manifestations examined in chapter five) would unlikely be 
considered as being the least restrictive measure given that law enforcement officers could 
easily add other non-sensitive characteristics.  However, the inclusion of sensitive 
characteristics in formal manifestations of terrorist profiling may be considered capable of 
being the least intrusive measure for law enforcement officers to select individuals for 
investigation in contrast to other forms of counterterrorism policing tools and given that 
formal manifestations rely on a mix of sensitive and non-sensitive characteristics. 
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In considering the last part of the test, the balancing exercise between the impact of the 
measure and the aim of the measure, it may be argued there that the manifestations of 
informal terrorist profiling examined in chapter five would not satisfy this part of the test.   
This is due to the concerns presented in chapter five about the impact of manifestations of 
informal terrorist profiling on Muslim communities.  The likely harmful nature of the impact 
of manifestations of informal terrorist profiling may well be considered as outweighing any 
legitimate aim even in the context of a prevailing threat of terrorism.    Furthermore, in light 
of the examination of informal terrorist profiling manifestations in chapter five, it is arguable 
that there are little or no mechanisms to protect against potential abuses of these examples 
of terrorist profiling.  As a result, it seems very unlikely that informal manifestations of 
terrorist profiling would satisfy the test.  
 
In considering manifestations of formal terrorist profiling, such as those examined in chapter 
three, it may be argued that this latter part of the test may be satisfied given these 
manifestations of terrorist profiling have significant systematic processes to construct and 
apply profiles, which are open to review and are capable of being challenged.  Furthermore, 
if these manifestations of terrorist profiling are properly conducted then it may be capable 
of managing the limitations discussed in chapter three.  As a result, this may mean that 
formal terrorist profiling could be considered as having a broader societal interest by 
assisting in counterterrorism over the rights and interests of those disadvantaged individuals 
subjected to profiling so as to satisfy this part of the test. 
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In summary, it may be concluded that the proportionality of including sensitive 
characteristics is something that can only be assessed in each individual manifestation of 
terrorist profiling.  While the assessment here has been primarily concerned with 
manifestations of soft racial profiling, it may be argued that it is impossible to brand soft 
racial profiling as being proportional in every circumstance.  Rather, the conclusion to be 
drawn here is that the assessment of proportionality will require individual assessment in 
each manifestation of profiling in terms of suitability, its necessity to achieve the aim and 
its proportionality in achieving the aim.    
(c) The Standard of Review 
The standard of review commonly adopted by the courts to assess discrimination varies 
according to a number of factors present in each case.  In Handyside87 the ECtHR developed 
the concept of a margin of appreciation, which allows states some latitude in realising the 
obligations established in law and practice.   While the margin of appreciation concept has 
been criticised as being a vague test lacking a practical substance, it may be argued that at 
minimum the application of the right to non-discrimination in common with other rights 
requires an element of flexibility in applying the law in practice.88   The standard of review 
in the context of sensitive characteristics is going to be an enhanced level of review as 
sensitive characteristics are by their very nature classifiable as being suspect grounds of 
discrimination, which require particular justification for any differential in treatment. 
 
It is important to note that the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of race is 
considered a core part of customary international law.  In addition to customary law, 
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international and regional law also prohibit distinctions in treatment on the basis of race.  
For example, the ECtHR has held that “a special importance should be attached to 
discrimination based on race”.89 Similarly, in the US the Supreme Court in Hirabayashi v 
United States90 and Korematsu v United States91 developed its strict scrutiny test for any 
measure capable of creating a distinction in treatment on the grounds of race.  In Ghaidan v 
Godin-Mendoza92 the House of Lords in the UK held that any distinctions in treatment on 
the basis of race “are properly stigmatised as discriminatory” “unless some good reason 
exists”.93 
 
Similarly, any distinction on the grounds of religion is clearly prohibited as part of human 
rights law.  In Hoffmann v Austria94 the ECtHR stated “notwithstanding any possible 
arguments to the contrary, a distinction based essentially in religion alone is not 
acceptable.”95  Similarly, in the UK, the House of Lords in Ghaidan96 stated distinctions in 
treatment on the grounds of religion would not be considered “acceptable, without more, as 
a basis for different legal treatment.”97 
 
Finally, distinctions based on citizenship or country of origin there has been some case law 
to demonstrate a heightened level of review.  For example, in Gaygusuz v Austria98 the 
ECtHR applied a strict review of distinctions based on religion where it stated  
                                                             
89 East African Asians v United Kingdom (1973) 3 EHRR 76, para 207. 
90 320 US 81 (1943). 
91 323 US 214 (1944). 
92 [2004] UKHL 30. 
93 ibid, para 9. 
94 (1993) 17 EHRR 293. 
95 ibid, para 9. 
96 Supra (n92) 
97 ibid, para 9. 
98 (1996) 23 EHRR 364. 
 299 
“very weighted reasons would have to be put forward before the Court could 
regard a difference of treatment based exclusively on the ground of 
nationality as compatible with the Convention”.99 
 
(d) Further Observations 
As a result of this discussion, it is evident that any distinction in treatment on any of the 
suspect grounds, which include sensitive characteristics, will be difficult to justify as it 
attracts a heightened level of review.  For example, in Rosalind Williams Lecraft v Spain100 
the complainant, who was a US born black naturalized Spanish citizen, was subjected to an 
enhanced identity check at a Spanish border as her appearance was not common with the 
appearance more frequently associated with Spanish nationality. An argument advanced by 
the complainant was that she was only subjected to an enhanced identity check because of 
the colour of her skin and her ethnicity which allegedly breached Article 2 of the ICCPR.   
 
Amongst other arguments, the State contended that the subjection of the complainant to an 
enhanced security check did not violate any ICCPR rights on two key grounds. 
 
Firstly, they argued that checking immigration documents was simply a measure adopted to 
deal with illegal immigration across all Spanish borders.101  Furthermore, the State argued 
that its national law, “Organisation Act No 7/1985 on the Rights and Freedoms of 
Foreigners in Spain” placed an explicit obligation on all foreigners to carry appropriate 
identification documents when entering Spain so as to validate their identity.  Other national 
laws including the “Public Security (Organisation) Act” and the “Decree on the National 
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Identity Document” provided Spanish domestic authorities with the power to check identity 
documents.   
 
A key concern of the Spanish authorities was that there were relatively few ethnic minorities 
in Spain being black born and this ethnicity group was a significant source of concern as 
many illegal immigrants have notoriously sought to enter Spain from sub-Saharan Africa.   
Therefore, the State sought to justify the interference with the complainant’s ICCPR rights 
by arguing that the measure adopted was no more than necessary to deal with the problem 
of illegal immigration and that the complainant was only selected so as to rule her out from 
illegal immigrants.  The evidence provided supporting this contention was the fact that the 
complainant had not been subjected to a further enhanced identity check in the fifteen years 
from the commencement of the complaint. 
 
Secondly, the State also argued that the manner in which the enhanced security check was 
carried out was in a “respectful manner and at a time and place where it is normal for people 
to be carrying identity papers.”102  Therefore, the action undertaken by the law enforcement 
officers was no more than necessary to validate the complainant’s identity for lawful 
purposes. 
 
In determining the complaint, the Human Rights Committee held that  
“not every differentiation of treatment will constitute discrimination, if the 
criteria for such differentiation are reasonable and objective and if the aim 
is to achieve a purpose which is legitimate under the Covenant.”103   
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However, in this particular instance as the complainant was not given any information 
concerning the reasons for her enhanced identity check, the Committee concluded that the 
complainant  
“was singled out for the identity check in question solely on the ground of her 
racial characteristics and that these characteristics were the decisive factor 
in her being suspected of unlawful conduct.”104   
 
Consequently, the subjection of the complainant to the enhanced identity check could not be 
considered reasonable or objective. 
 
This case can be classified as being an example of a manifestation of hard racial profiling 
where sensitive characteristics, such as race and ethnicity, were the sole criteria used by the 
state to identify the complainant for an enhanced security check.  Therefore, the inclusion 
of sensitive characteristics in profiling may be justifiable if the state can provide an 
explanation and that explanation is “reasonable and objective”.  In this case the protection 
of the state’s perceived threat from inward bound illegal immigrants at Spanish borders was 
insufficient to be considered reasonable and objective.  It is evident from the Committee’s 
determination that they appeared to be particularly influenced by the inability of the law 
enforcement officers to rely on other non-sensitive characteristics in selecting individuals 
for enhanced scrutiny.  
 
However, it should be noted that the argument advanced in this chapter is not to suggest that 
it is possible to justify the construction and/or application of terrorist profiles solely on the 
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basis of the sensitive characteristics.  Rather, it is argued that the inclusion of sensitive 
characteristics in addition to non-sensitive characteristics may be considered justified so 
long as there is evidence to demonstrate the investigative value of terrorist profiling in the 
context of preventing, detecting or deterring acts of terrorism or preparatory activities.   As 
a result, it is argued that while it is difficult, if not impossible, to justify the inclusion of 
sensitive characteristics as the sole characteristic in the construction and/or application of 
terrorist profiles, it is in theory at least possible to argue that where sensitive characteristics 
may be included alongside or in addition to non-sensitive characteristics, it may be 
justifiable to include sensitive characteristics.  It is argued that manifestations of soft racial 
profiling may be justified so long as care is taken to ensure that a combination of sensitive 
and non-sensitive characteristics are included in the construction and/or application of 
terrorist profiles. 
 
In the context of our assessment of the justification for including sensitive characteristics in 
terrorist profiling, this case reveals two significant points.  Firstly, the justification for 
including sensitive characteristics in the construction and/or application of profiles aimed at 
assisting law enforcement officers identify individuals for enhanced scrutiny necessitates 
that the state must provide an explanation so as to justify the interference with an 
individual’s human rights.  Secondly, the assessment of whether this explanation is 
“reasonable and objective” must be by reference to the content of the affected human rights. 
 
Therefore, the assessment of the justification for including sensitive characteristics 
necessitates reasons for the profiling measure and secondly an assessment of those reasons 
so as to determine whether they can be considered “reasonable and objective” by reference 
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to human rights law.  It is contended that informal manifestations of terrorist profiling and 
hard manifestations of racial profiling can never be justified and are almost always likely to 
be considered as being unlawful and even may be classified as being harmful as individuals 
or groups of individuals are subjected to enhanced levels of scrutiny by law enforcement 
officers without any reasonable justification. It is the reliance on sensitive characteristics as 
being the sole criteria or the risk of being the sole criteria for identifying individuals or 
groups of individuals that makes informal manifestations of terrorist profiling and 
manifestation of hard racial profiling unlawful and arguably harmful.  Furthermore, the 
apparent inability to place sufficient controls against potential abuses of these informal 
manifestations of terrorist profiling further support the argument that these examples of 
terrorist profiling cannot be considered lawful.  Consequently, it is argued that these 
manifestations of terrorist profiling are harmful as they carry an innate potential to alienate 
individuals or groups of individuals from ethnic, racial, national or religious groups that 
become the focal point for law enforcement without any justification other than being part 
of that ethnic, racial, national or religious group. 
 
Furthermore, it can be recalled from the second section above, we identified that some 
academics, including American Civil Liberties Union,105 Ceukkar,106 Harcourt,107 Harris,108 
Moecki109 and Roach110 have characterised the inclusion of any sensitive characteristics as 
posing an unjustifiable risk that particular individuals or groups of individuals exhibiting the 
sensitive characteristics may become subject to official scrutiny and suspicion by law 
                                                             
105 American Civil Liberties Union (n3). 
106 Cuellar (n4). 
107 Harcourt (n5). 
108 Harris (n6). 
109 Moeckli (n8). 
110 Roach (n7). 
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enforcement officers.  It is argued here that the forms of racial profiling referred to by these 
academics may be considered a form of “hard racial profiling”.   
 
Consequently, the use or risk of sensitive characteristics becoming the sole criteria used in 
the construction and application of profiles are unquestionably unjustifiable as this 
manifestation of profiling will always pose an unjustifiable risk that particular individuals 
or groups of individuals betraying the sensitive characteristics will become subject to official 
scrutiny and suspicion by law enforcement officers. 
 
However, a further analytical distinction was drawn in the second and third sections relating 
to formal manifestations of terrorist profiling and manifestations of soft racial profiling.    It 
is contended that these manifestations may be considered as being lawful and therefore 
‘justifiable’ as suspects are not selected for enhanced levels of investigation by law 
enforcement officers solely on the grounds of sensitive characteristics but rather their 
selection is based on a combination of different characteristics.  It can be recalled that in the 
second section above, we identified that some academics such as Armar,111 Banks,112 
Derbyshire,113 Ellmann,114  Kinsley115 and Risee and Zeckhauser116 suggest that the 
inclusion of sensitive characteristics in the profiling process may be justifiable so long as 
they are included with other non-sensitive characteristics and that the sensitive 
                                                             
111 Amrar (n15). 
112 Banks (n16). 
113 Derbyshire (n17). 
114 Ellmann (n18). 
115 Kinsley (n19). 
116 Risse and Zeckhauser (n20). 
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characteristics do not become the sole criteria in identifying and selecting individuals for 
enhanced investigation by law enforcement officers.   
 
Consequently, the inclusion of sensitive characteristics in addition to non-sensitive 
characteristics in formal manifestations of terrorist profiling can be considered justified as 
the risk of the sensitive characteristics becoming the sole criteria is lessened due to the 
reviewability of manifestations of formal terrorist profiling.  This means that manifestations 
of formal terrorist profiling may be considered as being lawful so long as these 
manifestations of terrorist profiling are properly conducted and any interferences with 
human rights are justifiable by reference to human rights standards. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
The primary aim of this chapter was to consider the human rights issues arising from the 
examination of the usefulness of terrorist profiling which could overshadow any conclusion 
previously drawn on the usefulness of terrorist profiling.  This aim was pursued by asking 
whether the inclusion of sensitive characteristics can ever be justified and, if so, in what 
circumstances? The argument advanced in this chapter was that there is no singular answer 
to address these questions but rather it involves considering a sequence of arguments to 
assess the justification question.  
 
This sequence of arguments requires first a legal determination as to whether the inclusion 
of sensitive characteristics can be considered lawful, and then secondly even if lawful, 
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whether there may well be other reasons to suggest it should be unlawful and therefore 
unjustifiable. 
 
In light of the discussion throughout this chapter, it is argued that so long as manifestations 
of formal terrorist profiling and manifestations of soft racial profiling are properly 
conducted, they may be considered lawful.  This contention rests on at least two core 
arguments: 
 
Firstly, the formal and systematic nature of the profiling process in these manifestations of 
terrorist profiling mean it is possible to review, alter and adapt profiling so that the risk of 
relying solely on sensitive characteristics is minimised.   For example, the examination of 
formal manifestations of terrorist profiling in chapter three identified that terrorist profiling 
schemes, such as the German Rasterfahndung scheme, were entirely reviewable and as a 
consequence of this they could be curtailed so as ensure minimum human rights are attained. 
 
Secondly, the sensitive characteristics are included with non-sensitive characteristics to 
reduce the risk of sensitive characteristics becoming the main or sole criteria to identify 
individuals for enhanced levels of review by law enforcement officers.  For example, in 
manifestations of formal terrorist profiling examined in chapter three such as the German 
Rasterfarhndung scheme and the US terrorist profiling at ports relied on a range of data in 
the construction and application of profiles. 
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However, turning to address the second part of the justification question, whether there are 
other reasons to suggest formal terrorist profiling should be unlawful and therefore 
unjustifiable.  This question is essentially a ‘values’ issue and the discussion in chapter three 
questioned whether the cost of the manifestations of formal terrorist profiling is so high that 
it begins to undermine the democratic legitimacy of the state’s authority to govern.  The 
danger posed by these manifestations of terrorist profiling is that they effectively require the 
state to engage in exercises tantamount to mass snooping exercises on its citizens.  The 
requirement of vast arrays of personal data to feed into the construction and/or application 
of formal manifestations of terrorist profiling undermines these examples of profiling.  
Nevertheless, it is argued that manifestations of formal terrorist profiling (if properly 
conducted) remain capable of being considered lawful in contrast to manifestations of 
informal terrorist profiling given the fact that formal terrorist profiling is reviewable and 
controllable. 
 
It may be argued that those informal manifestations of terrorist profiling and manifestations 
of hard racial profiling can never be justifiable on the grounds that these profiling process 
are not subject to review or transparency so as to assess whether these manifestations of 
terrorist profiling can be considered unjustifiably targeting individuals or groups of 
individuals simply on the grounds of exhibiting the selected sensitive characteristic.   
 
Additionally, manifestations of informal terrorist profiling and hard racial profiling carry a 
risk that particular individuals exhibiting the sensitive characteristics become the 
concentration for law enforcement officers in the detection, prevention and prosecution of 
acts of terrorism and preparatory activities.  For example, in manifestations of informal 
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terrorist profiling examined in chapter five, there was considerable evidence to demonstrate 
to a high degree of probability that some uses of the powers to stop and search in addition 
to other discretionary police powers may have been deployed to engage in the racial profiling 
of individuals that belong to Muslim communities.  Furthermore, even if some of the 
evidence examined in chapter five was considered to be examples of police abuse of their 
discretionary powers, then it may serve to demonstrate the inability of the statutory 
frameworks advances these discretionary police powers to protect against the potential 
abuses of these powers. 
 
To sum up, the inclusion of sensitive characteristics in manifestations of formal terrorist 
profiling may in some circumstances be considered lawful and therefore justifiable.  
However, the inclusion of sensitive characteristics in manifestations of informal terrorist 
profiling are likely unlawful and therefore are very likely to be unjustifiable.  
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The research questioned that this thesis attempted to address was: 
 
“to what extent (if at all), and in what ways (if any) terrorist profiling may 
be useful as part of the law enforcement process of identifying individuals 




This primary research question was broken down into three subsidiary research questions: 
 
▪ What is terrorist profiling? 
 
▪ How should the usefulness of terrorist profiling be examined? 
 






In addressing the first question, ‘what is terrorist profiling’ it was argued in chapter one 
that terrorist profiling exists in variety of different manifestations and it is a phenomenon 
that is not properly understood in the literature. As a result, it is best to view terrorist 
profiling as a label that is not synonymous with any one type of profiling. In seeking to 
make an original contribution to knowledge by going beyond previous assessments of 
terrorist profiling, chapters three to five have shown that a full analysis of terrorist profiling 
requires an analytical distinction between different manifestations of terrorist profiling. 
Specifically, chapters three to five analysed terrorist profiling by reference to a profiling 
spectrum ranging from formal to informal manifestations of terrorist profiling. This adds 
to the previous examinations of terrorist profiling given that many of the previous 
examinations focused on the lawfulness and the impact of terrorist profiling without 
attempting to understand what is terrorist profiling by separately analysing the 
construction and application of terrorist profiles. 
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In chapter three, it was shown that manifestations of formal terrorist profiling were those 
that exhibited at least three common features including a systematic and official use of a 
profiling method/approach to construct/apply profiles, the application of profiles by law 
enforcement officers and an ability to review the operation and practice of formal terrorist 
profiling. This chapter examined various manifestations of formal terrorist profiling that 
adopt a highly systematic and formalised process to construct and apply profiles which 





In chapter four, it was shown that a further manifestation of terrorist profiling existed that 
moved towards the informal end of the profiling spectrum, which is accurately called 
behavioural terrorist profiling. The discussion in this chapter showed that the 
manifestations of behavioural terrorist profiling in Israel and the US used a greater degree 
of a formalised and systematic process than in comparison to other more informal 




In chapter five, it was show to a high degree of probability a further manifestation of 
terrorist profiling exists that is accurately classified as being informal terrorist profiling. 
This type of profiling is classified as being ‘informal’ when two criteria are met. Firstly, 
no formal acknowledgement is made by the state that some sort of profiling is being/may 
be used. Indeed, it is common for the state to refuse to recognise or acknowledge the use 
of profiling in the use of police powers. These police powers appear as part of their 
available apparatus of tools and mechanisms to assist in detecting, deterring and 
preventing acts of terrorism or associated preparatory activities.  Secondly, manifestations 
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of informal profiling do not exhibit the same level of a systematic process, approach or 
structure in contrast with manifestations of formal terrorist profiling such as those 




As a result of these analytical distinctions, it is contended that any analysis of terrorist 
profiling should be undertaken by reference to the profiling spectrum that ranges from 
formal to informal manifestations. It is contended that this spectrum provides the basis to 
conduct a systematic examination of terrorist profiling. It is acknowledged that at various 
points throughout this thesis it has not always been possible to conclusively prove the 
manifestations of terrorist profiling examined. However, it is contended that this thesis 
does advance an analytical framework to understand and examine phenomenon of terrorist 
profiling that can be used in future research to further test its scope. This analytical 
approach is not undertaken in existing literature and therefore the profiling spectrum 
provides the basis to move the debate on terrorist profiling further than previous attempts, 




In addressing the second research question, ‘how should the usefulness of terrorist profiling 
be examined’, chapter two established an analytical lens that relied upon general profiling 
methods and approaches as the basis to critique the various manifestations of terrorist 
profiling examined in chapters three to five. This approach represents an original 
contribution of knowledge by using criminal profiling methodologies as the basis to 
critique manifestations of terrorist profiling. The discussion in chapter two made a 
distinction between deductive and inductive profiling so as to analyse the usefulness and 
potential  usefulness  of  the  different  manifestations  of  terrorist  profiling  examined  in 
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chapters three to five. A core argument advanced in chapter two was that only inductive 
profiling approaches are likely to be capable of assisting law enforcement officers predict 
likely terrorist characteristics. This was on the basis that deductive profiling 
methods/approaches tended to only work in the context of pathological crimes where 
suspects left clues in the form of crime scene evidence that could be interpreted by 
profilers. Inductive profiling methods/approaches attempted to predict future likely 
characteristics on the basis of scientific methods/approaches based on an array of different 
datasets. This inductive/deductive analytical lens provides the basis to identify, explain 
and evaluate each manifestation of terrorist profiling.  Therefore, this approach represents 
a further contribution to knowledge by extending the reach of criminal profiling 




Chapter one established an effectiveness framework so as to address the third research 
question, ‘can terrorist profiling ever be considered a useful counterterrorism tool’. This 
effectiveness framework adopted a three-tiered evaluative approach by examining the 
input, output and impact of each manifestation of terrorism profiling. This allowed a full 
analysis of each constitute part of terrorist profiling from the construction through to the 
application of terrorist profiling. An input assessment provided the basis to conduct a 
detailed examination of the construction of terrorist profiles by analysing the likely 
usefulness of each manifestation of terrorist profiling identified. The output assessment 
provided the basis to examine the application of terrorist profiles by law enforcement 
officers in the field separately from the construction of terrorist profiles. This allowed for 
an evaluation of each of the various manifestations of terrorist profiling so as to determine 
whether they could be capable of achieving the aim of assisting law enforcement officers 
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identify those likely to be engaged in terrorism or its preparatory activities. These first two 
assessments, the input and output assessments, essentially conducted a utilitarian 
assessment of terrorist profiling. However, the effectiveness framework also conducted an 
impact assessment of each manifestation of terrorist profiling examined. The impact 
assessment went beyond the utilitarian assessment by asking whether the impact or likely 
impact of terrorist profiling compromises the very legitimacy of the state’s moral authority 




This three tiered framework represents a further contribution to knowledge as it provides a 
new basis to evaluate different manifestations of terrorist profiling so as to determine 
whether they can be considered as being capable of assisting law enforcement officers 
identify those likely to be engaged in terrorism or its preparatory activities. It can be 
considered a new approach as in many of the previous attempts at analysing terrorist 
profiling, the focus is firmly placed on the lawfulness and/or the impact of terrorist 
profiling which fails to engage in an in-depth analysis of the phenomenon of terrorist 
profiling. It is contended that an input, output and impact assessments provide a basis to 
help understand whether, if at all, terrorist profiling might be capable of helping law 




In chapter three, it was argued that manifestations of formal terrorist profiling (if properly 
conducted) may be considered as being capable of assisting law enforcement officers 
identify those likely to be involved in terrorism by conducting an input and output 
assessment of various manifestations of terrorist profiling. This argument rested on the 
contention that a thorough and systematic process used to construct terrorist profiles 
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allows for a careful examination of the types of data needed to constructed profiles. 
Furthermore, an assessment of the application of these profiles provided the basis to 
review the operation of formal terrorist profiles in the field so as to ensure they are 




However, in going beyond the input and out assessment of terrorist profiling, chapter three 
questioned the impact of formal manifestations of terrorist profiling by querying whether 
the cost associated with these manifestations of terrorist profiling can be considered as 
outweighing its capabilities in practice. This was an important assessment given that some 
manifestations of formal terrorist profiling (if properly conducted) may be considered as 
being capable of assisting law enforcement officers manage the threat of terrorism. The 
sheer quantities of personal information required for this type of profiling was a 
concerning consideration that cast a shadow over whether the state should be involved in 
profiling exercises that may be considered tantamount to mass snooping on its citizens. 
These profiling practices may well serve to erode the democratic legitimacy of the state’s 
moral authority to govern its citizens. Nevertheless, manifestations of formal terrorist 
profiling were at minimum reviewable and could be considered as being capable of 
accommodating human rights within counterterrorism policy. Furthermore, it is argued 
that although there are limitations with manifestations of formal terrorist profiling, they are 
significantly more acceptable than manifestations of informal terrorist profiling examined 
in chapter five. 
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The discussion in chapter four examined behavioural terrorist profiling which was 
classified as being a manifestation of terrorist profiling that moved towards the informal 
end of the profiling spectrum. The separate analysis of the input and output assessment 
here allowed for the discussion to identify that this type of profiling was distinguishable 
from formal manifestations and were unlikely to be considered as being capable of assisting 




The discussion of informal manifestations of terrorist profiling in chapter five concluded 
that it was highly unlikely that these manifestations could assist law enforcement officers 
identify those likely to be involved in terrorism given the weaknesses that surrounded the 




Chapters four and five questioned the impact of manifestations of informal terrorist 
profiling. This discussion found that manifestations of informal terrorist profiling carry a 
very high risk of alienating ethnic minority communities from the state which carries a 
high cost that undermines the legitimacy of the state to govern. As a result, it was 
contended that even if these manifestations of informal terrorist profiling were capable of 
been classified as being input and output effective, the impact or likely impact of them is 
so significant that it is capable of compromising the state’s ability to manage the threat of 
terrorism through counterterrorism policies. Therefore, informal manifestations of terrorist 
profiling are not only unlikely to able to identify those likely to be engaged in terrorism, 




A further important consideration was the determination of the justification of including 
sensitive characteristics in terrorist profiling which was conducted in chapter six. The 
argument advanced in chapter six was there is no single way to address this question. 
However, in chapter six the justification issue was addressed by reference to firstly 
considering whether the inclusion of sensitive characteristics could be considered lawful 
and secondly even if lawful whether there were any other reasons which suggest terrorist 




The discussion in chapter six concluded that manifestations of formal terrorist profiling 
were capable of being considered lawful. This argument came with the caveat that these 
manifestations needed to be properly conducted by having a demonstrable input and output 
effectiveness. However, beyond a strict legal assessment by considering whether there 
were other reasons affecting the justification question, it was also identified in chapter six 
that there was a need for any manifestation of formal terrorist profiling to deal with the 
limitations of its impact in society so as to ensure the state’s moral authority and societal 
values were not eroded by this form of terrorist profiling. The discussion in chapter six 
also concluded that manifestations of informal terrorist profiling were unlikely to be 
considered lawful and given the likely harmful effects of this form of profiling, it could 




To return to the overall research question, it is argued that formal manifestations of formal 
terrorist profiling are at least capable of being considered capable of assisting law 
enforcement officers as part of the law enforcement process of identifying individuals 
engaged in acts of terrorism and/or associated preparatory activities.  However, it is noted 
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that formal manifestations of terrorist profiling come with limitations which could 
compromise its ability to assist law enforcement officers concerning its impact. 
Nevertheless, in contrast to manifestations of informal terrorist profiling, it is argued that 
formal terrorist profiling may be considered as being more acceptable. It is argued that 
manifestations of informal terrorist profiling are very unlikely to be ever considered 
capable of assisting law enforcement officers identify individuals engaged in acts of 









Formal terrorist profiling, if properly conducted by having a demonstrable input and 
output effectiveness, may be capable of assisting law enforcement officers identify those 
likely to be involved in terrorism or its preparatory activities. However, even if these 
manifestations of terrorist profiling may be considered capable and lawful, there is a 
further question as to whether the cost of this form of profiling is outweighed by its 




Informal terrorist profiling (in all forms) are not only likely to be unlawful and 
unacceptable but they are very likely to be harmful by alienating ethnic minority 




It is acknowledged that the conclusions drawn throughout this thesis are sometimes tentative 
which is part due to available evidence or context. For example, the assessment of 
lawfulness in chapter six involved a complexity of factual matrixes that required a 
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balance between the interference with rights and a rigorous terrorist profiling scheme. 
However, despite these limitations, it is contended that the thesis has managed to develop a 
methodology capable of assessing terrorist profiling in all of its manifestations. Namely, 
the use of criminal profiling methods/approaches to evaluate terrorist profiling, the three- 
tiered evaluative approach and the development of the profiling spectrum. This analytical 
framework provides the basis to evaluate and test other manifestations of terrorist profiling 




In final conclusion, it is hoped that the discussion in this thesis moves the debate on 
terrorist profiling further than previous attempts to examine it. At minimum, this thesis 
provides the basis to think about terrorist profiling before dismissing it by being able to 
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